

PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT DEFENSE POLICY

2003

The Ministry of National Defense
The Republic of Korea

www.mnd.go.kr

This English version of *Participatory Government Defense Policy 2003* has been translated by the Translating Team of the Department of English, Korea Military Academy (KMA) on behalf of the ROK Ministry of National Defense. For comments or questions, please contact KMA English Department or MND General Policy Division at:

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Message from the Minister of National Defense



Embracing the nation's aspiration and historical call for reform and change, the "Participatory Government" has begun its voyage full of hope. The longing for a new order and values is already pervasive in many walks of Korean society.

In particular, the new government, which has presented a vision of "peace and prosperity," is rallying the nation's wisdom and energy on realizing the two goals of "establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula" and "building a Northeast Asian hub."

Meanwhile, recent events around the world have betrayed humanity's hopes that the 21st century would usher in a new era of stable co-existence and co-prosperity. Instead, as witnessed in the 9·11 terrorist incidents and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the vicious and incessant cycle of conflict is still characterizing the international political scene.

In Northeast Asia, despite the rise in economic interdependence within the region, potential sources of conflict surrounding territorial, resources, environmental and economic issues remain unresolved. The resulting competition by the countries of the region to expand their influence and interests as well as pursue a military buildup is rendering the security environment uncertain.

On the Korean Peninsula, in spite of the progress in inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation, North Korea's military threat remains very real. In particular, North Korea has yet to abandon its nuclear ambitions despite the efforts by our government and the international community to find a peaceful resolution to the problem. Hence, the likelihood of the tension arising from the nuclear issue still exists.

From the standpoint of national security, it cannot be denied that the environment we face at home and abroad is fraught with considerable instability and uncertainty.

Under these circumstances, the Republic of Korea (ROK) Armed Forces which is responsible for the national security is fully appreciative of the need to strengthen its ability to meet and overcome today's challenges as well as furnish itself with a self-defense capability that upholds the nation's interests and prosperity in the uncertain security environment of the future.

Accordingly, the ROK Armed Forces has designated the "Realization of an Advanced, Self-Reliant National Defense" as its defense policy objective in order to support the government's drive toward "peace and prosperity" and "establishing a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula." The Armed Forces is channeling its efforts to consistently pursue its defense policy.

While maintaining a firm defense posture to respond to any threat, the ROK Armed Forces will build a forward-looking defense capability and posture that is self-reliant in its ability to deal with the changes in the strategic environment and future mode of warfare. It

will also undertake sustained defense reforms that heighten organizational efficiency and enhance its orientation toward the future, both of which will support its objective of realizing a self-reliant and advanced defense. Moreover, it will be unsparing in its efforts to dramatically improve the barracks and the welfare of service members, while striving to become an “Armed Forces of the People” that wins the heart and support of the general population, mindful that the people are the source from which defense is derived.

This year’s “Participatory Government Defense Policy,” which illustrates the policy direction and the blueprint for reforms that the Armed Forces is planning to pursue, has been published to deepen public understanding and support.

To further enhance the reader’s understanding and offer assistance in security-related research, a wide range of defense-related data have been compiled into the Appendices. With the sincere hope that this book will be useful in furthering public understanding of, and consensus on our defense policy, I cordially ask for your continued support and interest.

July 11, 2003

A handwritten signature in black ink, consisting of stylized Korean characters, likely representing the name Cho Yung-kil.

Cho, Yung-kil
Minister of National Defense
Republic of Korea

Part One Assessment of Security Situation

Chapter One Global and Northeast Asia Security Situation 21

 A. Global Security Situation 21

 B. Security Situation in Northeast Asia 22

Chapter Two Security Situation and Military Threat of North Korea 25

 A. North Korean Security Situation 25

 B. North Korean Military Threat 26

Part Two Participatory Government's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" and Defense Policy

Chapter One Participatory Government's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity"
..... 31

 A. Background and Significance of "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" 31

 B. "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" and Self-Reliant Defense 32

 C. Policy Goals to Realize "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" 34

Chapter Two Goals and Direction of Defense Policy 36

 A. Goals and Key Points of Defense Policy 36

 B. Direction of Defense Policy 37

Part Three Establishment of a Firm Defense Posture

Chapter One Military Preparedness of the ROK Armed Forces 47

 A. Preparedness against Infiltration and Local Provocation 47

 B. Strengthening ROK-US Combined Crisis Management System 49

 C. Readiness Posture for All-Out War 50

Chapter Two Operations of ROK Armed Forces	51
A. Army	51
B. Navy	52
C. Air Force	53
D. Reserve Forces	55
Chapter Three Operations of USFK and Augmentation Forces	56
A. United States Forces in Korea	56
B. Augmentation Forces	57
Chapter Four Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises	59
A. Combined and Joint Training and Exercises	59
B. Major Training of the Three Services	62
C. Strengthening the Moral Education of Service Members	67

Part Four Building a Future-Oriented Defense Capability

Chapter One Improving Force Structure	71
A. Changes in Battle Field Environment	71
B. Military Structure Improvement	72
C. Pursuit of Force Improvements	73
Chapter Two Pursuing Defense Digitization	75
A. Changes in Defense Digitization Environment	75
B. Pursuit of Defense Digitization and Its Goals	75
C. Building Integrated Defense Digitization System	76
D. Building Support System for Battle Focused Training	79
E. Strengthening Digitization Education of Service Members	80

Chapter Three Advancing the ROK-US Alliance	81
A. Developments in the Roles and Characteristics of ROK-US Alliance	81
B. Progressive Adjustment of USFK Base Structure	82
C. ROK-US Combined Forces Modernization	83
Chapter Four Promoting Foreign Military Exchanges and Cooperation	86
A. Military Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries	86
B. Participation in International Peace-Keeping Operations	91
C. International Arms Control and Multilateral Security Cooperation Activities ...	98
D. War against Terror and the Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces	101
Chapter Five Reducing Tension and Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula	109
A. Efforts to Build Military Confidence between the Two Koreas	109
B. Efforts to Peacefully Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue	111
C. Military Support for Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation	113
Part Five Continuous Reform of the Defense System	
Chapter One Reforming Personnel Management	119
A. Management of Elite Defense Manpower	119
B. Fair Personnel Management	120
Chapter Two Restructuring Defense Organization	123
A. Background and Implications	123
B. Directions of Organizational Restructuring	123

Chapter Three Improving Military Service and Reserve Forces System ...	125
A. Reduction of Military Service Period	125
B. Improvement of Military Manpower Administration	126
C. Improvement of Reserve Forces System	129
Chapter Four Reforming Military Judicial System	131
A. Background and Progress	131
B. Key Contents of the Reform	132
Chapter Five Enhancing the Efficiency of Defense Build-up	134
A. Direction of Defense Acquisition and Development	134
B. Applying “Open Decision Making System” to Force Improvement Program ...	135
C. Policy Improvement of R&D and Defense Industry	137
D. Efficient and Economical Pursuit of Defense Acquisition and Development Programs	138

Part Six Improving Service Members' Welfare and Barrack Environment

Chapter One Improving Service Members' Welfare	143
Chapter Two Fostering a Desirable Military Culture	146
A. Background	146
B. Prospective Directions	146
Chapter Three Promotion of Welfare for Veterans	148

Part Seven Defense Budget

Chapter One FY 2003 Defense Budget 153

Chapter Two Defense Budget Allocation Trend and Status of Defense Management 155

 A. Defense Budget Allocation Trend 155

 B. Status of Defense Management 156

Chapter Three Need for Appropriate Defense Budget 160

 A. Preparation for Current and Future Non-Specific Threats 161

 B. Preparation for Progressive Readjustment of ROK-US Alliance 161

 C. Securing Defense Capability that Corresponds with National Power 162

 D. Defense Budget and National Development 163

Chapter Four Requirement for Advanced Self-Reliant Defense 165

Part Eight Realizing the National Defense with the People

Chapter One Public Benefits Enhancement and Protection of Rights171

 A. Enhancing Military's Environment Preservation Activities171

 B. Management of Military Facilities and the Protection of Individual Property Rights173

 C. Activities of Military Support for the Public177

Chapter Two Realizing Open Defense Administration	182
A. Satisfying the People's Right to Know	182
B. Participation of Civilian Experts in Development of National Defense Policy	189
C. The Korean War and the 50 th Anniversary Commemoration Project	191

Appendices

Appendix 1 Status of Global Conflicts in 2002	199
Appendix 2 Comparison of South and North Korean Military Capabilities	200
Appendix 3 North Korea's Missile Development and Capabilitiy	201
Appendix 4 Combined / Joint Training and Exercises	202
Appendix 5 Chronology of ROK-US Military Affairs	204
Appendix 6 Chronology of Major Foreign Military Exchange and Cooperation	210
Appendix 7 Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the PKO	214
Appendix 8 Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the Iraq War	216
Appendix 9 Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Current Number of Military Personnel	218
Appendix 10 Force Integration Project of Major Military Equipment in 2003	219
Appendix 11 Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements	220
Appendix 12 Status of Investment in Defense Research & Development	221
Appendix 13 Status of Career Guidance Training before Retirement in 2002	222
Appendix 14 Status of Retirees Re-employment in 2002	223
Appendix 15 Composition of MND Budget by FY	224
Appendix 16 Defense Budget of Select Powers	225

Figures

[Figure 2-1] Direction and Goals of the Participatory Government	34
[Figure 2-2] Goals and Key Points of National Defense Policy of the Participatory Government	36
[Figure 2-3] Main Reform Initiatives for National Defense	41
[Figure 3-1] Organization of the ROK Army	51
[Figure 3-2] Organization of the ROK Navy	53
[Figure 3-3] Organization of the ROK Air Force	54
[Figure 3-4] Command Structure of the Reserve Forces	55
[Figure 3-5] Organization of USFK	56
[Figure 4-1] Diagram of National Defense Integrated Information System	76
[Figure 4-2] Organization of the Evergreen Unit	93
[Figure 5-1] Overview of the Defense Acquisition and Development System	134
[Figure 5-2] Three Main Policy Directions for Defense Acquisition and Development	135
[Figure 7-1] Allocation of FY 2003 Defense Budget by Function	153
[Figure 7-2] Proportion of Defense Outlays to GDP and Government Outlays	155
[Figure 7-3] Change in Proportion of Force Investment to Defense Budget	158
[Figure 7-4] Reduction and Delay of Key FIPs	159
[Figure 8-1] Process of information disclosure	183

Tables

[Table 3-1] Army Manpower/Equipment	51
[Table 3-2] Navy Manpower/Equipment	53
[Table 3-3] Air Force Manpower/Equipment	54
[Table 4-1] Military Exchanges with Neighboring Countries	90
[Table 4-2] PKO Participation Status of the ROK	92
[Table 5-1] Reduced Service Period According to Enlistment Dates	125
[Table 5-2] Number of Recruits Choosing Enlistment Dates	127
[Table 5-3] Disclosure of Personal Military Service Information	128
[Table 5-4] Improvements in the Reserve Forces Training	129
[Table 5-5] Improvements in the Decision-Making System	136
[Table 5-6] FIP Budget Allocation in 2003	139
[Table 5-7] Major FIPs in 2003	139
[Table 7-1] Defense Budget in FY 2003 in comparison to FY 2002	153
[Table 7-2] Defense Outlay of other Countries (FY 2001)	163
[Table 8-1] Military Owned Basic Environmental Facilities/Plan	171
[Table 8-2] Military Employed MOS Personnel/Plan	172
[Table 8-3] Relocation of Military Facilities Unit	173
[Table 8-4] Settlement of Private Land Cases	173
[Table 8-5] Cancellation and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas	177
[Table 8-6] Farmland Support in 2002	178
[Table 8-7] Support for the Public during the Last 5 Years	179
[Table 8-8] Statistics of Support for the Public during the Last 5 Years	179
[Table 8-9] The Current Status on Information Disclosure	184
[Table 8-10] Civil Petition Information	184
[Table 8-11] Methods of Civil Petition at MND	186
[Table 8-12] Teenager Organizations National Defense Camping Support Result	188

Abbreviation


ACMI	Air Combat Maneuvering Instrumentation
ADD	Agency for Defense Development
AG	Australia Group
AOE	Fast Combat Support Ship
ARF	Asean Regional Forum
ARS	Audio Response System
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ATACMS	Army Tactical Missile System
ATM	Asynchronous Transfer Mode
AWACS	Airborne Warning and Control System
BCTP	Battle Command Training Program
BIDS	Biological Integrated Detection System
BPR	Business Process Reengineering
BWC	Biological Weapons Convention
C4ISR	Command, Control, Communication, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
CALS	Continuous Acquisition and Life-cycle Support
CBMs	Confidence Building Measures
CBT	Computer Based Training
CCW	Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons
CD	Conference on Disarmament
CDIP	Combined Defense Improvement Project
CERT	Computer Emergency Response Team
CFA	Combined Field Army
CFC	ROK/US Combined Forces Command
CIO	Chief Information Officer
COCOM	Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Control
CPAS	Command Post Automation System
CPX	Command Post Exercise
CRC	Control and Reporting Center
CRAC	Combined Rear Area Coordinator
CSCAP	Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Region
CT	Computer Tomography
CTBT	Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention

DD	Destroyer
DMZ	Demilitarized zone
DPAMIS	Defense Procurement Agency Management Information System
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operation
EC	Electronic Commerce
EDI	Electronic Data Interchange
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
ERW	Explosive Remnants of War
EU	European Union
FDO	Flexible Deterrence Option
FF	Frigate
FMP	Force Module Package
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
FTX	Field Training Exercise
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMO	Genetically Modified Organism
GOP	General Outpost
HEU	High Explosive Uranium
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICAO	International Civil Aviation Organization
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ISG-CBMs	Intersessional Support Group on Confidence Building Measures
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battle
IT	Information Technology
IW	Information Warfare
JSA	Joint Security Area
KADIZ	Korean Air Defense Identification Zone
KCTC	Korea Combat Training Center
KDX	Korean Destroyer Experimental
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
KIDA	Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
KNTDS	Korean Naval Tactical Data System
LAN	Local Area Network
LNWFZ-NEA	Limited Nuclear Weapons Free Zone for Northeast Asia
LPE	Long Range Precision Engagement
LPP	Land Partnership Plan
LST	Landing Ship Tank

Abbreviation

MCM	Military Committee Meeting
MCRC	Master Control and Reporting Center
MD	Missile Defense
MDL	Military Demarcation Line
MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MLRS	Multiple-Launch Rocket System
MND	Ministry of National Defense
MOG	Military Observer Group
MOOTW	Military Operations Other Than War
MRI	Magnetic Resonance Imaging
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NATO	North-Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEACD	North-East Asia Cooperation Dialogue
NEASED	North-East Asia Security Dialogue
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NLL	Northern Limit Line
NPT	Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSC	National Security Council
NVG	Night Vision Goggle
OAU	Organization for African Unity
OCI	Olympic Council of Asia
OEF	Operation of Enduring Freedom
OPCW	The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PCC	Patrol Combat Corvette
PDA	Personal Digital Assistant
PGMs	Precision Guided Munitions
PKF	Peace-Keeping Forces
PKO	Peace-Keeping Operations
PPBEES	Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, Evaluation System
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific Exercise
RMA	Revolution in Military Affairs
RDL	Rapid Deployment Level
RTDS	Real Time Display System
SCC	Security Cooperation Committee
SCM	Security Consultative Meeting
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSM	Submarine Midget

START-I,II,III	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty-I,II,III
TACC	Theater Air Control Center
TCOG	Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group
TPFDD	Time Phased Forces Deployment Data
TF	Task Force
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
UDT	Underwater Demolition Team
UFL	Ulchi-Focus Lens
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India & Pakistan
UNOMIG	United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WAN	Wide Area Network
WEN	Western European Union
WHNS	Wartime Host Nation Support
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WRSA	War Reserve Stocks For Allies
WTO	World Trade Organization
ZC	Zangger Committee



Part One

Assessment of

Security Situation

Chapter One
Global and Northeast Asia Security Situation

Chapter Two
Security Situation and Military Threat of
North Korea

Chapter One

Global and Northeast Asia Security Situation

A. Global Security Situation

Despite hopes for co-existence and co-prosperity in the post-Cold War era, recent world events have shown that the vicious cycle of endless conflict is still in motion as witnessed by the 9 · 11 terrorist incidents and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. While the world has seen international cooperation and competition coexist in the US-led reconfiguration of the world order, uncertainty and instability still persist due to the changes in regional dynamics.

Also, while the concept of security has expanded from its traditional military-oriented notion to the concept of “comprehensive security” that encompasses economic, diplomatic and social issues, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as the turbulent situation in the Middle East and the Chechen region have demonstrated how military force is still the main tool in protecting national interests.

Furthermore, the various seeds of conflict that lay dormant during the Cold War (i.e. territorial, religious, resource, and ethnic disputes) have emerged to increase the possibility of local conflicts. The rapid advances in globalization coupled with the deepening of interdependence have diversified transnational or non-military threats such as terror, environmental pollution, natural disaster, piracy, and illegal refugees. Recently, new forms of diseases, namely Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), have also emerged as new forms of threats. A serious threat to international peace and security also comes from those states that are developing and producing weapons of mass destruction (WMD).

The US-led war on Iraq that began on March 20, 2003, albeit in the face of opposition by the UN and global anti-war/anti-US sentiment, was the first case in which “pre-emptive action” was employed to eliminate the WMD capabilities of a rogue state. Such action not only reaffirmed the superiority of US military power but also provided the momentum to more firmly secure the uni-multipolar system led by the United States.

With the overwhelming victory in Iraq, the United States is expected to foster the spread of American democracy in the political field, and control the Middle East and global order through the stable supply of crude oil in the economic field. At the same time, the United States is anticipated to bolster policies on counter-terrorism and WMD non-proliferation toward those states that support terror or develop/produce WMDs.

Despite its wide range of activities in arms reduction, conflict intervention, conflict mediation and other peacekeeping activities, the United Nations has suffered a severe blow in stature as a result of independent action by the United States in disarming Iraq, and there is rising concern that its role will continue to diminish.

Meanwhile, with the pioneering developments in science and technology, the paradigm of war is drastically changing. As recently witnessed during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, future warfare is being transformed to focus less on territorial acquisition and mass destruction through heavily numbered troops and conventional weapons and more on information paralysis and center of gravity strikes through sophisticated weaponry such as precision guided munitions (PGM). As a result, states are working to develop a high-tech military based on information and technology, which will determine the winners and losers on the future battlefield.

B. Security Situation in Northeast Asia

Despite the rise in economic interdependence within the Northeast Asian region, which has emerged as one of the strategically important pillars of the world, the security environment continues to remain in a state of flux as a

result of diverse sources of potential disputes, conflict of interests and competition for influence among countries.

Some of the diverse sources of potential disputes in Northeast Asia that fuel instability include territorial disputes such as the Kuril Islands dispute between Russia and Japan, the Senkaku Islands dispute between Japan and China, the issue of boundary demarcation as a result of the new 200-nautical-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), environmental pollution, Taiwan, and Missile Defense (MD). On the Korean Peninsula, in particular, despite efforts to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, the possibility of a rise in tension remains real.

The United States, continuously playing the role of stabilizer and balancer in Northeast Asia, is focusing on the establishment of MD and the strengthening of its information, air and space capabilities so as to maintain its military supremacy. The US is also maintaining the strategy of forward deployment in the region to help keep Northeast Asia and the Pacific Region stable.

At the same time, the United States is recognizing the need to realign its forces stationed overseas and to modify its military strategy as a result of the changing security environment and the enhancement in military capability following its efforts to transform the US military. Accordingly, partial changes and modifications to the US forces in the Asia-Pacific region are expected.

Japan, while still under the umbrella of the US-Japan security alliance, is pursuing an increased military role for its Self Defense Forces as evidenced by the enactment of the Emergency Law in June, 2003. Japan is also seeking to actively pursue security dialogues and exchanges with Northeast Asian countries. In particular, Japan is working to secure an independent information gathering capability, expand its maritime control and operational scope and increase its international role by participating in Iraqi reconstruction and humanitarian assistance.

China, in an effort to build up as well as modernize its forces to a level congruent to its economic strength, is seeking to transform its strategic missile, naval and air power to cope with future warfare. At the same time, China is making every effort to calm the fears of neighboring countries that China is “emerging as a new regional threat.” Furthermore, recognizing that peace and

stability on the Korean Peninsula is crucial to its own economic well-being, China is seeking a peaceful resolution to the North Korea nuclear issue by playing a crucial role as a concerned party and a mediator in the US-led multilateral approach. China's constructive role in facilitating cooperation among the related parties is expected to continue.

Russia is espousing a pragmatic foreign policy based on national interest. Russia is trying to increase its influence through the modernization of its military and the strengthening of its diplomatic capabilities. Russia is maintaining a strategic cooperative relationship with China to counterbalance the US, and is working to strengthen its role on the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue. Also, to regain its prestige as a military superpower, the Russian military is undergoing restructuring, downsizing, and modernizing to make its armed forces more agile, mobile, light, and adept at long-range power projection.

Chapter Two

Security Situation and Military Threat of North Korea

A. North Korean Security Situation

While trying to stir up the people's loyalty to Kim Jong-il, the Chairman of the National Defense Committee (NDC), the North Korean government is tightening its military grip over the country based on its “Military First Policy.” Emphasizing “military-civilian unity,” it is encouraging the people to arm themselves with the “revolutionary military spirit.” With the recent deterioration of relations with the United States, North Korea is trying to keep the country under tight control by maintaining a state of continued tension within the country by such means as staging nationwide anti-American rallies.

The continuing economic stagnation has pushed North Korea to the realization that there is a limit to sustaining the inefficient system of a planned economy. As such, under the orders of Chairman Kim Jong-il, North Korea has initiated many sweeping reform measures including the following: The “Directive for Improving Economic Management” (October, 2001), the “Measures to Improve Economic Management” (July 1, 2002), and the “Basic Laws for the Sinuiju Special Administrative Zone” that was adopted by the Supreme People's Assembly (September, 2002).

Such market-oriented measures, while an attempt to ensure the survival of the North Korean regime, are doubtful to be effective given the structural deficiency that plagues the North Korean system.

Ever since announcing the termination of the freeze on its nuclear program on December 12, 2002, North Korea has resorted to such “brinkmanship tactics” as announcing the withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on January 10, 2003. At the same time, North Korea has also been

focusing on negotiations with the United States, demanding a non-aggression pact as a means to ensure regime survival. While North Korea's recent participation in the trilateral talks with US and China offers hope for a peaceful resolution to the nuclear issue, the outstanding differences between North Korea and the US still cloud the prospects for a resolution to the issue.

North Korea's relations with Japan which reached new heights with the summit meeting on September 17, 2002, during which both sides agreed to reopen talks to normalize relations, have since remained stagnant due to the issues of North Korea's nuclear program and North Korea's past abduction of Japanese citizens. Meanwhile, North Korea is strengthening its traditional cooperative ties with China and Russia to secure political and economic support.

As regards to inter-Korean relations, North Korea is continuing its rapprochement strategy with ROK; it is calling for the implementation of “the June 15 Joint Declaration,” maintaining government talks and civilian exchanges, as well as sustaining such pragmatic inter-Korean cooperative projects as the linkage of the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads. However, internally, North Korea does not seem to have given up its strategy to communize the South as evidenced by its lukewarm response to ROK's offers to discuss military confidence building measures.

B. North Korean Military Threat

North Korea's armed forces are comprised of more than 1,170,000 soldiers (1,000,000 Army, 60,000 Navy, 110,000 Air Force) in active duty, with more than 7,480,000 in the reserve forces constituting the Reserved Military Training Units (RMTU), Worker/Peasant Red Guards and the Red Youth Guards. More than 70% of the ground forces are stationed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan line, which enables North Korea to launch a surprise attack and invade the South without additional deployment of its units.

North Korea, which is also concentrating on WMD development, is

estimated to have acquired the capability to develop crude nuclear explosive devices and enough plutonium to build these weapons. North Korea is also believed to have pursued the import of resources and facilities needed to enrich uranium.

In terms of biological weapons, North Korea is believed to possess 13 types of bacteria including anthrax, small pox and cholera. As regards to chemical weapons, North Korea has produced over ten kinds of lethal chemicals that include nerve, blister, and blood agents. Some 2,500 to 5,000 tons of these chemical agents are estimated to be stored in six separate facilities.

Meanwhile, North Korea has deployed the Scud B and C missiles whose maximum range is 300 to 500 km and the Rodong-1 missile with a maximum range of up to 1,300 km. The 2,000 km range Daepodong-1 was used as a satellite launch vehicle in August 1998 and the Daepodong-2 with a range of 6,000 km is currently under development.

While recently strengthening its long-range firepower with the addition of a Rodong missile battalion, it has also forward deployed its 170 mm and 240 mm long-range artillery guns to pose a greater threat to the Seoul metropolitan area. North Korea is also continuing its military buildup with the production of the Chonmaho tank and the Shark-class submarines.

Since the revelation of its recent nuclear program in October 2002, North Korea has strengthened its defense-oriented readiness posture by performing exercises such as test-firing of ground-to-ship guided missiles and nationwide air raid drills. By stressing national solidarity between the two Koreas over the nuclear issue, North Korea is also concentrating on psychological warfare.

Beginning in March 2003, with regards to the US military operations in Iraq,



North Korea's 240mm Multiple Rocket Launcher System (MRLS)

North Korea has issued orders for increased combat readiness and has conducted air raid drills. It has also continued to voice strong criticism against US military operations as well as ROK's dispatch of troops to the region.

Some of the more recent and noteworthy military actions taken by North Korea with the intent to create tension include the intrusion of the Yeonpyeong Island airspace by a North Korean MIG-19 fighter aircraft on February 20, 2003, the test-launch of a ground-to-ship guided missile off the East Sea Coast on February 24, 2003, and the threatening interceptive maneuvers on a US RC-135 reconnaissance aircraft by MIG-23/29 fighter aircraft over the East Sea on March 2, 2003.

During the height of the crab-fishing season, between May 26 and June 3, a total of 37 North Korean fishing boats crossed the Northern Limit Line (NLL) on ten occasions. In response, ROK Navy patrol boats fired warning shots on June 1 and June 3. The northward extension of fishing waters ordered by the ROK Navy's West Sea Fleet Command, coupled with forceful patrols along the area, have prevented the North Korean boats from further intruding the NLL. Considering these recent events, further provocation by North Korea along the NLL and the Military Demarcation Line (MDL), either intentional or accidental, cannot be ruled out.

In brief, the military capability and posture of North Korea have not changed. North Korea is continuing to intensify self-indoctrination under the "Military First Policy" slogan and is sustaining a vast military apparatus. Also, the further emphasis on WMD development, military buildup, and increased readiness all point to the unchanged nature of North Korea's military threat.



Part Two
Participatory Government's
“Policy of Peace and Prosperity”
and Defense Policy

Chapter One
Participatory Government's “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”

Chapter Two
Goals and Direction of Defense Policy

Chapter One

Participatory Government's “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”

A. Background and Significance of “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”

With the historical wave of the post-Cold War era and the inter-Korean summit meeting of June 15, 2000, new opportunities and challenges for the “establishment of peace” on the Korean Peninsula are within our grasp. With substantive progress in inter-Korean relations following the summit and the rising interest of neighboring countries on the geoeconomic significance of the Korean Peninsula as the central pillar of Northeast Asian prosperity, President Roh Moo-hyun outlined in his inaugural address on February 2003 the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” to help build peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia on the basis of a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the establishment of an inter-Korean economic community.



Inauguration of President Roh Moo-hyun

The “Policy of Peace and Prosperity” is a comprehensive national development strategy that encompasses issues of reunification, foreign policy and security. In pursuing parallel progress not only in the economic sector but

also in the military/security sector, it explores a balanced approach to peace and prosperity.

Under the broad objective of advancing peace and pursuing common prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, the Participatory Government's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" will proceed under the following four principles: ① resolution of problems through dialogue, ② mutual trust and reciprocity, ③ international cooperation based on the party autonomy principle of South and North Korea, and ④ keeping the policy in tune with the public. In the short term, these principles will serve as guidelines in cooperating with neighboring countries to bring about a peaceful resolution to the North Korean nuclear issue.

On such a basis, the mid-term goals would be to advance substantive cooperation, realize military confidence building between the two Koreas and establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula by supporting the normalization of relations between North Korea and the US and Japan. These will be the precursors of the long-term goals to pursue common prosperity, establish the grounds for peaceful re-unification and develop the Korean Peninsula into an economic hub of Northeast Asia.

B. "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" and Self-Reliant Defense

To establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula as sought by the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity," ROK needs to further develop its defense capability. In the context of continued military confrontation between South and North Korea, the focus must be on deterring a military attack by North Korea.

During the course of pursuing a national security strategy with the ROK-US alliance as its central fixture, the ROK's military has been inevitably dependent in many aspects on the United States and its forces in Korea. Some South Koreans who came to recognize this problem, have raised concerns on the political and military weakness of ROK. In order to be able to firmly defend

itself and restore public confidence, ROK needs to pursue a self-reliant defense. By doing so, ROK can actively respond to the changes in the ROK-US alliance and play a leading role in inter-Korean relations.

The concept of self-reliant defense aims to achieve a self-reliant deterrence capability against North Korea while complementing this capability by strengthening the ROK-US alliance and security cooperation with neighboring states. In order to realize this, ROK needs to overcome its military disadvantage vis-à-vis North Korea in terms of autonomous forces, manage the military in a more efficient manner, and rationally address such important matters as improving the combined command system of the alliance in anticipation of changes and developments in the future.


As regards to uncertain security threats other than North Korea, a self-reliant defense capability must form the basis on which to address these threats in tandem with the ROK-US alliance and cooperation with neighboring countries. The constantly maturing ROK-US alliance should gradually delineate roles for the two parties: ROK will play the leading role in deterring a North Korean attack with the US playing a supporting role, and the United States will play the balancing role in the region. During their recent ROK-US summit, the presidents of the two countries took note of the opportunity provided by ROK's growing national strength to continue expanding the role of the ROK Armed Forces in the defense of the Korean Peninsula. In brief, self-reliant defense does not, in any way, translate into the withdrawal of US forces from Korea or the weakening of the ROK-US alliance.

Self-reliance in defense should be sought in a way that satisfies the following three points. First, it should lead to the establishment of a force that can deter North Korean aggression. Second, military reforms are needed to improve the organization and management system of the armed forces. Third, on the basis of the first two points, the combined command system must be further developed. While self-reliant defense deals with material aspects, the spiritual aspect is just as vital and important. The ROK Armed Forces should demonstrate a strong will to realize self-reliant defense and thereby evolve into the "Armed Forces of the People" that is deeply trusted and loved by the people.

C. Policy Goals to Realize “Policy of Peace and Prosperity”

The goal of the “Participatory Government” is to achieve the following: “Democracy with the People,” “A Society of Balanced Development,” and “Era of Peace and Prosperity in Northeast Asia.” In order to realize these goals, sector-specific policy goals were also designated. Of these goals, “to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula” is a policy goal to be pursued by the foreign, reunification and defense policy sectors to realize the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity.” For the Ministry of Unification, the sub-goal is to institutionalize peace through the improvement of inter-Korean relations. For the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the sub-goal is to “cultivate the international environment that is favorable to the establishment of peace on the Korean Peninsula.” For the Ministry of National Defense (MND), the sub-goal is to “firmly establish a defense posture to ensure peace.”

[Figure 2-1] Direction and Goals of the Participatory Government



In order to realize the goal of “firmly establishing a defense posture to ensure peace,” the ROK Armed Forces has designated the following as central objectives for national defense: ① early solidification of self-defense capability, ② development and strengthening of the ROK-US alliance, and ③ pursuing inter-Korean military confidence building. Also, recognizing the need to reform the military sector congruous with the Participatory Government's drive and direction, the ROK Armed Forces is contriving a direction for reform in all fields of national defense and will reflect this in detail for each specific area.

Chapter Two

Goals and Direction of Defense Policy

A. Goals and Key Points of Defense Policy

In order to demonstrate the President's governing will and carry out the national defense policy, as well as support the government's effort to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula

and pursue the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity," our military has set as its objectives the realization of an "advanced, self-reliant defense."



Conference of the Major Military Commanders

[Figure 2-2] Goals and Key Points of National Defense Policy of the Participatory Government



Self-reliant and advanced national defense focuses on maintaining a mutually complementary ROK-US alliance and cooperative relationships with foreign militaries based on a self-defense capability and national defense posture. Also, it signifies an overall state of national defense which incorporates an advanced operation system

based on rationality and efficiency. It also sets a standard our military must attain as well as the aim that we must pursue.

The key points in achieving our goals are the following: ① establishing a firm national defense posture, ② building a future-oriented defense capability, ③ continuously reforming national defense system, and ④ improving service members' welfare and barracks life. The ROK military is concentrating its energy to consistently pursue these points. Moreover, in order to achieve these goals, an appropriate defense budget needs to be procured, on which our military is making efforts to build a national consensus.

B. Direction of Defense Policy

1. Establishing a Firm National Defense Posture

Our military is maintaining a firm national defense posture to cope with any conceivable threat. On the one hand, the ROK and the US have adhered to the principle of peaceful resolution concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, and have pursued dialogue with North Korea to settle the problem. On the other hand, however, the situation remains unpredictable and the possibility that North Korea might stage a surprise provocation to enhance its negotiating power cannot be ruled out.

Accordingly, our military will establish a firm defense posture against North Korea's infiltration, limited provocation, terrorist and non-military activities, and will strengthen combat military training, while reinforcing the civil-government-military integrated defense posture.

In particular, the ROK-US combined forces operation system will play an essential role in deterring war, during the process of coping with North Korea's nuclear issue. Therefore, our military plans to strengthen the ROK-US combined readiness posture by enhancing ROK-US combined surveillance and intelligence capability and improving combined crisis management systems.

High-level units centered around the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) have made plans to employ joint forces and develop force structures to effectively

respond to current threats as well as those non-specific threats of the future. Accordingly, the ROK military will develop the necessary doctrines, force structures and force requirements.

In addition, to establish a firm sense of security in terms of maintaining readiness posture, commanders are placing emphasis on moral education for service members while holding firm national views and soldiership for themselves.

2. Building a Future-Oriented Defense Capability

In order to guarantee the survival of a nation and uphold its national interests, the military needs to maintain a certain level of force capability. However, enhancement of force capability is a long-term process which requires 10~20 years of preparation, and investments must be made at the earliest date to obtain an appropriate level of combat power that can be deployed whenever needed. Moreover, for the security of our nation, maintaining appropriate and cooperative relations with neighboring countries - including the ROK-US alliance - as well as obtaining combat power is also necessarily required. Taking this fact into consideration, our military is striving to build up its future-oriented defense capability that can cope with changes in the strategic environment and adjust to the characteristics of future war.

In order to achieve this, our military has set the goal of securing a self-sustainable defense capability that can respond to existing and future unspecified threats, actively carrying out improvements in force structure which involve transforming the military into a technology-intensive force, cultivating the ability to rapidly react to present threats, procuring sufficient combat defense power, and reinforcing the basis of R&D (research and development) and defense industry.

As a core strategy to establish a self-reliant and advanced national defense system in preparation for future information warfare, our military will construct an integrated information system of national defense based on intelligence, arrange an actual training support system, and strengthen

information-oriented education for our soldiers.

Appreciating the contribution the ROK-US alliance has made in deterring war and maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula for the past half-century, the ROK Armed Forces, to further develop ROK-US military relations, will continue to conduct serious research on the common objective and direction to be pursued by the alliance in the future. Above all, coordination and cooperation between the ROK and the US on the basis of mutual respect are crucial. Through “The Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative,” the military will formulate a blueprint of the alliance for the 21st century and explore ways to better cope with the security environment of tomorrow.

The direction for further developing the overall ROK-US alliance focuses on consolidating the future ROK-US alliance and strengthening deterrence on the Korean Peninsula by jointly preparing and adjusting to the changing regional and global security environment and exploring a plan to develop an alliance that reflects both the US global strategy and the ROK's security situation.

As regards to the relocation of USFK (US Forces Korea) military bases, i.e. whether to integrate and/or close USFK military bases, especially concerning the redeployment of the 2nd US Infantry Division, careful consideration should be made in connection with the security situation in Korea. As for the LPP (Land Partnership Plan), modifications will be made when required, while the early relocation of Yongsan Garrison will be pursued in a manner that maximizes the efficient use of national property and contributes to the improved conditions for the US forces and to a strengthened combined defense posture.

The development of the combined command system is a critical security issue which forms the central pillar of ROK-US military cooperation, and so any misunderstanding or friction should be avoided in the process of carrying out its development program. When Korea becomes fully capable of executing operations independently, this issue could be settled in a smooth manner. Therefore, in the long term, the development of the combined command system should be pursued under broad public support and under close consultation with the US, in a manner that does not weaken the ROK-US alliance.

For foreign military cooperation, military diplomacy activities that are objective-oriented need to be pursued while a future-oriented partnership will be pursued with Japan, a broad cooperative relationship with China, and diversified military exchange and industry cooperation with Russia. Through these plans, our military will seek policy coordination with the US and Japan, and induce China and Russia to play a more constructive role vis-à-vis North Korea. Additionally, our military will bolster activities to increase practical benefits such as defense export diversification, and also actively participate in international arms control and multilateral security cooperation.

With the purpose of enhancing our nation's stature in the international community and advancing our national interest, our military will actively dispatch troops abroad. However, when it is not a UN PKO (Peace Keeping Operation), the government will decide whether to dispatch troops after considering the circumstances in the area of conflict or war, the support from international society, public opinion and its feasibility.

Currently, the number of troops sent abroad exceeds 1,473 in seven regions around the world, including troops sent to support UN PKO and to participate in the international coalition against terrorism. They play an important role in uplifting our military's stature and in strengthening self-defense capabilities. In order to keep up with overseas troop dispatches whose importance is growing, our military will build an international peace support center, actively participate in UN stand-by arrangement reserve system, and legislate and supplement related regulations.

For substantial peace on the Korean Peninsula to take root, confidence building and reduction of tension between the two Koreas are essential, and on that account, our military will take actions to gradually build military confidence based on firm deterrence against the North.

3. Continuous Reform of National Defense System

The military of a nation is the cornerstone of national defense, and therefore its response posture and capability needs to be strengthened through

continuous self-evaluation and self-reform in preparation for changing battlefield environments and the challenges they represent. By doing so, the military can set clear directions and objectives to maintain vigilance in the organization and continue to serve as an engine for development.

Defense reform is a mission to satisfy the aim of “enhancing combat capabilities” by improving efficiency, effectiveness and future-oriented mindset of the defense organization. In other words, it is a continuous task of advancing the entire system of defense in order to invigorate the military's mission-accomplishing posture.

For the past 50 years, our military has provided the basis for national development by maintaining a strong defense posture, and has continuously developed into today's elite fighting force. However, notwithstanding the growth and dramatic development achieved by the ROK Armed Forces, we are deeply conscious of the calls for a change in times and growing demand by the people for a change in the armed forces.

Based on this recognition, the MND is closely looking to see whether there are unreasonable procedures, practices or inefficient aspects in management to set the basic aims of “moral reform,” “national defense system improvement,” “combat power structure consolidation,” and has selected and is implementing main reform initiatives.

[Figure 2-3] Main Reform Initiatives for National Defense

- ① Personnel Management Reform
- ② Defense Organization Consolidation
- ③ Reform of Military Service and Reserves System
- ④ Improvement of the Military Judicial System
- ⑤ Efficiency Enhancement in Building Military Power

First, to reform the personnel management system, we will rationalize the hierarchical structure in the military and make personnel management more efficient. To achieve this goal, the rules of fair competition will be upheld; the rank system of each military service will be readjusted to guarantee

appropriate promotional rate; the number of those who failed in promotion will be gradually reduced and those who failed to get timely promotion will get certain benefits to bolster their service in the military.

Second, "the restructuring of defense organization" is a plan to make our nation more flexible to future defense surroundings. To this end, our military aims to reach the level where it can cultivate elite forces. By reinforcing and reorganizing the function of the MND, JCS and the headquarters of the three services, our national defense will be able to function actively and effectively.

Third, by reforming the military service and reserve forces system, our military intends to lessen the burden on taxpayers and enhance the capability of our reserves. With the service period of the military and other alternative services being reduced by 2 months, our military is seeking a plan to secure sufficient military manpower. As for the reserve forces system, an improvement plan will be proposed in 2003 and implemented in 2004, considering the required number of reserves according to the current security situation.

Fourth, reforming the military judicial system aims to protect the rights and interests of both officers and service members by employing "a circuit pool of military judges," which works directly under the MND, limiting the commander's authority for confirmation, and expanding the trial defense counsel program.

Finally, with the purpose of raising efficiency in force enhancement, the decision-making process in the Force Improvement Programs (FIPs) will be changed into the form of "an open decision-making system." In order to invigorate national defense R&D, our military will review all relevant matters and work to strengthen the foundation of defense industry.

In past years, there have been numerous national defense reform initiatives. Some were successful while others were altered or discontinued. The main reason why some of these initiatives failed was because they were planned and carried out by a small number of people, which lacked full coordination and cooperation. In the forthcoming future, all reforms will be planned and carried out only when every member of an organization participates actively,

and when a consensus is formed through various discussions and negotiations. The pursuit of the initiative, “a reform in which everybody participates,” will hopefully result in success.

4. Improving Service Member's Welfare and Barracks Environment

The Republic of Korea has achieved exponential economic growth in the past few decades. As a result, overall living standards and welfare conditions have shown great improvement. Our military has also made various efforts to improve the welfare of service members and their barracks life within the purview of available resources. However, these improvements are still greatly shy compared to the current economic and social development and service members' expectations. The morale and welfare of soldiers are the basis of combat power in wartime. In order for the military to perform its duties without fail, conditions where soldiers can fully concentrate on their duties are imperative. Thus, the military has made it one of its top priorities to make innovative improvements in service members' welfare and barracks life during the term of the participatory government.

First, welfare improvements will be focused on renovating outdated barracks and officer's quarters, increasing service members' pay to a realistic level at which basic needs can be met, and balancing welfare benefits among each of the military services.

In addition, the military plans to foster a “more desirable military culture.” In other words, the military will take measures to do away with unreasonable conventions, to create a sound environment for normal duty performance and to establish firm vocational ethics and instill military values amongst officers, thereby nurturing an advanced military culture.

The military is also working to guarantee employment and stable living conditions for retired and discharged service members, a task that calls for immediate attention. To do so, the military plans to broaden employment opportunities, while at the same time systemizing career guidance programs to help enhance social adaptation.

5. Procuring an Appropriate Level of Defense Budget

Maintaining a firm security posture is vital for the government to push ahead with the "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" and to establish a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. To meet these ends, the military will set clear policy objectives in defense, designate key points around which detailed plans will be formulated. The ROK Armed Forces will channel its efforts to consistently pursue these points.

The ROK Armed Forces, in particular, will focus on improving welfare and increasing morale of service members, preparing defense capabilities fit for future warfare, and enhancing combat readiness through substantial exercise and training. It also aims to maintain a firm defense posture that can guarantee peace by continuous and sweeping defense reforms. Furthermore, the military will realize "a self-reliant and advanced national defense" which is our military's blueprint for the future in ensuring the nation's survival and upholding the national interests in an uncertain security environment.

To do so, the military must first procure a sufficient defense budget. Currently, the national defense budget is appropriated at around 2.7% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as of 2003. This allocation rate has been declining for the past few years, rendering overall maintenance and investment in future defense buildup even more problematic.

The ROK Armed Forces projects that, in order to overcome these impediments and build a military force that can guarantee the nation's survival and prosperity, a budget at the 3.2~3.5% level of GDP must be appropriated for national defense.

Internally, the military will explore ways to make efficient use of the national defense budget by scientifically analyzing defense planning and raising awareness of service members. Externally, it will also strive to forge a public consensus of the need for an appropriate defense budget whilst endeavoring to elicit the full support at the government level.



Part Three

Establishment of a Firm Defense Posture

Chapter One
Military Preparedness of the ROK Armed Forces

Chapter Two
Operations of ROK Armed Forces

Chapter Three
Operations of USFK and Augmentation Forces

Chapter Four
Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises

Chapter One

Military Preparedness of the ROK Armed Forces

North Korea, which has continued to increase its military capability and strengthen its combat readiness posture despite economic difficulties, broke off from the 1994 Agreed Framework and is continuing its nuclear development, thereby heightening the level of tension on the Korean Peninsula.

Pursuant to such posture undertaken by North Korea, the ROK Armed Forces is reinforcing its military preparedness through the maintenance of enhanced surveillance of North Korean military activities and the strong ROK-US combined defense posture, in order to simultaneously respond to both military threats (such as infiltration, local provocation, and all-out war) and non-military threats such as terrorism.

A. Preparedness against Infiltration and Local Provocation

As witnessed by the Gangreung submarine infiltration attempt in 1996, infiltrations along the East Sea and on Ganghwa Island, the semi-submersible infiltration attempts on Yeosu and armed infiltration on Mukho in 1998, the Yeonpyeong Sea Battle in 1999, the violation of ROK territorial waters by North Korean commercial boats in 2001, and the West Sea skirmish in 2002, North Korea has constantly perpetrated acts of provocation on the ROK. Without any major change in North Korea's strategy to communize the ROK, such acts are expected to continue in the future. In particular, there is a possibility that such military adventurism may be used to influence the

negotiations regarding the nuclear issue. Also, during the season of thick crab foliage, the possibility of a military clash is inherent.

Through the use of ROK-US combined surveillance assets, the ROK Armed Forces maintains a 24-hour surveillance posture on all North Korean military movements and potential infiltrators in order to respond in a timely and effective manner to any form of military or non-military aggression. In particular, in preparation against the possibility of any intended or unintended military clash in the West Sea during the crab fishing season, the ROK Armed Forces



Coast Barrier Guard

has enhanced combat readiness according to the new guidelines for military engagement issued in 2002. In addition, the quality of patrol forces along the DMZ, the coastlines and riverbanks is being improved, while measures for the response system in the Korea Air Defense Identification Zone (KADIZ) are being supplemented. Furthermore, contingency plans at the construction sites of the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and the Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads have been put in place. Also, counter-terrorism forces are readily available in case of terrorist activities and any other non-military aggressions, with the cooperation from other related agencies.

As regards to establishing an integrated civilian-government-military defense posture, central and local meetings were held on integrated defense (in January and February of 2003) to promote the importance of integrated defense and to forge a consensus. By revising the Integrated Defense Law, applying the decrees and guidelines of this law, and conducting the comprehensive rear-area exercise called the Hwarang Training, the MND is enhancing the implementation posture of integrated defense operations and strengthening defense posture on major national facilities.

B. Strengthening ROK-US Combined Crisis Management System

The strength of the ROK-US combined readiness posture has been maintained and reinforced through cooperative efforts of ROK-US CFC, ROK JCS and Strategic Operations Command. The importance of the ROK-US combined crisis management system is based on its role in putting a quick end to a crisis situation and deterring war upon



Defense Minister's Inspection of CFC

unforeseen political, economic, diplomatic, or military crisis that either threaten national security or create a crisis situation that necessitates the use of military assets and troops. To more actively respond to the current security situation, the ROK Armed Forces has been strengthening the ROK-US combined crisis management system based on the shared sense of importance for the ROK-US policy coordination system.

To ensure that the ROK and the US can take consistent measures from a shared perspective at a time of crisis on the Korean Peninsula, the combined crisis management consultative body will be strengthened in its crisis management and military coordination functions. The two countries will also continue to enhance the abilities of crisis management personnel to react to such crises. They will undergo periodic training on different types of potential crisis scenarios. In addition, we are planning to improve the performance level of the Command Post Automation System (CPAS) and make it interoperable so as to guarantee prompt situation awareness and an effective remedy for the situation through timely information sharing between the crisis management units of the MND, JCS and CFC.

C. Readiness Posture for All-Out War

Regardless of any changes in inter-Korean relations or the national security environment, the mission of the ROK Armed Forces remains the same: to defend the homeland and to protect the lives and properties of its people. While tension on the peninsula is increasing due to the North Korean regime's continuing efforts to reinforce its



Air Defense System

military strength through its “Military First Policy” and the pursuit of nuclear weapons, the ROK Armed Forces remains ready to deter any aggression by the North and counter any such act of aggression.

First, in preparation of a military attack by North Korea, the ROK Armed Forces is making preparations to respond to North Korea's long-range artillery and WMD in order to address the threat posed on the capital region in the early phase of the war. Also, operational plans (OPLAN) are being updated to reflect the new security and the fast changing operational environments. Based on the ROK-US combined defense posture, surveillance on enemy activities and permanent war readiness are at hand, while the ability to carry out OPLANs are enhanced through more virtual and scientific training and exercise as well as other tactical discussions. At the same time, measures have been taken to deter any possibilities of the construction sites of the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and the Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads being used by the North as maneuver paths, and C4I and information operations systems are being updated to reflect the advances in the fields of information technology and science.

Chapter Two


Operations of ROK Armed Forces

A. Army







The ROK Army constitutes the core of our national defense. Its mission in peacetime is to deter war, along with the Navy and the Air Force; its wartime mission is to achieve victory in all ground combat.

Organized into the ROK Army Headquarters, three Field Army Commands, the Army Aviation Operations Command, the Special Warfare Command, the Capital Defense Command, and units to support these commands, the ROK Army consists of 10 corps, 47 divisions, 19 brigades, with approximately 560,000 personnel, 2,400 tanks, 2,300 armored vehicles, and 5,200 pieces of field artillery.

[Figure 3-1] Organization of the ROK Army



[Table 3-1] Army Manpower/Equipment

					
Troops	Tanks	Armored Vehicles	Field Artillery	Missiles	Helicopters
560,000	2,400	2,300	5,200	20	610

※ Field Artillery: MRLs included, Missiles: ATACMS included

The First and Third Field Armies have the mission to defend the region that spans from the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) to the Capital area. The mission of the Second Field Army is to defend the entire rear area, including the coastlines. The Army Aviation Operations Command provides maneuver forces with fire, airlift, and reconnaissance support, while the Special Warfare Command is tasked to collecting intelligence, locating enemy targets, and carrying out other designated missions. The Capital Defense Command has the mission of maintaining the security of the Seoul area as well as protecting the infrastructure of the city.


Each field army, corps command, and division has its own artillery units that provide effective fire support for the maneuver forces under it. These artillery units possess various sorts of artillery, targeting equipment, fire control systems, and high-tech weapons that make them capable of timely and sustained fire support.

B. Navy

Aside from deterring war in peacetime, the ROK Navy's missions include upholding national sovereignty, protecting maritime rights, supporting government's foreign policies, and enhancing national prestige. Its wartime missions include exercising control over the seas, ensuring the safety of our maritime activities, denying enemy's maritime activities, protecting the nation's lifeline which is the sea lines of communications (SLOC), and carrying out surprise landing operations on the enemy's flanks and rear areas.

The ROK Navy Headquarters, the ROK Naval Operations Command, Marine Corps Command, and support units make up the ROK Navy. It consists of three fleets under the ROK Naval Operations Command, two divisions and one brigade under the Marine Corps Headquarters, with 67,000 troops, 180 vessels, and 70 aircraft.

[Figure 3-2] Organization of the ROK Navy



[Table 3-2] Navy Manpower/Equipment

				
Troops	Submarines/ Submersibles	Combat Vessels	Support Vessels	Aircraft
67,000	10	150	20	70

The ROK Naval Operations Command has vessels and aircraft to conduct major naval component operations such as anti-submarine warfare (ASW), mine operations, landing, salvage, and special operations. Each fleet possesses combat vessels such as destroyers, frigates, corvettes and high-speed boats, to guard its operational zone of responsibility. The marines possess fire support capabilities of its own and a wide range of landing equipment including amphibious tanks with which they conduct landing operations.


C. Air Force

The Air Force constantly keeps a watchful eye on the enemy and maintains a high-level combat readiness posture that allows for response, such as retaliatory strikes, to any enemy provocation. The mission of the Air Force during war is to achieve air superiority so as to prevent the enemy from gaining access to air space, to neutralize the enemy's will by destroying its principal and potential war-fighting capability, and finally, to give full support





to ground and naval operations.

The ROK Air Force Headquarters, Operations Command, and Support Command constitute the ROK Air Force. The ROK Air Force Headquarters has two wings subordinated to it, and the Operations Command has the Air Defense Artillery Command, Air Defense & Control Wing as well as nine tactical fighter wings with approximately 63,000 personnel and 840 aircraft including KF-16 fighters.

[Figure 3-3] Organization of the ROK Air Force



[Table 3-3] Air Force Manpower/Equipment


			
Troops	Fighters(550)	Special Aircraft(70)	Support Aircraft (220)
63,000	KF/F-16(150)	RF-4C(20)	Transport(30) / Training(160) / Helicopters(30)

Air operations are under the direct control of the Theater Air Control Center (TACC). Currently, the Air Force operates aircraft that are capable of precision bombing and carrying long-range air-to-air missiles. It can also provide support to ground and naval forces with close air support as part of joint air-ground-sea operations.

D. Reserve Forces

Based on the “Local Reserve Forces Establishment Law” of 1961, the first Reserve Forces were created immediately after the armed infiltrators from North Korea attempted an assault on Cheong Wa Dae (Presidential Residence) in January 1968. Since then, the Reserve Forces have played a pivotal role in deterring North Korea's war provocations. Currently, the Reserve Forces stand at 3.04 million strong, organized into regional and workplace units. The MND, through the Army and Navy Headquarters, commands the Reserve Forces, and the Military Manpower Agency is responsible for maintenance of their structure. During peacetime, reservists receive regular education and training, while maintaining their ability to defend their homeland. During wartime, reservists become supplementary manpower to create new units, reinforcing the existing units and serving as replacements for combat losses.

[Figure 3-4] Command Structure of the Reserve Forces



Chapter Three


Operations of USFK and Augmentation Forces

Since its arrival in Korea after the establishment of the “ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty” in October 1953, US Forces Korea (USFK) has remained a symbol of the ROK-US alliance and continues to contribute to the peace and stability of Northeast Asia including the Korean Peninsula.

A. United States Forces in Korea

The Commanding General of the United Nations Command (UNC)/ Combined Forces Command (CFC) also commands USFK. Eighth US Army (EUSA), US Naval Forces Korea, US Air Force Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and the Special Operations Command Korea make up USFK. In case of a

[Figure 3-5] Organization of USFK



contingency on the Korean Peninsula, the USFK Commanding General is in full control of the operations of the seventh US Air Force.

USFK stands at 37,000 men strong, made up of 28,000 in the Army, 8,700 in the Air Force, and 400 in the Navy as well as the Marines. EUSA, centered around the Second Infantry Division and two aviation brigades, possesses 140 M1A1 tanks, 170 Bradley armored vehicles, 30 155mm self-propelled howitzers, 30 MRLs, 70 AH-64 helicopters as well as a wide range of surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles such as the Patriot, adding up to the capability to perform any required tasks under any circumstances.

US Air Force possesses approximately 100 aircraft: 70 advanced fighters such as F-16, 20 A-10 anti-tank attack aircraft, and other reconnaissance aircraft including U-2s. With this kind of highly modern equipment, US Air Force Korea has sufficient capability to launch all-weather attacks and to conduct air support operations under any circumstances. Limited manpower and equipment are allocated to US Naval Forces Korea, US Marine Forces Korea, and Special Operations Command Korea in peacetime. However, the US Pacific Command will augment these forces and assume command should a crisis or war erupt, thus providing them with a higher combat capability.

B. Augmentation Forces

US augmentation forces, including the army, navy, air force, and marine corps, are composed of approximately 690,000 troops. The augmented forces comprise 2 army corps that can execute rapid multi-dimensional maneuver; 5 carrier battle groups with highly advanced fighters capable of executing multi-dimensional naval operations; 32 tactical fighter wings that can secure air superiority, attack enemy's targets in depth, and respond to weapons of mass destruction; and 2 marine expeditionary forces stationed in Okinawa and on the continental US.

There are three types of augmentation capability: Flexible Deterrence

Options (FDOs), Force Module Packages (FMPs), and the Time-Phased Forces Deployment Data (TPFDD). These are executed through a unit integration process, when the Commanding General of CFC requests them and the US JCS orders them in case of a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.

FDOs are ready to be implemented when war is imminent. They can be classified into political, economic, diplomatic, and military options. Approximately 150 deterrence options are ready to be employed. FMPs are measures that augment combat or combat support units that need the most support in the early phase of the war should war deterrence efforts through FDOs fail. Included in the FMPs are elements such as rapid deployable aircraft and carrier battle groups. Under TPFDD, in which FDO and FMP are included, key forces are planned ahead of time to be deployed in case of an outbreak of war. The types of forces under TPFDD are, in-place force, or forces currently deployed to the peninsula; pre-planned forces, or forces of time-phased deployment in a contingency; and on-call forces, which could be deployed if needed.

Since 1994, ROK forces and US forces have been maintaining reception and logistical procedures of augmented forces in the case of contingency through the annual RSOI exercise.

Furthermore, USFK plans to implement a revolutionary force augmentation plan in order to enhance CFC's ability to deter North Korean aggression and to safeguard the security of the ROK.



Aircraft Carrier, USS Kitty Hawk

Chapter Four

Combat Task-Oriented Training and Exercises

A. Combined and Joint Training and Exercises

The ROK Armed Forces is increasing its ability to carry out military conflicts through combined and joint training and exercises that apply scientific methodology. Major combined training and exercises include the Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise, the Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Exercise, the Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise, and the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise. Major joint training and exercises include the Corps-level field training exercises (FTX), the Amnokgang Exercise, and Hwarang Training.

1. Ulchi Focus Lens (UFL) Exercise

The Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise is a comprehensive Command Post Exercise (CPX) designed to enhance wartime leadership and war-fighting capabilities as well as to ensure fluidity in performing specific warfare procedures. The exercise has been performed annually since its inception in 1976. It is the combination of the Focus Lens



ROK-US Combined River Crossing Training

Exercise, which has been conducted under the control of the United Nations Command since 1954, and the Ulchi Exercise that has been held by the ROK since North Korea attempted an armed commando raid on Cheong-Wa-Dae on January 21, 1968.

During the Ulchi Focus Lens Exercise, the ROK government's crisis management and ROK-US combined crisis management processes during the early stages of war are depicted through various situations from each operational phase.

2. Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) Exercise

The RSOI Exercise is a command post exercise conducted under the control of the ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC). Contents of this computer-simulated exercise include the processes of reception, staging, movement to the forward area, and integration of US augmentation forces that would be deployed to the peninsula during war. Also included in these exercises are wartime support, mutual logistics support, mobilization, combined rear area coordination (CRAC) tasks and mastery of the restoration procedures of combat power on the part of the ROK Armed Forces. The RSOI Exercise has been conducted annually since 1994. The ROK MND, JCS, headquarters of each service, and operational commands participate in the exercise. The US has CFC, USFK, Space Command, Transportation Command and augmentation forces taking part in the exercise.

3. Foal Eagle (FE) Exercise

The Foal Eagle Exercise is an annual ROK-US combined field training exercise conducted since 1961. Its purposes are to demonstrate



Foal Eagle Exercise

ROK-US military resolve to deter war on the Korean Peninsula and to improve the combined and joint operational posture. Since 2002, it has been conducted simultaneously with the RSOI Exercise in late March in order to guarantee realistic exercise conditions and improved results.

4. Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) Exercise

Conducted biennially (every even year) under the leadership of the US Third Fleet, RIMPAC is a multinational, combined sea maneuver exercise in which the ROK, the US, Australia, Canada, Chile, the United Kingdom, and Japan have participated since 1971. The ROK Navy has participated in the exercise seven times from 1990 to 2002. The exercise is held with



Rim of the Pacific Exercise

the objective to increase mutual cooperation and enhance the combined operations capabilities among the countries around the rim of the Pacific Ocean so that they can ensure the safety of major sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and improve their combined response capabilities in the event of conflict at sea.

5. Amnokgang Exercise

As the ROK military's CPX under the command of the JCS since 1996, the Amnokgang Exercise is conducted every May, with the JCS and the operational commands playing central roles. The CPX is used to master the war execution procedures and enhance the operational command capabilities of the ROK military. During the Amnokgang Exercise, the JCS and operational commands participate as the supervisory body while other units and organizations are grouped into either a response team or an execution team

and conduct the exercise based on the war game model in their respective command posts and combat simulation center.

With the Amnokgang Exercise, the JCS has improved wartime combat capability restoration procedures and the wartime support requirement production and support system by mastering the operational command and staff activity procedures and wartime transition procedures. In particular, JCS has considerably increased the productivity of these exercises by operating CPAS since 1999.

6. Hoguk (“Guarding the Nation”) Exercise

Conducted under the command of the ROK JCS since 1996, Hoguk Exercise is a large-scale joint exercise in which all services gather to jointly execute operation plans along coastal and inland axes of movement.

Since 2001, fast and fair evaluation has been made possible by adopting the Joint Battle Evaluation war game model produced in Korea. Also, by reflecting the results of the tactical discussion of operational plans on the draft of new training plans, it has significantly enhanced the results of training.

B. Major Training of the Three Services

In a bid to maximize individual capabilities to perform combat missions, exercises and training on varying scales are conducted in each service on specific training areas, land or sea, with the characteristics of Korean terrain and North Korea's tactics being taken into account.

1. Army

ROK Army training is classified into two main types: individual training and collective training. All army training is conducted according to unit size, type, function, and branch in order to maintain operational capability for enemy's infiltration and local provocation in peacetime and to win all ground

combat in wartime. Individual training puts emphasis on Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) training necessary for individuals to master basic combat skills. It equips soldiers with professionalism towards their duties based on mental discipline and physical strength. In collective training, intense and practical training consists of small unit tactics training including live-fire exercises and two-side training using Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System(MILES) equipment per platoon and squad.



Air Assault Training

Battalion training focuses on field maneuver training and situational training. Cold weather regimental training includes Regimental Combat Team (RCT) training designed to perfect combined arms and joint forces operations execution capabilities and is conducted between December and February of the following year.

Division-level field training exercise is carried out under the supervision of a corps commander for one week or more during the term of a division commander. Division training is focused on integrated battle execution and firepower coordination, obstacle construction and denial operations, chemical and biological operations, and combat service support.

The corps and division-level Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is used to nurture the combat command capabilities of corps and division-level unit commanders and staff. BCTP includes mastering tactical decision-making processes, strengthening the operational capabilities of integrated combat power, and assessing battlefield experiences and field standing operating procedures. In addition, BCTP significantly enhances the corps and division-level commanders' leadership and their staff capabilities by applying “Changjo (Creation) 21 Model” that fits the characteristics of Korean terrain

and operational concepts. BCTP is held under direct supervision of the ROK Army Headquarters within one year after the arrival of a new unit commander.

Cooperative and joint training is conducted by each operational unit, and the training includes anti-tank attack training, joint air-ground operations training, joint air-ground-sea operations training, joint amphibious training, and river-crossing training. Conducted in close consultation with USFK, combined forces training include air assault training, NBC training, and counter-fire operations training.

Miscellaneous training is carried out in extreme situations simulating combat during the year in each unit as well: night training, cold weather training, ranger training, NBC training, and search-and-rescue training. These types of miscellaneous training are conducted in every unit at each level according to the annual training program.

To create an atmosphere where one can be fully responsible for the training and education given to soldiers and officers and to encourage creative programs of instruction, subordinate commanders of every unit are entrusted with the full responsibility for the proper education and training of their men. A comprehensive development plan on training areas has been drawn up. Based on this plan, the ROK Army is promoting the establishment of integrated regional training areas for administrative or military districts. The Army is also in the process of building the Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) where actual combat training using MILES equipment can be conducted against specialized opposing forces.

2. Navy

The ROK Navy enhances its combat execution capability through various types of naval component operational training events such as anti-submarine, anti-surface vessel and amphibious operations, mine warfare, search and rescue, and special operations.

Vessels larger than corvettes are mainly used for anti-submarine, anti-air,

and electronic warfare training. All battleships are utilized primarily for offensive and defensive training with a special focus on three-dimensional and comprehensive maneuver training in order to deter large-scale enemy maritime provocations, thus upgrading naval wartime capabilities. The navy's amphibious operations capabilities are being upgraded through amphibious assault and surprise amphibious raid training which employs landing craft. Mine warfare craft are used to foster mine-sweeping and mine-laying capabilities, which will enable the navy to respond effectively to already laid enemy mines.



Naval Maneuver Training

Special warfare units are trained to enhance their capabilities to conduct special operations by training for coastal reconnaissance, surprise attack, and survival. Submarine units receive virtual combat training on such missions as port blockades, anti-submarine operations, surveillance of enemy surface activities, and torpedo launching.

Aviation units concentrate on enhancing their capabilities to conduct three-dimensional operations through the execution of surface patrol operations and anti-submarine training in conjunction with surface vessels, and through training on guiding missile attacks on targets beyond radar range.

Once a year since 1993, the ROK Navy has been conducting a large-scale Integrated Surface Maneuver Training in which all available naval forces as well as the army and the air force participate. Through this training, the navy is developing joint operations execution capabilities based on multiple combat concepts under multiple crisis situations. Three-dimensional training for surface, underwater, and air assets is being intensified in order to block enemy infiltration of special operations forces by high-speed landing craft.

The ROK Navy is vigorously conducting combined training and exercises

with the navies of the US and other allies with an eye to establishing a combined maritime defense posture. We continue to exert our efforts in upgrading the combined operations system between the navies of the ROK and the US by improving the existing ROK-US combined training.

The ROK Navy is also in the process of increasing the frequency of Naval Academy cadets' cruise training and expanding observer exchanges with neighboring countries. When Korean warships visit a foreign country, or when warships from a foreign country visit Korea, the navies of the two countries conduct combined training, which not only raises Korea's international status but also enhances the ROK Navy's operational capabilities.

3. Air Force

All ROK Air Force training is conducted under the presence of actual combat environment and situation in order to successfully secure air superiority and provide ground and naval forces with favorable conditions for operations and seizing the initiative of war at its earliest phase possible. To achieve this end, ROK Air Force performs air defense, offensive



Patrol Flight Training of KF-16 Fighter

flight group, moving target attack, counter fire operations, close air support, air reconnaissance, tactical airlift and search and rescue training, either alone or through combined training with the US Air Force.

To create a real combat environment, air defense training utilizes simulated enemy aircrafts using enemy infiltration tactics to detect, identify, intercept, and destroy any enemy aircraft that intrudes by air. Offensive flight group training is designed to enhance our ability to conduct deep operations and to launch decisive attacks against enemy strategic targets. To reach this goal, low-

and medium-altitude navigation and tactical firing training are performed against tactical targets.

In addition, through the use of KF-16 fighters that can carry out precision attack, night and all-weather close air support training and joint anti-ship attack trainings are conducted in order to facilitate joint operational capability. Also, visual intelligence collection and distribution procedures are exercised through air reconnaissance training as well as the ability to move forces and supplies through tactical airlift training. Practical training is emphasized through night search and rescue using NVG, NBC warfare training, and non-conventional warfare training.

C. Strengthening the Moral Education of Service Members

The ROK Armed Forces is taking steps to strengthen the moral education of its officers and enlisted men serving under such an uncertain security environment so as to make sure that their concept of national security and value system are in agreement with the desired state of war readiness.

First, in order to secure the correct concept of the enemy, the current security situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula as well as the unchanging threat posed by North Korea are being educated, while the Government's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" must be pursued based on military strength. Also, in regard to the ROK-US alliance, which forms one of the most important foundations of our security, the necessity of the ROK-US alliance as well as the role of USFK in the security of the Korean Peninsula are explained, along with the economic and military benefits that USFK accompanies. Finally, the aim of such moral education is to nurture a real soldier who has a desirable career goal based on right values and ethics.

In order to realize such goals, former education system is being reformed to reflect the changing realities. Second, the content of the education is being reorganized according to its audiences, and text materials and learning tools

such as CATV are being utilized to maximize the result. Third, in consideration of the trend that values individualism, the share of audio-visual content is being increased while the number of books available through camp libraries is being increased. Fourth, through the use of Defense Net and the Defense satellite TV, a cyber education system is being constructed to enhance the efficiency of moral education on a real-time basis. Finally, as a part of the defense readiness posture, the importance of moral and psychological education by the commanders of each level is being stressed with the aim of nurturing leaders that will take full responsibility for their own men's education status.

The importance of the role of the commander as the focal point of troop moral education is well reflected in the curricula of service academies and other officer candidate schools as well as various levels of post-graduate officers training courses.



Part Four

Building a Future-Oriented

Defense Capability

Chapter One
Improving Force Structure

Chapter Two
Pursuing Defense Digitization

Chapter Three
Advancing the ROK-US Alliance

Chapter Four
Promoting Foreign Military Exchanges and Cooperation

Chapter Five
Reducing Tension and Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula

Chapter One

Improving Force Structure

A. Changes in Battlefield Environment

Pioneering developments in science and technology have shifted the focus of traditional warfare from territorial conquests and mass destruction to a new mode of warfare that aims to achieve information paralyzes and center of gravity strikes.

The recent war in Iraq is a perfect example that demonstrated the aspects of future warfare by expanding the 3-dimensional battlefield covering ground, sea and air to a 5-dimensional battlefield including cyberspace and space. It also transformed the manpower-oriented force structure to an information intensive force structure. A firm understanding of the battlefield, intelligence sharing and improved precision strikes along with knowledge and information, became the elements that constitute the core military strength.

The War in Iraq, which clearly is a fundamental departure from the warfare of the Industrial Age, has exhibited the complex aspects of future warfare that involve information and network-centric warfare as well as long-range precision engagement. It proved that the ability to conduct information and scientific war is the decisive factor in military victory.



3-Dimensional Integrated Battlefield

The US-UK Coalition Forces took the initiative in the War in Iraq with highly sophisticated precision weapons, operating on the advanced C4I control system. Precision strikes by aircraft and missiles neutralized the Iraqi command and control systems. Armor-protected mechanized units were employed to provide mobility for the ground operations. The Coalition Forces suffered 650 casualties in the war. On the other hand, the Iraqi forces suffered 6,500 casualties with 7,300 prisoners of war and the disintegration of the rest of its forces.

To cope with these changes in warfare and to prepare for the threats of today and non-specific threats of tomorrow, ROK MND is pursuing improvements in force structure to secure “self-defense capabilities.”

B. Military Structure Improvement

Dramatic advancements in weapons systems resulted in the overlapping of the traditional battlefields of land, sea and air, with the boundaries between services slowly disappearing. For this reason, victory in today's war is heavily dependent on the level of cooperation and effective communication between the different military services. And balanced developments among the three services are being pursued to optimize the effects of integrated force structure.

Efforts are also being made to restructure the military by simplifying the multi-level chain of command to guarantee prompt response against any local aggression and disputes. Furthermore, the force structure of the past 50 years with its heavy emphasis on quantitative traditional military strength is expected to undergo a major transformation into high-tech intensive, qualitative force structure by linking information and scientific technology.

C. Pursuit of Force Improvements

Under the premises of preparing for the threats of today and non-specific threats of tomorrow, the objective of force improvements is to promptly secure a self-defense capability that can respond to changes in security environment. Accordingly, the first priority is to fully acquire the ability to counter existing threats from North Korea. At the same time, the ability to counter non-specific threats of the future will be developed while the basis of R&D and defense industry will be strengthened.

In order to fully acquire the ability to counter existing threats from North Korea, the ROK Armed Forces will overcome the quantitative advantage of North Korea's military strength through acquisition of and qualitative improvement in forces concerning surveillance, intelligence and precision-strike weapons. In particular, the ability to counter asymmetric forces such as WMD will be enhanced. In addition, to prepare for non-specific threats of the future, “a minimum level of sufficient combat defense power” that can deny enemy acts of aggression will be attained. Furthermore, digitized and scientific force structure that is adequate to conduct future war will be developed.

As a measure to solidify the foundation of defense industries and R&D, the acquisition of various weapons systems from abroad is to be minimized. The promotion of domestic R&D will receive priority while active efforts will be made to meet the requirements to facilitate localization of imported parts and promotion of future export.

On the other hand, efforts will be concentrated on the promotion of the domestic defense industry, encouraging domestic research for advanced weapons, and replacing the weapons parts produced from abroad with domestically produced ones.

The main focus of FIPs of each service is as follows. First, surveillance and intelligence collection capabilities over the Korean Peninsula theater and the establishment of real-time automated command and control processing

system are crucial in C4I and electronic warfare. To this end, plans are being made to secure the surveillance satellites, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), CPAS, and the tactical C4I system.

Maneuver/Strike forces structure is being improved with more emphasis placed on quality than on quantity. Also, more emphasis will be given to the acquisition of MLRS, K1A1 tanks, and K-9 self-propelled artillery to expand capabilities in offensive mobile warfare and strategic target strikes.

For naval forces, the Korean destroyer (KDX-II), 7000-ton class destroyer (KDX-III), LPX and 214-class submarines will be obtained to protect the SLOCs and to expand its maritime control capability.

Regarding the air and air-defense forces, the decision to acquire F-15K fighter has been made to maintain air superiority within the air defense area and to secure the pinpoint strike capability of strategic targets as well as long-range early warning systems and strategic surveillance capabilities. In addition, the attainment of the Airborne Warning and Control system (AWACS) and short-range air defense guided missiles will also be pursued.



Korean Destroyer (KDX-II)



K1A1 Tanks



Next Generation Fighter (F-15K)

Chapter Two

Pursuing Defense Digitization

A. Changes in Defense Digitization Environment

Due to the rapid developments in information and computer technology, the paradigm of civilization is changing from industrial to information, and firepower and maneuver-oriented modern warfare is changing into information and knowledge-based warfare. As a result, the traditional battlefields of land, sea, and air are expanding into space and cyberspace, creating a demand for a network integrated information system.

As a core policy measure, the military is currently pursuing “e-Defense Vision 2015” to achieve the objectives of advanced defense digitization.

B. Pursuit of Defense Digitization and Its Goals

The objective of defense digitization is to establish the “National Defense Integrated Information System” that will help achieve the vision of becoming “Information/Knowledge Focused Elite Digitized Military.” Under the objective-oriented policy, a gradual and systematic digitization process is carried out. To achieve standardization and interoperability, user-oriented digitization system is economically and efficiently being constructed by utilizing national resources and receiving cooperation from industrial, academic and research institutes.

The first stage of laying the information communication foundation system is to build a national defense integrated information system by 2005. The national defense integrated information system encompasses battlefield

[Figure 4-1] Diagram of National Defense Integrated Information System



management information system and resource management information system, which guarantee interoperability. The first stage of this project is to build a basis and core information system by 2005. Its second stage is to integrate all the functional systems to form an integrated information system and then upgrade the systems on a gradual basis until they reach the level of an advanced information system.

C. Building Integrated Defense Digitization System

1. Battlefield Management Information System

To visualize battlefields and enable prompt command decisions, the integrated C4I system will build and operate the military information system, operation planning and execution system and tactical resource distribution system based on the CPAS. Furthermore, it will construct an intelligent Information Integration System that enables command and control via a single terminal both during peacetime and wartime by mutually interlocking the

national warfare management system, CFC C4I system and tactical C4I system of each military service.

The ground-combat tactical C4I system aims to establish the combat execution system by automating the combat execution procedure of tactical units of the corps or subordinate level, which will detect, decide and strike prior to the enemy. The system will be completed by 2006.

The naval tactical C4I system, based on the Korean Naval Tactical Data System (KNTDS) and CPAS of the Naval Operations Command, plans to integrate every battlefield function in order to circulate and share prompt and accurate information needed for naval operations at the operations command level and to maximize the cooperative engagement capability including striking means.

The air-combat tactical C4I system will integrate the military information system, which currently provides target, electromagnetic and atmospheric information with the Master Control and Reporting Center (MCRC)-based operation information management system into the Air Force Operations Command-based operation information management system.

2. Resource Management Information System

Currently, the budget management system has been completed and is in full operation in the budget drafting and management fields. The fields of the budget investment and national defense financial information system will be completed by 2003 and 2004 respectively. As of 2002, the medical management system is currently operational in five hospitals including the Armed Forces Capital Hospital. Four additional hospitals will be incorporated into this system by 2003 and it will be expanded to a total of 16 hospitals in the long term.

The ammunition and materiel information system is currently being operated, and the international freight operation system will be developed by 2003. In addition, the equipment maintenance information system and transportation information system will be developed by 2007. By procuring all

the commodities through the electronic commerce system and by standardizing all facility operations of military service, the real-time automation processes are currently in operation beginning with the year of 2003.

In relation to the fields of data distribution, the National Defense Office Automation System will be changed to a web-based environment, completing the conversion of the whole of the military into a single system. This change is expected to provide a foundation for electronic administration and the sharing of information and knowledge.

3. Information Communication System

The information network will have greater processing capabilities and will be built extensively in connection with the national ultra-speed information network for a better broadband multimedia information distribution. The introduction of the Next Generation Network (NGN) concept will upgrade strategic and tactical networks, and the computer system will be intelligent, mobile and multi-functional. Computer facilities, which are currently scattered over individual echelons, will be integrated into the Consolidated Intelligence Management Office for national defense.

The information protection system safeguards the national defense information infrastructure from a cyber attack. To prepare for future information warfare, civil, government and military branches are maintaining a cooperative system to improve related policies and system. Furthermore, a multi-level information protection system, which is organically interlinked with a variety of systems, will be constructed removing vulnerabilities beforehand that may be exposed to various invasions. The development of national defense cryptograph equipment will be continually enhanced.

4. Digitization Environment

The mid- and long-term development of national defense digitization will

reinforce visions, goals, and strategies of national defense which were influenced by changes in information technology and the national defense environment. In building the national defense integrated information system, we will not only secure and standardize the common operating environment but also promote mutual integration with the automated information system.

D. Building Support System for Battle Focused Training

In the field of education and training, a remote education system, which continually integrates and supports school education, unit training and education training support, will be developed by applying cutting-edge information technology, thereby overcoming the limits imposed by space and time. By 2010, this kind of system will be reflected in the curriculum of current military training school by stages.

In the field of military library digitization, the library management and operation system will be standardized and computerized; a database will be constructed to share all of the information and library collections possessed by each individual institute.


The army's project of digitized training field at the battalion-level will help troops accumulate warfare experience in accordance with future battlefield environments, and the project will be developed into the Korea Combat Training Center (KCTC) by 2004. At the KCTC, new tactics and war technique will be developed and verified. The troops will also be able to experience combat training in an integrated cyber war-game multiplex.

The modeling & simulation system aims at developing a war-game model on a functional and objective basis and this will be gradually integrated into a Korean war-game model. To ensure real-time operational simulation and decision-making support that can provide operation execution capabilities,

the modeling & simulation system will ultimately be developed as a dispersed form of a war game system.

E. Strengthening Digitization Education of Service Members

Digitization education of service members, which contributes to the policy of national digitization education, is focused on keeping up with the knowledge-based information society. Therefore, by improving the Internet environment and continually securing personal computers at a company level, the project of digitization education will provide an opportunity for cyber education and language training of military personnel.



Digitization Education of Service Members

Chapter Three

Advancing the ROK-US Alliance

This year marks the 50th anniversary of the official inauguration of the ROK-US alliance. As the cornerstone of our nation's security, the ROK-US alliance has contributed not only to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula for the last 50 years but also to ROK's political development and economic prosperity.

There have been numerous changes in the national security environment pertaining to the ROK-US alliance including the US-led reconfiguration of the international order following the fall of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War, while in terms of national power, the ROK has joined the ranks of advanced nations. Within the framework of such a changing security environment, the ROK-US alliance now faces the challenges to change and develop with an eye toward the future. The Participatory Government is thus making diverse efforts to advance the ROK-US alliance to a more comprehensive and dynamic partnership for the 21st century.

A. Developments in the Roles and Characteristics of ROK-US Alliance

The conventional definition of national security has been to ensure the survival and independence of a nation against external military threats. However, as we enter the new era of information and globalization, some sources of threats, such as terrorism and drugs, are becoming increasingly more non-military and transnational in nature, and the paradigm of national security is changing into a more comprehensive concept that includes economy, technology, and environment.

Taking these changes into consideration, the Participatory Government, through the ROK-US Summit meeting of May 15, 2003, agreed to further develop the ROK-US alliance into a more comprehensive and dynamic one from what was essentially a military alliance to deter the North. Furthermore, through the talks between the



ROK-US Defense Ministers' Talks

two Defense Ministers held on June 27, 2003, it was agreed that the ROK Armed Forces expand its role in defending the Korean Peninsula, and that the ROK-US alliance develop in such a way that will continue to contribute to regional stability.

As a result, the ROK-US alliance will transform into a more productive alliance that enables both countries to preserve and advance the universal values of humanity. The ROK, with its enhanced role accompanying its international status, will strengthen its position as one of the core nations contributing to peace and prosperity not only on the Korean Peninsula but also in the surrounding region.

B. Progressive Adjustment of USFK Base Structure

During the past half century, the ROK has experienced exponential growth, and, as a result of rapid urbanization and expansion, USFK bases and facilities dispersed throughout the nation have increased the number of civil petitions, resulting in negative effects on the ROK-US alliance. In order to process these civil petitions, and at the same time design a more efficient plan to utilize land resources while strengthening combat readiness and the efficiency of base

management, a plan to integrate USFK base structure into select key areas is currently under way.

The Yongsan garrison, which has been the source of inconvenience to people due to its location at the heart of Seoul, is scheduled for relocation in the near future, paving the way for a more balanced urban development, and the relocation of USFK bases located north of the Han River is to be carried out in two phases.

The first phase is to consolidate USFK bases north of the Han River into either Camp Casey of the Dongducheon area or Camp Red Cloud of the Uijeongbu area. The second phase is to ultimately integrate these bases into key areas south of the Han River. These adjustments of the USFK base structure will take into account the political, economic, and security situations of the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. As a result of these adjustments, the ROK and the US will be able to share such common interests in addressing civil petitions and improving combat readiness posture, thereby solidifying the alliance between the two countries.

C. ROK-US Combined Forces Modernization

The information age, which was brought forth by the digital and network revolutions, is fundamentally altering the paradigm of warfare.

New types of warfare completely unknown during the Industrial Age, such as information, network, and long-range precision strike warfare, are being introduced, as was demonstrated in the Gulf War (1991), and wars in Kosovo (1999), Afghanistan (2001), and Iraq (2003). The ROK and the US are working together to modernize their combined military capabilities in line with these new concepts in warfare.

USFK has decided to invest \$11 billion over the next 4 years to gradually modernize and reinforce its forces, enhancing intelligence collection capabilities, increasing stockpiling of precision munitions, stationing and

rotating its rapid deployment brigade (the Stryker Unit) in order to improve its counterstrike capabilities and procure additional pre-deployed stockpiles for the purpose of strengthening the ROK's defense posture.

The ROK Armed Forces, in accordance with its force improvement plan, will reinforce its own self-defense capabilities by enhancing the core areas of strength, such as intelligence capabilities and deterrence capabilities against North Korea, that



The Second Joint Consultation Meeting on the Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative

have been, up to now, dependent on the US. In tandem with these efforts, the ROK Armed Forces will also gradually assume some of the military missions that were performed by USFK, consequently expanding the ROK military's role in defending the peninsula. These efforts will help to enhance the competency of the ROK-US alliance and fortify the security of the Korean Peninsula.

In the past, the domestic affairs of the US or changes in the international security environment resulted in one-sided policy decisions, which in turn caused the ROK-US alliance to undergo certain fluctuations. However, both countries agree that the alliance between the two sides should be coordinated in accordance with the common interests achieved through close cooperation.

Thus, the ROK and the US are currently undertaking the “Future ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative” to provide a blueprint for the future of the ROK-US alliance.

Based on the outcomes of the past 50 years, the ROK-US alliance will continue to develop into a mutually beneficial relationship that hinges on respect and trust of one another through close assistance and cooperation,

while at the same time, maintaining a firm and stable combined defense posture.

Chapter Four

Promoting Foreign Military Exchanges and Cooperation

A. Military Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries

The goal of the ROK's military diplomacy is to deter war on the Korean Peninsula and to contribute to regional peace and stability and more broadly to world peace by building mutual trust among friendly nations. To accomplish this goal, the ROK government will strengthen the traditionally friendly and cooperative ROK-US alliance. Another focus is on the development of balanced military relations and multilateral military cooperation with neighboring countries. Through these efforts, the ROK government hopes to realize “Peaceful and Prosperous Era in Northeast Asia” and “Establishment of a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula.”

In particular, military diplomacy with neighboring countries plays a central role in the ROK government's foreign policy because geo-politically the Korean Peninsula is an area of political and military interest where competition and cooperation of the world military powers cross over. Moreover, the Cold War order still remains on the Korean Peninsula with the military standoff between the two Koreas.

Therefore, based on the foreign policy of the government, we are trying to gain the understanding and support from neighboring countries to resolve pending security issues, such as a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Military trust and enhanced relations between neighboring countries are also being pursued through diverse military exchanges and cooperation. Furthermore, ways to contribute to the regional peace are also

being sought.

1. Military Exchanges and Cooperation with Japan

Military exchanges and cooperation with Japan are based on the “New Partnership for the 21st Century” between Korea and Japan and are being developed into a future-oriented partnership. The ROK and Japan have gradually expanded and developed military exchanges and relations since the establishment of the ROK military attaché's office in Japan in 1966 and the Japanese military attaché's office in Korea the following year. These exchanges were mainly personnel-based. Since 1994, however, the scope of exchanges has expanded and diversified through visits of high-ranking officials, such as the annual Defense Ministers' Talks and a variety of regular working level meetings.

The “Joint Declaration of New Korea-Japan Partnership for the 21st Century” was agreed on October 3, 1998 in Tokyo, providing an opportunity for both countries to strengthen bilateral cooperation and exchanges in many areas. Following this, meetings such as the 1999 ROK JCS-Japanese Joint Staff Council staff talks and the ROK Navy-Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Forces talks were held for the first time, diversifying military communication channels. Moreover, a joint search-and-rescue exercise was conducted in 2000 for purely peaceful purposes, and the ROK Navy marching band participated in the Japanese Self Defense Forces Marching Festival.

In 2001, however, the disagreement on the contents in Japanese history textbooks modified and put on hold military relations. In April 2002, the Japanese Defense Minister visited Korea to participate in the Defense Ministers' talks, and the two Ministers agreed that “we must learn from history and step forward together into the future in harmony,” and reconfirmed that military exchanges must be accompanied by mutual trust and the support of both Korean and Japanese citizens, based on the correct understanding of the two nations' past history.

The successful 2002 Korea-Japan World Cup and PKO cooperation in East

Timor have made a great contribution not only to both countries but also to regional stability as well. During the Defense Ministers' talks on March 29, 2003, the two ministers agreed to strengthen the ROK-US-Japan security relations to peacefully resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. The visits of high-ranking officials and exhibition soccer match between cadets are expected to raise the relationship to another level.

Future military exchanges and cooperation with Japan will become more diversified based on the idea of the joint declaration of “New Partnership of the 21st Century.” It will greatly contribute not only to building military confidence and promoting friendship but also to establishing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as well.

2. Military Exchanges and Cooperation with China

There has been significant progress in economic, social, and cultural relations between the ROK and China since normalization of relations in August 2002. In November of 2002, presidential talks were held and both sides agreed to form the “ROK-China Cooperative Partnership for the 21st Century.” With Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's visit to Korea, the two countries agreed to develop their relationship to the one of “Full-Fledged Cooperation,” including politics and military, laying down a framework for an epochal development of ROK-China relationship in all areas.

Based on the extensive progress in ROK-China relations, military relations between the two countries have progressed gradually after the establishment of a ROK military attaché's office in 1993 and a Chinese military attaché's



China's Deputy Chief of Staff visiting the ROK Defense Minister

office in 1994. Since then, the exchanges of military athletic groups, the ROK-China defense forum, and military education have been active. In particular, since the ROK-China Defense Ministers' talks in 1999, these talks have become an annual event. Through these events, including official visits at the level of Chief of Staff, the scope of military exchanges is gradually expanding.

Recently, more substantial exchanges and cooperation have been made. In 2001, for instance, a cruiser fleet from the ROK Naval Academy visited Shanghai for the first time. In 2002, ROK aircraft visited China, and in the same year, Chinese naval vessels visited Korea for the first time. In 2003, more diverse military exchanges and cooperation are expected to take place. Korea expects a visit from China's Deputy Chief of Staff, and the ROK Chairman of JCS is also planning to visit China. A Chinese transport aircraft is expected to land on Korean soil in 2003.

With President Roh Moo-Hyun's visit to China on July 2003, ROK-China relations have been raised to the new level of a “Full-Fledged Cooperative Partner Relationship” and will focus on solidifying military confidence between the two countries while contributing to establishing peace in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean Peninsula.

3. Military Exchanges and Cooperation with Russia

After the diplomatic normalization in 1990 and the establishment of military attaché's offices of both countries in 1991, exchanges between high-ranking officials have resulted in various measures for building military confidence. The military relations between the two countries have made a noticeable development during the short period of time.

The first ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' Talks in 1994 produced an “Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents at Seas Beyond Territorial Waters” between the two countries. The ROK-Russia Joint Defense Policy Consultative Meeting was held in 1997, and since its first meeting in 2000, the Defense Industry and Logistics Cooperation meetings have been held annually. In 2002, the “Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities” was

concluded. Through these events the two countries are strengthening the foundation for building military confidence.

On April 10, 2003, the ROK-Russia Defense Ministers' talks were held in Seoul. During the talks, both sides agreed to diversify their military exchanges and cooperation, and Russia gave support for a peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue and the ROK's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity."



Signing of MOU on Military Exchange between ROK and Russia

[Table 4-1] Military Exchanges with Neighboring Countries

() : year of initiation

Classification	Japan	China	Russia
Defense Ministers' Talks	Annual event since 1994 * March 29, 2003, Seoul	Exchange visits since 1999 * January 20, 2001, Seoul	Exchange visits since 1994 * April 10, 2003, Seoul
Working Level Meetings	Defense Policy Working Level Meeting(1994) National Security Policy Consultative Meeting (1998, Foreign Policy + National Defense Policy) ROK JCS-Japan Joint Staff Council Meeting (1999) Air Defense Working Level Meeting (1991)	Defense Policy Consultative Meeting (1995) Foreign Policy, Defense Meetings (2002)	Defense Policy Working Level Meeting (1997) Defense Industry and Logistics Cooperation Committee (2000) Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities Committee (1995)
Exchanges of Ships	Visit to Japan (1994) Visit to Korea (1996)	Visit to China (2001) Visit to Korea (2003)	Visit to Russia (1994) Visit to Korea (1993)
Exchanges of Transport Aircraft	Visit to Japan (2000) Visit to Korea (2002)	Visit to China (2002) Visit to Korea (2003)	Visit to Russia (planned in 2004)
Other Important Exchanges	Joint Sea Operations (2000) Participation in Japanese Self- Defense Forces Marching Festival (2000)	Exchanges of military athletic groups (1992)	Conclusion of the Agreement on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities (2002)

More diverse exchanges and cooperation have been planned in 2003, such as visits of high-ranking military officers and military exercises.

In the future, the ROK-Russia relationship will continuously develop into a “Constructive Partnership.” Based on personnel exchanges and systematic efforts towards building military confidence, this relationship will contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

B. Participation in International Peace-Keeping Operations

1. Outline of Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO)

With the end of the Cold War, the probability of a large-scale war has greatly diminished. In the meantime, regional disputes, fought over race, borders, and resources are increasing. Under such circumstances, roles of Peace-Keeping Operations (PKO) led by the UN have been extended as sentinels of world peace and order. The PKOs led by the UN are carried out with the approval of the UN Security Council, and with an agreement between involved parties in the conflict in most situations. The operational units are composed of military, civilian, police, election observers, UN and international organizations, various NGOs, etc.

Peace-Keeping Forces (PKF) that are dispatched at the unit level exercise authority granted by the UN to perform peacekeeping activities such as maintaining public order and conducting civil operations. Military Observation Groups (MOG), who are dispatched in a private capacity and are unarmed, monitor violations of ceasefire agreements and perform such duties as patrol, investigation and arbitration. In principle, the UN finances the expenses of UN-led PKOs. For operations led by regional organizations, the troop dispatching countries pay for most of the expenses.

As of May 2003, approximately 37,000 military and civilian police personnel from 89 countries are serving in 14 regions including East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Cyprus.

2. Participation Status of ROK Armed Forces in PKO

In 1993, a ROK engineer battalion was dispatched to Somalia (UNOSOM-II). Since then, 5,000 Korean peacekeepers have been dispatched to seven different regions including East Timor, Angola, and Western Sahara, in accordance with the international effort to maintain peace throughout the world. In October 1999, ROK PKO faced a new phase both in terms of quantity and quality, by dispatching an infantry unit comprised of mainly Special Warfare Forces to East Timor. ROK's active participation in PKOs is partly an act of reciprocating the military support that the UN and the international community provided the ROK during the Korean War.

In addition, it has contributed to improving reputation of the ROK in the international society. As of May 2003, the ROK MND has sent a total of 295 Korean soldiers to 5 regions of conflict, which puts the Korean army in 30th place in terms of size of troops participating in PKOs. Currently, ROK soldiers are faithfully carrying out their responsibilities as sentinels of peace.

[Table 4-2] PKO Participation Status of the ROK

Region	Type	Dispatch Period	Size of Troops	Rotation Term
Western Sahara	Medical support unit	September 1994~	20	6 months
Georgia	Military Observers	October 1994~	7	1 year
India, Pakistan	Military Observers	November 1994~	9	1 year
East Timor	Infantry battalion	October 1994~	250	6 months
	Headquarter staffs	January 2000~	8	1 year
Cyprus	Commander in Chief	January 2002~	1	1 year


※ Numbers as of May 2003. Refer to appendices for older data.

a. Participation in East Timor PKO

In October 1999, the ROK government formed the 420-member strong “Evergreen Unit” which consisted of the main contingent force of 201 infantry personnel and support personnel in transportation, supplies, communications, and medical support. The first Evergreen Unit began its operations on October 22, 1999 in Los Palos, East Timor. Since then, the Evergreen Unit was the first unit among participating multinational forces to have its status changed to the UN PKF on February 1, 2000. Currently, the 8th dispatch unit is carrying out various missions after being relocated from Los Palos to the Oecussi region on January 13, 2002.

[Figure 4-2] Organization of the Evergreen Unit

(as of May 30, 2003)



※ The number of persons in the Evergreen Unit : 250 (3 liaison officers included)

The Oecussi region, which is currently under the Area of Responsibility (AOR) of the Evergreen Unit, is an isolated territory in East Timor which is actually located within West Timor. It has a population of approximately 47,000. The Evergreen Unit has perfectly conducted its duties including borderline control, maintenance of public order, provision of military support to civil operations, and protection of vital facilities in the Oecussi region.

The unit transferred the borderline control mission to the East Timor government in April 2003. The unit has also actively engaged in humanitarian relief activities, such as provision of medical treatment to local residents, prevention of infectious diseases, transportation of relief goods, as well as execution of restoration operations. A civil operation named the “Blue Angel” program that consisted of provision of medical care, movie-showing, haircut service, and repair of farming equipment, is particularly notable. This operation, which has been conducted twice a week, has contributed to the strengthening of relations between the unit and the natives by providing much needed services to improve their quality of life. Moreover, the operation has helped the locals find renewed hope and will to revitalize their region.

The Evergreen Unit is now referred to as “Malraimutin,” meaning the best of the multinational forces by the locals for its devotion and sincere effort to accomplish its mission. The UN has also praised it as the most exemplary unit among the countries participating in the PKO in East Timor.



Humanitarian Aid Activities By the Evergreen Unit

● The Achievements of the ROK Armed Forces in East Timor PKO

First, the dispatch of the ROK troops made the ROK an active contributor in maintaining peace in the Asia-Pacific region. This was a significant progress because the ROK was, in the past, only a passive receiver of the UN's help in defending its freedom and democracy.

Second, this was the ROK's first dispatch of an infantry unit in PKO. It had broadened the ROK's scope of participation in Peace-Keeping activities. Previously, only medical and engineer units were dispatched considering of the security situation of the ROK.

Third, with its prompt dispatch and successful completion of the mission, the unit has greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace and stability in East Timor, building a good image of the ROK as a peace-loving nation.

As East Timor regained its stability after winning their independence in May 2002, the UN has gradually reduced the size of PKF in East Timor. The Evergreen Unit is expected to completely withdraw in October 2003.

b. Activities of Korean Medical Units in Western Sahara

The Korean medical unit, currently participating in the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), started its mission in September 1994, when the very first dispatch contingent unit was sent from the ROK. As of May 2003, 20 Koreans are carrying out their duties at the 8th dispatch contingent unit. The Korean medical unit is the only organized unit among participating units and is performing the following duties: provision of basic medical support to MINURSO personnel; transfer of severely injured or sick patients to larger hospitals; 24-hour standby for emergency patient treatment; prevention of infectious disease of the MINURSO Headquarters; and inspection of both water and food hygiene. The teams have contributed to building a great reputation for the ROK by providing top quality medical care to over 45,000 UN personnel in the past 9 years.



Activities of Korean Medical Units in Western Sahara

c. Military Observer Activities

The ROK Armed Forces has been dispatching military observers since 1994. Currently, nine field officers are working as a member of the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and seven are participating in the UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). The dispatched officers are serving under the control of the local command and have been faithfully performing tasks including monitoring of ceasefire violation, patrolling, investigation, reporting, and arbitration.

d. Participation as Commander in Chief of UN PKF in Cyprus

The ROK's successful accomplishment in PKO is well acknowledged, and the ROK military was requested to recommend a ROK general to be appointed as the PKF commander in the Republic of Cyprus by the UN Secretariat in October 2001. The government recommended General Hwang Jin Ha and in due course he became the first ROK military officer to be appointed as a commander in chief of the UN Peace-Keeping Forces in January 2002. He has been providing support to the Special Representative of the Secretary General in regards to military and security issues. He is currently responsible for prevention of military conflicts and maintenance of peace in Cyprus.

4. Policy Agenda for Peace Keeping Operations

a. Participation in the UN PKO Stand-by Arrangement System

The UN PKO stand-by arrangement system requires participating nations to designate a set of units and troops for UN PKO participation and maintain readiness posture for their dispatch. The agreement also requires the nations to provide the UN with the dispatching units within an agreed time period. The ROK notified the UN of its desire to participate in the system by setting approximately 800 troops aside for PKO dispatch in March 1995. Yet the ROK's participation still remains in the class 3-level, the lowest level according to the UN's PKO classification system. Recently, the UN has notified its member states that it added a new "Rapid Deployment Level (RDL)" in addition to the current system and requested their cooperation. RDL stipulates that a nation should have the ability to dispatch 5,000 troops within 30 days and 10,000 troops within 90 days for PKO operations. The ROK MND has well recognized that acquiring RDL-status is vital in securing opportunities for the future PKOs. Hence, the MND plans to collaborate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to acquire RDL status. The MND has been actively preparing to meet the "Rapid Deployment Level" by pre-designating suitable units and developing adequate education and training system for the UN PKO

stand-by arrangement system.

b. Legislation of Overseas Troop Dispatch Laws

As mentioned above, the ROK Military has made significant achievements in PKO, yet its participation was severely limited due to lack of laws that would support PKO operations. Thus, each case of dispatch had required the approval of the National Assembly, which occasionally made the dispatch impossible due to prolonged delays as well as lack of legal ground to guarantee legal status of service members.

In order to resolve these problems, the MND, along with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, is working on specific procedures and regulations for overseas dispatch of troops as well as related legislation to clarify legal grounds to guarantee the legal status of the dispatched personnel.

c. Development of the PKO Education System

The MND designated the National Defense University as the institution exclusively in charge of educating officers chosen to serve as military observers and staff, and established a PKO department in the school. Also, the institution was designated as the exclusive institution responsible for providing unit-level PKO education to special warfare training units.

However, the organization of the PKO department is so weak that it does not have adequate resources for neither systemic research nor appropriate education and training.

Taking such limitations into consideration, the MND decided to establish an “International Peace Supporting Center” in the National Defense University to function as a specialized educational institution to train personnel fit for PKO activities. It is also expected to serve as a research center of PKO. The MND has a plan to expand its function as a special PKO educational institution not only for the military personnel but also for police, civilian, and foreign army personnel who will take part in PKO activities.

C. International Arms Control and Multilateral Security Cooperation Activities

1. International Arms Control Activities

Currently, the international community is operating various international arms control treaties and organizations in an effort to strengthen the control of strategic materials and the reduction and nonproliferation of WMDs, that threaten world peace and stability. Also, the international community has been actively pursuing multilateral dialogues on arms reduction by utilizing key international organizations such as the UN, Conference on Disarmament, and the IAEA.

Recognizing that the effort in arms control and nonproliferation will greatly contribute to world peace and stability, the ROK government has also joined and actively participated in international arms control arrangements. By faithfully fulfilling the required duties as a concerned party to these international regimes, the ROK has strived to enhance its national interest as well as to uplift its international status and credibility.

The ROK government is involved in many international efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons through participation in the NPT, the NSG, and the Zangger Committee, and is exerting diverse efforts to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in a peaceful way. In addition, in order to bring the CTBT into force as early as possible, the ROK is applying multi-dimensional diplomatic efforts so that the signatories (44 states that possess nuclear reactors including the 5 nuclear states) including North Korea who are obliged to ratify the treaty, sign the CTBT in an expedite manner. Furthermore, North Korea's missile production and deployment, which severely threatens the ROK's security, is being deterred through the ROK-US combined defense posture, and the ROK government is cooperating with the international community to fundamentally resolve the missile issue by inducing North Korea to give up the production and export of missiles and join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).

Currently, the ROK government, in accordance with the international trend towards the reduction and abandonment of chemical and biological weapons, is participating in various international organization activities related to inspection and verification of chemical and biological weapons by the UN, OPCW and BWC. However, considering that North Korea is not a member state of the CWC, the ROK government has proposed a resolution that calls for immediate accession to CWC by all non-member states, titled “Recommendation on Ensuring the Universality of the Convention,” to be adopted by the OPCW Executive Council. Through this resolution, an international consensus for inducing North Korea to abandon its chemical weapons will be achieved. Furthermore, the ROK government is making every effort to enhance the level of professionalism of the ROK Armed Forces by actively dispatching personnel to international organizations related to issues of bio-chemical weapons such as OPCW and the UN, as well as to facilitate the internationalization of the ROK Armed Forces.

Meanwhile, after signing the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in May 2001, which prohibits the inhumane use of land mines, the ROK government has solidified its image as a nation that is continuously concerned about inhumane use of land mines. In particular, with the concern that landmines, the major purpose of which is to protect key facilities in the rear area, could inflict harm on the civilian population, the MND commenced full-scale mine clearing operations in the rear area in 1996. Accordingly, mines in 7 bases located in or near urban areas out of 39 rear area bases have been completely cleared as of 2002. As a part of the plan to clear the entire rear area of minefields by 2006, 11 additional bases will be cleared of mines this year. Also, in order to join in the international community's pursuit to achieve peace for mankind, the MND will actively participate in supporting the UN mine removal trust fund and humanitarian mine clearing activities.

2. Participation in Regional Multilateral Security Cooperation Dialogue

Since 1990, the ROK government has been actively participating in regional multilateral security cooperation talks in an effort to increase mutual understanding of nations in Asia, and to build confidence and establish cooperative systems in order to aggressively deal with potential threats that may arise from the changing international and regional security environments.

In particular, the Participatory Government, which was inaugurated in February 2003, adopted a concept of “cooperative security” along with alliance policy as its key security concepts in order to deter war, reduce tension, promote peaceful coexistence, and create an environment for peaceful reunification on the Korean Peninsula. It is also as well as making efforts to establish a multilateral security cooperation dialogue that involves ROK, North Korea, US, Japan, China, and Russia for comprehensive consultation on issues regarding the security in Northeast Asia.

Currently, the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF) is a primary inter-government level multilateral security cooperation dialogue body within the Asia Pacific region. From the perspective of regional security, ARF has recently been involved in a process to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue and after the Intersession Meeting for Confidence Building Measures held in Wellington, New Zealand in November 2002, ARF has demonstrated its deep concern over North Korea's nuclear weapons program and has made concerted efforts to work through the situation in a peaceful manner urging North Korea's prompt return to NPT and its resumption of cooperation with the IAEA.

By actively participating in regional multilateral security cooperation dialogues, the ROK government continues to make all necessary efforts to address various threats to security, including the peaceful resolution of the Korean Peninsula problem, with other regional states, while actively supporting activities of non-governmental regional multilateral security cooperation dialogue, thus making an effort to converge policy initiatives proposed by civilian experts.

D. War against Terror and the Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces

1. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War in the late 20th century, terrorism has been perceived as the greatest threat to the international community and has emerged as an urgent issue that needs to be jointly addressed by the international community. The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center buildings on September 11, 2001, which terrorized the US, has clearly exposed the new forms of threat of the 21st century and has triggered the ongoing war against terror.

After first attacking Afghanistan, a direct state-sponsor of the 9 · 11 terrorist incident, the US, as an extension of its War on Terror, planned and executed a war against Iraq on March 20, 2003, to eliminate weapons of mass destruction and terrorist threats.

It is true that the international community holds a different perspective on the two wars led by the US. The War in Afghanistan, named “Operation Enduring Freedom,” which aimed to punish Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network that are responsible for the 9 · 11 terrorist attacks, was carried out under the full support of the international community. However, a fierce debate on the war against Iraq erupted for the reason of lack of justification, whose side effects continue to this day.

The ROK has joined the US-led international coalition against terrorism to contribute to world peace and security and to further strengthen the ROK-US alliance. With the approval of the National Assembly, a total of 1,178 military personnel has been dispatched and they are making every effort to successfully complete their objectives.

2. The War in Afghanistan and Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces

The War in Afghanistan, triggered by the 9 · 11 terrorist attacks, began with

US air-raids on October 7, 2001 under the name “Operation Enduring Freedom.” The operation had four phases. The objective of the first phase (September 2001~October 2001) was to set conditions with focus on military cooperation and troop deployment. The second phase (October 8, 2001~December 2001) was the initial combat phase that put emphasis on air operations and special forces operations. The third phase (December 8, 2001~present), which constitutes the decisive operation, has put a practical end to combat. The fourth phase of stabilization concerns supporting the interim Afghanistan government (established in July, 2002) focusing on the mopping up of remnant Al Qaeda forces and the capture of Bin Laden. Both the third and fourth phases of the war are in progress simultaneously, and the transition to the fourth phase is expected to be completed in the near future.

The stabilization operation is expected to last for a prolonged period of time. The US plans to organize provincial reconstruction teams and put them in charge of civil operations in the eight regional administration districts delineated by the US. The US has already begun civil operations in three of the eight districts.

Sporadic small-scale terrorist attacks are still taking place in Afghanistan. However, the country is in relatively stable condition and thus, there is no serious threat to the safety of dispatched ROK forces in the area. The dispatched ROK forces consist of a medical support unit and both air and maritime transport support units. They were dispatched immediately after the ROK government issued the statement of assistance on September 24, 2001, and the National Assembly gave its consent. An additional construction engineer corps was dispatched to the area in February 2002 upon the request by the US.

The first ROK medical support unit consisting of 100 soldiers and officers was sent to Kyrgyzstan on February 27, 2002. The unit has provided medical services to the soldiers of the coalition forces as well as to the local population. The second dispatched unit laid the groundwork for subsequent dispatch to Afghanistan. Finally, the third unit was dispatched to the largest US military

base located in CJTF-180, 40km north of Kabul, Afghanistan. The third dispatch was made in February 2003 and some of the troops are working in Manas.

So far, the ROK units have been successfully carrying out their missions by providing medical services to approximately 60,000 allied troops and citizens of Afghanistan. In addition, it has been raising ROK status as well as promoting inter-state relations by providing services such as Tae-kwon-do lessons and granting scholarships to Kyrgyzstan college students who are majoring in the Korean language.

The first ROK Navy transport support unit consisted of one landing ship tank (LST) and 171 crew members. It was the first unit to be sent to the war. It has been carrying out missions within the AOR of US PACOM using the Singapore port as its base port since it left Korea on December 18, 2001. The sixth dispatch unit, which consists of 163 sailors, is currently operating the ship. So far, it has transported 5,000 tons of US military supplies in 16 missions and has given assistance to special operations.

The Air Force transport support unit, which consists of 76 crew members, began carrying out their duties on December 28, 2001, using Kimhae Airbase as its main base. It has functioned as a regular conveyance line that connects Gimhae, Singapore and Diego Garcia. Its main mission has been transportation of troops and supplies within the AOR of US PACOM. The sixth dispatch unit, which consists of 78 crew members, is currently on duty. So far, the aircrew has successfully completed 62 missions that involved transport of 250 tons of supplies and 577 troops.

A construction engineer support unit of 150 troops was organized according to a request from the US army and was sent to the US base in Bagram, Afghanistan with the third medical support unit on February 27, 2003. Its main mission has been construction work within the base. It plans to provide assistance to Afghanistan civilians as soon as the necessary work is completed on the base.

3. The War in Iraq and Dispatch of ROK Armed Forces

a. Operation Iraqi Freedom

Upon completion of the War in Afghanistan, the US singled out Iraq as a producer of WMDs and a state-sponsor of terrorism. On March 20, 2003, the US-UK Coalition Forces initiated the air-raid of Iraq titled “Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF).” OIF was divided into 4 phases. During the first “set condition” phase, inducement of division within Iraq, gradual attrition, and pre-deployment of military forces were executed. In the second “initial combat” phase, focus was on the elimination of Saddam Hussein and neutralization of the Iraqi command and control system. In the third “decisive operation” phase, executed between March 20 and April 15, 2003, major battles of the war were concluded with the deployment of main forces that conducted a simultaneous multi-dimensional battle, that led to the capture of Baghdad and Tikrit. With President Bush's declaration of the end to major combat operations on May 1, 2003, the 43 day-long War in Iraq was concluded with the US and the coalition forces being victorious. Currently, it has entered the fourth “stabilization” phase, with force relocation, reconstruction, and support of the interim government in progress.

b. Underlying Rationales for ROK Armed Forces Dispatch

The US asked for support in the form of possible participation of the ROK in the war through humanitarian support, post-war reconstruction and combat support operation in November 2002 and March 2003. The ROK government has carefully assessed the request and prepared for possible outbreak of war accordingly. When the war broke out on March 20, 2003, President Roh made a public address to the people of Korea during which he presented the official government position that, “in light of current international events, the non-proliferation of WMD, and the importance of ROK-US alliance, it is in our national interest to support US efforts.” The President, after convening the National Security Council and cabinet meetings, decided the dispatch of the

construction engineer and medical support units.

There was much internal conflict that led up to the approval by the National Assembly to dispatch troops on March 21. Globally, the weak justification for war and little regard of the due process of law spurred criticism and anti-war public opinion in the international community. Domestically, public opinion against the dispatch of troops grew at many levels including the civic groups. A special session of the National Assembly to approve the troop dispatch was held, but the plenary session of the Assembly had to be postponed twice due to rising public opinion and demonstrations against dispatching troops. A special meeting that required mandatory participation of all members of the National Assembly had to be held for the first time in Korean legislative history. The meeting lasted for two full days.

While the ROK Armed Forces prepared for the quick dispatch of its troops with government approval, it also made a great effort to convince political parties and the governmental branches involved of the necessity to dispatch troops. The MND also made efforts to build a public consensus in favor of troop dispatch through the press and defense publications. After government efforts to galvanize public support, such as the President's public address on the subject as well as televised debates, the National Assembly finally approved the dispatch on April 2, and the troop dispatch to support the war in Iraq was put on track.

Following are the rationale for the dispatch, despite wide-spread opposition from both domestic and international communities. The first rationale was strengthening the alliance between the US and the ROK. The two nations have maintained a strong alliance over the past half-century. The US, which committed more than 140,000 lives in defending the ROK during the Korean War, is an ally forged in blood and has continued to support the defense of the ROK by having stationed 37,000 troops in Korea. Bound by a special bilateral alliance, Korea is living up to the spirit of the alliance to assist the US, a partner in the defense of ROK, when they are in need of help. A strengthened alliance between the two nations is especially important because coordination with the US is vital to the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear

issue. It is in this context that the dispatch of troops to the war in Iraq will be an opportunity to respond to the US as an ally and further strengthen the ROK-US alliance.

The second rationale for dispatch is to contribute to the establishment of world peace and security as a responsible member of the international community, and thereby promote the nation's status and peaceful image. There has been much criticism regarding the US government's justification for the War in Iraq, that Iraq has been the active supporter of the terrorism and that it poses a serious threat to world peace. Despite such sentiment, the ROK government decided to support the US based on the belief that the war could contribute to world peace and stability. After the war ended, much evidence has been found that supports the ROK government's position. In particular, the activities by our dispatched support units in reconstruction and humanitarian efforts clearly demonstrate that our troop dispatch is living up to its initial goals.

Third, economic factors including energy resource security and participation in post-war reconstruction were considered. The fact that Korea is 97% dependent on energy resources from foreign sources and 77% of these are imported from the Middle East was a major factor in the final decision. Another consideration was that the dispatch would improve the country's chances of participation in a great number of large-scale reconstruction projects and various other projects after the war.

Other rationales for troop dispatch include gaining combat experience, strengthening combined operations capability through joint operations with foreign armed forces, and expanding military diplomatic ties with allied and concerned nations.

c. ROK Armed Forces Dispatch and Future Prospects

The dispatch of ROK Armed Forces was made after careful preparation. All units were dispatched only after a comprehensive three-week training course. First, three staff members were sent to Kuwait on April 7 for cooperation purposes. Twenty additional members were sent to Kuwait on April 17 for a

detailed assessment of the operation environment and duties. They also laid the groundwork for cooperation with involved countries.

While there was a problem regarding establishment of a SOFA for entry into Kuwait, the dispatch was made on time with full support from Kuwait and the US. The first echelon was sent on April 30. The unit, which consisted of 236 construction engineers and 90 medical staff, went through RSO, an adjustment-training program, under the supervision of US forces in Kuwait. They were then assigned to the Nasiriya area. On May 14, the second echelon of 329 construction engineers was deployed, which marked the successful completion of the ROK Armed Forces dispatch.

Since April, the medical support unit has been providing medical services twice a week in different areas of Iraq. So far, it has provided medical services to an average of 130 people per day. The July 11 completion of a hospital building has enabled the unit to provide services to a much greater number of people.

The construction engineer unit has been actively involved in repair of aged infrastructures in Nasiriya which lay in ruins after years of war and prolonged economic stagnation. Hospitals, public waterworks, sewage pipelines and schools have been the top priority of their operation.

Despite the conflict regarding justification of dispatch and troop



Departure of Suh-Hee Unit for Iraq



Provision of medical service to Iraqi civilians

safety issues, the dispatched units have been receiving favorable comments from the local citizens. They also have been contributing greatly to building favorable national image of the ROK and improving military diplomatic ties with various nations.

The likelihood of war being led by a single nation or a regional body, such as in the case of “Operation Enduring Freedom” and “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” is expected to rise. Unlike the UN led military operations like PKO, the participating nations must cover their own expenses, which will create more difficulty in the decision making process.

Therefore, it is vital to modify regulations and military systems to more efficiently manage dispatch units, and consolidate as well as strengthen the organization to carry out these tasks. The MND recognizes the importance of overseas dispatch operations and has allocated resources for necessary research.

Chapter Five

Reducing Tension and Establishing Peace on the Korean Peninsula

A. Efforts to Build Military Confidence between the Two Koreas

Establishment of a peace regime on the Korean Peninsula can be defined as the transition from the state of armistice to the state of peace, the former of which has characterized the order on the Korean Peninsula for the past 50 years, and development of institutions in the areas of security, inter-Korean relations as well as foreign relations to guarantee the latter. Therefore, the Participatory Government believes that the establishment of a peace regime will make it possible for both Koreas to prosper together and furthermore lay the foundation to become “the economic hub of Northeast Asia.”

By pursuing the “Policy of Peace and Prosperity,” the ROK government will establish a sound peace regime in order to eliminate the security threat and the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula. To achieve this, the ROK government plans to support those actions necessary to build confidence between two Koreas on military issues, since this is one of the most important and essential tasks to realistically establish peace on the Korean Peninsula.

However, North Korea is strictly adhering to its position that discussions on building military confidence between the two Koreas are meaningless until the Armistice Agreement is replaced with a peace treaty, arguing that military issues on the Korean Peninsula are issues between North Korea and the US to which ROK is not a concerned party. Moreover, the North has stated that confidence between the two Koreas can be acquired naturally with arms reduction. However, the attitude of the North towards exchanges and

cooperation in the civil sector has changed as it recognizes possible “practical gains” that can be acquired through dialogue and collaboration. As a result, the North has stopped avoiding opportunities for dialogue and has lessened setting extensive preconditions for talks.

Despite their change of attitude toward economic and other areas of collaboration, North Korea continues to maintain their negative attitude toward military issues. The ROK Armed Forces will take this change of attitude into account and take gradual steps toward building military confidence with

North Korea based on our solid war deterrence capacity in accordance with the ROK government's “Policy of Peace and Prosperity.”

The aim of the first phase is creating a favorable environment to pursue confidence building between the two Koreas. This phase involves the implementation of military tension reducing measures such as the cessation of slandering, reprobation, and hostile activities. Also in this phase, the ROK military will continue to provide military assurance for various inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects such as Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads reconnection project, Mt. Geumgang tourism and construction of the Gaeseong Industrial Complex. Through these efforts, the ROK Armed Forces will focus on utilizing these initiatives as a means to build military confidence.

Phase two aims to establish an institutional mechanism for military confidence building through the regularization of inter-Korean military talks. In this phase, ROK will strengthen its crisis prevention measures in order to avert military conflicts such as the Yeonpyeong Sea Battle in 1999 and the West



Roadbed construction work to reconnect the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) inter-Korean railways and roads

Sea skirmish in 2002. Other initiatives in this phase include the establishment and operation of a hotline between the two militaries, activation of the inter-Korean Joint Military Committee, and increased exchanges and contacts between military personnel.

In consideration of the progress made in inter-Korean relations, the third phase is aimed to pursue control over military operation and mutual verification. Verification measures for implementation of agreement will be established through operational arms control such as notification and control of large-scale military exercises and unit activities as well as formation and operation of a South-North joint inspection and verification mechanism.

Establishing military confidence building mechanism as described above will enhance the military transparency of the two sides and the possibility of predicting the other side's military activities. This will allow the transition to the arms control phase to take place at an early stage and will militarily guarantee the government's efforts to successfully establish a structure of reduced tension and peace on the Korean Peninsula.

B. Efforts to Peacefully Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Issue

The North Korean nuclear issue became a tension-laden issue once North Korea admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium (HEU) program during the visit by James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of the US State Department.

The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) ceased its supply of heavy oil to North Korea on November 14, 2002, judging that the existence of a HEU program is a clear violation of the Agreed Framework (AF) of 1994. Since then, North Korea has responded with actions that have increased the tension on the Korean Peninsula. Those actions include terminating the freeze on its nuclear program, removing the seals on the spent fuel rods, deporting IAEA inspectors, announcing its withdrawal from the

NPT, and reactivating its 5 MWe nuclear reactors.

The IAEA board of directors held a special meeting on February 12, 2002, to discuss this matter further and requested a resolution from the UN Security Council (UNSC). UNSC held its first meeting regarding this matter on April 9, 2003. However, UNSC did not make any official statement, deciding not to provoke North Korea. Meanwhile, China actively tried to mediate the situation by hosting a trilateral meeting between US, China, and North Korea in Beijing on April 23. However, with the announcement by North Korea that it already started reprocessing the spent fuel rods and that it currently possesses nuclear weapons, the meeting ended a day earlier than planned without making progress.

The NPT evaluation meeting preparation committee produced a “factual summary” of this issue on May 9, 2003, requesting that North Korea scrap its nuclear weapons program and take safety measures recommended by the NPT. It also recommended a multilateral approach to resolve the issue. In addition, the committee reported and criticized the status of North Korea's concentrated uranium and plutonium production plan, a violation of NPT's safety requirements, at the G8 meeting in Evian, France between June 1 and 3. The committee pointed out that North Korea had failed to take appropriate action as a responsible nation and made a co-statement urging North Korea to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle any nuclear weapons programs. At the ARF held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia, on June 18, all participants with the exception of North Korea expressed the shared opinion that it is vital to resolve the North Korean nuclear program for the safety of the region. Also, the participating nations urged North Korea to observe the state of a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula and demanded that North Korea return to the NPT.

If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons, not only will it be a detrimental threat to peace on the Korean Peninsula, but will also destabilize the regional military balance by inducing a nuclear arms race in Northeast Asia. Therefore, it is the firm position of the ROK government that North Korea must not possess nuclear weapons under any circumstances, and governments of the US, Japan, China and Russia share the same position. Also, with the ample

agreement in the international community regarding the intolerability of a nuclear North Korea, the peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue seems quite possible.

The ROK government believes that close information sharing and policy coordination between the ROK and the US are essential in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, and is making efforts to cooperate throughout the entire process of setting goals and strategy. By agreeing on basic principles to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue during the ROK-US summit meeting held on May 15, the two nations made important progress in acquiring the foundation for substantial policy coordination and flexibility in their North Korean policies.

Through all possible channels, the ROK government is urging North Korea that the pursuit of nuclear weapons development will not be beneficial and that the ROK and the international community will render full support if and when North Korea becomes a responsible member of the international community. In other words, the ROK government is urging North Korea to choose between the nuclear program and economic development. Also, the ROK government sees that it is important at this stage to maintain the momentum of dialogue, and is making an effort to prevent any additional tension from heightening in the course of its talks with North Korea.

The ROK Armed Forces is making utmost use of its military diplomatic channels at its disposal, such as mutual visits by high-ranking officials, working level defense policy meetings, and security policy consultations, to support such efforts being made by the government towards peaceful resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue, while strengthening combined surveillance posture on North Korean nuclear facilities and activities and maintaining a firm ROK-US combined deterrence capability.

C. Military Support for Inter-Korean Exchanges and Cooperation


Inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects have played an important

role in gradually removing the age-old distrust and barriers to economic activities between the two Koreas.

As an extension of the progress in the government's policy toward North Korea, the Participatory Government's "Policy of Peace and Prosperity" provides a new vision towards Korea's peaceful reunification and development as the economic hub of Northeast Asia. Therefore, further expansion and promotion of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects are one of its most important strategies. In other words, the government is seeking to recover the sense of unity among all Koreans through establishing the foundation for economic community by further expanding inter-Korean economic cooperation projects, and actively pursuing exchanges and cooperation in social and cultural fields.

In support of such policy, the ROK Armed Forces is actively searching for areas in which it can render support in the course of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects, at the same time making various efforts to turn contacts and talks that take place into military confidence building and tension reduction measures.

The reconstruction project of the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and the Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads not only has symbolic nationalistic value, but it is also a first step in constructing physical infrastructure to pursue further inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation. In order to support this project more efficiently, the ROK Armed Forces has established a special committee at the Army and MND as well as a separate unit in charge of construction. Also, a direct military telephone link has been established between the construction situation offices of both sides to be used as a channel to prevent accidental clashes




Reconnection of Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) Inter-Korean Railroad

through frequent consultations on various issues as the need arises.

The ROK Armed Forces' involvement in the reconstruction project of the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) and the Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads includes clearance of minefields and roadbed work in the area north of the civilian control line including the demilitarized zone (DMZ). The ROK Armed Forces began its work on the Gyeongui (Seoul-Sinuiju) railways and roads on September 18, 2000 and the Donghae inter-Korean railways and roads on September 18, 2002. The two Koreas agreed to complete the two projects before the end of 2003 and both projects are well under progress as planned. Meanwhile, the two Koreas held the official ceremony to celebrate reconnection of the railroad at the DMZ on June 14 of this year. In addition to the construction work, the ROK Armed Forces is also taking various measures to strengthen the defense around the construction area, including maintaining close contact with the UNC to maintain appropriate status according to the Armistice Agreement.

In addition, regarding the Mt. Geumgang Tourism projects via cruise line that began in November 1998, and via road that began in February 2003, the ROK Armed Forces is making the utmost efforts to guarantee the safety of tourists while maintaining a firm readiness posture for rescue operations in the case of accidents.

The ROK Armed Forces will continue to provide all necessary military services for various exchanges and cooperation projects, including the Gaesung Industrial Complex project and the Imjin River flood prevention project. It will also make efforts to study possible areas of defense weaknesses during the course of inter-Korean exchanges and cooperation projects beforehand so as to maintain a seamless defense readiness posture.



Part Five
**Continuous Reform of the
Defense System**

Chapter One
Reforming Personnel Management

Chapter Two
Restructuring Defense Organization

Chapter Three
Improving Military Service and Reserve Forces System

Chapter Four
Reforming Military Judicial System

Chapter Five
Enhancing the Efficiency of Defense Build-up

Chapter One

Reforming Personnel Management

A. Management of Elite Defense Manpower

Rapid changes in the security situation on the Korean Peninsula and its surrounding area, new developments in science technology and high-tech weapons systems, and the new era of information and technology have called for defense manpower with more capabilities and various specialties. In order to achieve this objective of training and managing elite defense manpower, a more efficient manpower management system, which fosters military specialists and expands the role of female service members, is being developed.

First, the manpower management system will be improved to form a pyramid-shaped structure to make it more efficient and so that it guarantees stronger combat power.

To carry out this plan, balance between services, ranks, and branches will be sustained, while the service period for each rank will be adjusted reasonably to fit the new system. The retirement program will also be adjusted so that promotions to higher ranks are possible in a reasonable period of time. By applying these measures, manpower management will become more stable and systematic.



First female officers on battleship duty

As a means of strengthening military competitiveness necessary to adapt to changes in the defense environment, it can be predicted that the demand for elite military specialists will increase in the future. In order to foster elite specialists needed for the future battlefield environment, scientific research regarding the appropriate number of military personnel necessary in each field will be carried out. Based on the results of such research, ways to utilize and recruit civilian specialists will be prepared along with a new individual evaluation system for these specialists. Recruitment, education and assignment of these specialists will be coordinated under a unified management system.

The role of women in Korean society has expanded greatly through the years and the Participatory Government is carrying out various policies aimed at expanding the role of women to a greater degree. To actively answer such policies, the military has opened its doors to elite females who choose to serve in the military. The rate of female officers in the military is set to reach 5% in 2020. In the past, female service members were mainly assigned to the nurse corps or the administrative branch. However, the new policies will seek to assign women to all branches, especially to positions where they will be able to fully demonstrate their capabilities. These new policies will encourage highly qualified women to join the military and they will play an important role in achieving the objective of “Advanced, Self-Reliant Defense.” Utilization of female service members will be evaluated annually. Based on the results of these evaluations, management plans for female military service member will be improved to fit the changing environment.

B. Fair Personnel Management

MND is working to improve the current personnel management system so that promotions, assignments, education and other personnel affairs are handled in a more fair and transparent manner. This will enhance the spirit of harmony and unity in the military community.

First, a fair rule of competition with regard to promotions, assignments and education will be set. This rule will maintain the present balance between commissioning groups. Policies regarding promotions and vacant positions will be decided prior to the actual evaluation for promotions and they will also be publicly announced to make the process more transparent. Upon making decisions regarding assignments and education, personnel management committees in each unit will be asked to take a more active role. This will also make the evaluation procedure more fair and transparent so that the right person is placed at the right position.

To make this possible, “Personnel Management Committee Regulations” was enacted as an MND decree on May 23, 2003. As a result, all matters concerning promotions and vacancies as well as other personnel management policies will be made based on this order. To achieve fair and transparent personnel management, all units will utilize review committees to decide on matters of promotions, assignments and education.

After hearing opinions from all services and holding a MND Personnel Management Committee meeting, MND prepared the “MND Guideline on Personnel Management” regarding promotions and assignments and declared it as an order on April 12, 2003. All services will develop and apply a detailed plan that caters to each of the service's needs.

Starting from this year, the Army will no longer allocate vacant positions according to commissioning groups when deciding who will be promoted from the rank of captain to major. Instead, candidates will be evaluated based on their capabilities, specialties, and future potentials. Through tough and open competition, the most capable candidates will be promoted. The ROK Army is planning to introduce this open competition system to other rank promotions as well.

Until now, the commissioned year or the graduate class of officers was a key element in deciding who would be promoted. This had caused systematic problems - capable and outstanding officers could not be promoted if they were juniors. However, from now on, those who have been promoted to a certain rank in the same year with their seniors will be given an equal chance

to be promoted to the next higher rank along with his/her seniors who were promoted in the same year. When this year-based promotion system is applied, capable officers will be guaranteed early promotion.

Furthermore, research on introducing open and multi-dimensional evaluation, which takes into consideration the special characteristics of the military, is currently underway. Each service will do more research on the applicable rank, time and method so that it does not interfere with its own system. When complete, each service will gradually apply this new method starting 2003.

Additionally, a service evaluation program will be newly introduced to motivate those who have missed opportunities, for timely promotion. Those who record high scores in the evaluation will be given the chance for honorary promotions or promotions for a certain period of time. They will also be the first to be considered for job opportunities, and incentives for honorary discharges will also be provided to them. On the other hand, those who are insincere or have caused trouble during their service will be discharged at an early stage hold them responsible for their negligence.

To ensure improvements in the personnel management system to nurture military talent and a fair and transparent promotion or assignment decision process, the ROK Armed Forces will strictly rule out all favors based on personal background and pursue continuous personnel reforms so as to foster harmony and unity in the military community.

Chapter Two

Restructuring Defense Organization

A. Background and Implications

The present defense organization relies on temporary or unofficial bodies for carrying out government projects, large-scale defense weapons system acquisition and for dealing with pending and urgent problems in the military. Since the JCS is the key actor in war planning and execution, it is strengthening its abilities to play an independent role necessary to adapt to future security situation changes. Therefore, various measures with the objective of actively coping with future changes in defense environment and of building a defense organization more adequate for fostering a high-tech military emphasizing science and technology are underway as means of restructuring the defense organization. Operation reforms will make the organization more efficient and consequently help save money and human resources. The money saved will be accrued for future military funding needs.

B. Directions of Organizational Restructuring

To ensure the development of future-oriented defense policy and to strengthen policy execution capabilities, the organization of MND headquarters will be restructured. First, its policy-making and planning functions will be adjusted and reinforced. Excessively large organizations will be reduced to an appropriate and manageable size to make the operations system more efficient. PPBEES (Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, Evaluation System) will also be reorganized so that the

organization can execute policies more efficiently. The hierarchy of general public servants will be improved to form a pyramid-shape with more focus on professional skills. Under this improved hierarchy, public servants will be given greater opportunity for promotion.

The JCS will eliminate any non-essential, high-level positions and fairly balance assignments among services. In order to prepare for future changes in the ROK-US combined command system, functions of each office will be reconsidered and their risk management capabilities will be strengthened. Accordingly, an independent war operations system will be established with the JCS playing the central role.

Additionally, the headquarters of each service will readjust the functions of special offices and remove unnecessary small-sized divisions to build a digitized military that will adapt to future changes in defense environment in the era of information and technology. Organization dealing with digitization and force improvement will be integrated and at the same time personnel, logistics and mobilization functions will be readjusted in order to establish a more efficient support system.

Integrating and rearranging offices with similar or redundant functions will trim down the overall defense organization. The restructuring of unofficial bodies and temporary organizations including various committees and project teams will activate the utilization of the Task Force (TF). Unnecessary offices will be closed, but offices necessary and essential for operations will be made official.

Chapter Three

Improving Military Service and Reserve Forces System

A. Reduction of Military Service Period

The obligatory military service period will be reduced by 2 months in order to lighten the burden of military service and to enhance equity in military

[Table 5-1] Reduced Service Period According to Enlistment Dates

Enrolled Date	Reduced Service Period		
	Army/Marines	Navy	Air Force
Apr. 2001			1 week
May 2001			
Jun. 2001		1 week	
Jul. 2001			
Aug. 2001	1 week		2 weeks
Sep. 2001			
Oct. 2001	2 weeks	2 weeks	
Nov. 2001			
Dec. 2001			
Jan. 2002			
Feb.~May 2002	3 weeks		
Jun.~Sep. 2002	1 month		
Oct. 2002~Jan. 2003	1 month & 1 week		
Feb.~May 2003	1 month & 2 weeks		
Jun.~Aug. 2003	1 month & 3 weeks		
Sep. 2003~	Less than 2 months		
Oct. 2003~	2 months		

obligations.

Due to the declining birth rate in the 1980s, there will be a shortage of military service members starting from 2005. To solve this problem, the number of alternative service members will be reduced or eliminated (approximately 66,000 alternative service members at present) and reservists will be called upon for active duty to fill up the shortage.

Such improvements will help resolve much of the disputes regarding the fairness of obligatory military service. NCOs will be assigned to positions that require specialized skills (i.e. maintenance and repair) and be assigned as squad leaders to prevent any loss of combat power. The reduction of service period will first be applied to enlisted soldiers who joined the military in August 2001 (to be discharged in October 2003) and their service period will be one week shorter. The reduced period will gradually increase, and for those who joined the military in October 2003 the service period will be shortened by 2 months.

B. Improvement of Military Manpower Administration

1. Recruit-friendly Military Manpower Administration

a. Choosing Enlistment Dates and Training Units

In the past, recruits have not been satisfied with the military manpower administration mainly because they could not make their own choices concerning military service obligations. However, recruits can now choose when to join the military and the unit in which they are to be trained. It is hoped that a mood for voluntary fulfillment of military service will be created. In the future, the number of vacant positions from which recruits can choose from will be enlarged and the recruit system improved to a “Train Ticket Reservation” system which, within acceptable boundaries, takes into consideration the aptitude of recruits.

[Table 5-2] Number of Recruits Choosing Enlistment Dates

Classification \ Year	2001	2002	2003
Total Recruits	225,500	218,300	182,800
Recruits who enlisted on a self-chosen date	30,500 (13.5%)	49,200 (22.5%)	60,000 (32.8%)

b. Joint Enlistment / Service Program for Army Soldiers

In 2003, ROK Army introduced the joint enlistment/service program, a program that allows recruits to enlist and serve in the military with a friend or a colleague. Approximately 20,000 army recruits will be given the chance to participate in this program in 2003. Those participating in this program will be assigned to nearby barracks after boot camp and will serve together until they are discharged.

This program was introduced to relieve the recruits' uneasiness about having to serve in an unfamiliar environment alone as well as to ease concerns of their family members. By helping recruits adapt to the environment more quickly and preventing any possible accidents, this program hopes to strengthen combat power. On the first day of application, more recruits applied than expected and many other recruits are also showing interest in this program. The overall effectiveness of this program will be studied and ways to improve and expand this program will be developed.



Joint enlistment/service program

c. Utilizing Skills of Service Members

In order to encourage enlisted service members to utilize their skills and

specialties and give them a chance to develop their skills, recruitment of specialists will be expanded. Recruitment procedure of these specialists including application submission and selection process will be computerized and be disclosed to the public via Internet for their convenience. Such efforts will improve the overall recruitment systems, making it more recruit-friendly.

2. Enhancing Public Confidence Through Fair and Transparent Administration

a. Disclosure of Government Officials' Personal Military Service Information

In order to prevent illegal exemptions from military service by way of abusing official positions and to make the military manpower administration more transparent, “Government Officials' Personal Military Information Disclosure System” was prepared. According to this system, high-ranking public officials, Grade I or higher, in 5,997 positions are obliged to disclose their personal military service information. “Act on the Reporting and Disclosure of Personal Military Service Information of Government Officials and Others” is being revised to expand its scope of application to around 26,000 officials (Grade IV or higher).

b. Special Management of Public Figure Recruits

[Table 5-3] Disclosure of Personal Military Service Information

(as of June 30, 2003)

Classification	Total	Person in Question	Descendants
Number of People	25,379	12,133	13,246

To overcome the lack of public confidence in the military manpower administration and to emphasize the moral duty that everyone is obliged to fulfill his military service, people with high income, entertainers and athletes will be supervised in a special manner.

Management of these public figure recruits under public concern will start

from the day of their enlistment physical examination to the day of discharge. Relevant regulations regarding service and emigration will strictly be applied to ensure public confidence on the fairness of the military manpower administration and such measures will hopefully contribute to establishing a social mood for voluntary fulfillment of military service.

C. Improvement of Reserve Forces System

Currently, the reserve forces which constitute an indispensable part of national security and whose role will expand in the future come under the command of MND headquarters of each service and accepting units, and serve in this status until 8 years after discharge.

MND will improve the current reserve forces training system to build stronger reserve forces and to provide more convenience to those who participate in the training. The following table shows the improvements that will be made starting from 2004.

[Table 5-4] Improvements in the Reserve Forces Training

Classification	Present	Improvements	Remarks
Training for 1 st Year Reserves	Call-up Check (4 hours)	Mobilization Training	Unit-maintained Training Guaranteed
Expansion of Exemptions	1 year (8 th year)	2 years (7 th and 8 th year)	Annual Emergency Call-up Inspection of 7 th & 8 th year Reserves
Mobilization Training	3 nights, 4 days	2 nights, 3 days	
SSangyong Training	3 nights, 4 days		Participants will be exempted from 5 th year homeland defense training (8 hours)

Until recently, those who did not participate in mobilization training could commute to local units for reserve forces training instead. However, from 2003, to enhance the quality of training, they are required to participate in

mobilization training at a later time. Currently, call-ups are notified in person or by mail, but in the future it will also be done via the Internet. Reserves will also be able to choose training dates using the Internet.

The quality of lunch meals during reserve forces training was improved (price of a meal: 2,000 won → 2,500 won). Such efforts to improve reserve forces training environment will continue.

Various efforts to foster and support reserve forces are being carried out so that reserve forces may perform their best combat power during operations. For injuries or death during reserve duties or training, improved compensation and medical care programs have been prepared. Starting from 2003, those injured will be compensated 70% (instead of 60%) of the average income of urban and rural households during the period of hospitalization. Hospitalization in civilian hospitals may also be extended with the approval of unit commander to a maximum of 3 days.

At present, reserve forces lack sufficient equipments and resources necessary to execute homeland defense strategies. Mid-term and long-term plans to replace old equipments with new ones will be established, and resources for homeland defense will be reinforced to strengthen the combat power of reserve forces.

Chapter Four

Reforming Military Judicial System

A. Background and Progress

The enactment of the National Defense Law in 1946 whose origin lies in the translation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) of the US, marked the beginning of Korean military judicial system. The Court Martial Act and the Military Court Act followed and various amendments were made to adapt to changing situations. Although the military judicial system has developed through the years, changes in defense environment calls for further judicial reform.

With the inauguration of the Participatory Government, an overall reform of the military judicial system is being prepared to meet the expectations of the people. The original objective of the military judicial system, “maintenance of military order and discipline and realization of judicial justice,” will be upheld, but more focus will be given toward guaranteeing the rights of service members.

To achieve this goal, “System Improvement Task Force” was established on January 25, 2002 under the auspices of the Defense Research Committee to promote independence and fairness of trials, to protect the rights of service members, and to maximize the utilization of the JAG Corps. Heeding various opinions from a diverse number of sources (i.e. scholars, NGOs), MND is pursuing systemic reforms that will satisfy the public at large. The successful reform of the military judicial system is expected to guarantee the rights of commanders as well as the rights of service members.

B. Key Contents of the Reform

1. Circuit Pool of Military Judges at MND Independent from the Chain of Command

Under the current military judge system, judge advocates with the rank of captain or major under the command of service headquarters are appointed as military judges and one military judge is assigned to each corps. The military judges assigned to nearby corps form a pool of judges and this pool of judges takes responsibility for division trials and Corps General Court Martial.

The current military judge system has been criticized for the following reasons. First, the commanders can interfere with the trial, which in turn severely harms the independent nature of trials. Second, the military judges have little or no experience regarding court martial. Finally, the overall system is criticized for inefficiency because there are too many military judges compared to the number of actual cases.

Taking these criticisms into consideration, a consolidated “Circuit Pool of Military Judges (CPMJ)” was established at MND so as to separate military judges from the chain of command as well as military prosecutors of the unit in which the trial takes place. CPMJ takes charge of trial cases at the General Court Martial. In doing so, the country is divided into 5 regions. Officers with more experience and with the rank of lieutenant colonel or colonel, are assigned as military judges. To guarantee independence of court martial, the performances of military judges are reviewed by other military judges.

2. Restriction of Commander's Confirmation Rights and Noninterference of Trials

One of the characteristics of the military judicial system is that commanders can take part in the trial procedure. This is to give commanders the authority that comes with this responsibility. However, this important and necessary

element of court martial has been criticized as the main cause of distrust in the military judicial system. Therefore, in order to eliminate any conflicts rising from legal commutation by commanders and to enhance credibility of court martial, the commander with jurisdictions will be required to clearly state the reason for commutation and commanders or any third parties will be prohibited from interference or influence.

3. Support for Expanding the Trial Defense Counsel

To enhance the rights of service members and to eliminate any violation of rights during the investigation process, trial defense counsel will assist the defendant from the beginning of the investigation process. To this end, the number of trial defense counsels will be dramatically increased.

4. Improving Detention Procedures and Facilities

In order to minimize the violation of soldiers' rights caused by detention, which has “the effect of physical confinement,” the current detention program will be reviewed and fundamental improvements will be made. Judge advocates will screen the detention process and convicts with less than 6-month sentence will not be put in detention facilities. The overall environment of detention facilities will be improved as well.

5. Improvements in Recruitment and Personnel Management of Judge Advocates

In order to enhance efficiency in operating the JAG Corps and to enhance professionalism in legal affairs, recruitment of long-term officers who have passed the Korea Bar Exam will be carried out. Until recently, military prosecutors and judges rotated among the assigned positions. But from now on, they will be assigned according to their specialties and the principle of check and balance will apply between each group. As a way of recruiting highly qualified judge advocates, increase in pay for long-term officers and other welfare and benefit enhancements are being considered.

Chapter Five


Enhancing the Efficiency of Defense Build-up

A. Direction of Defense Acquisition and Development

As weapons systems become more complex and sophisticated, acquisition costs have increased rapidly along with R&D costs for important technologies. Therefore, R&D and acquisition projects should be pursued not only in an economical and efficient manner but also with transparency guaranteed and national consensus formed.

To achieve self-reliant defense, development and manufacturing of weapons systems should be localized, however costly and time consuming it may be.

[Figure 5-1] Overview of the Defense Acquisition and Development System



From the national defense strategy standpoint, all resources must be concentrated on the R&D of those fields where accumulation of technology is necessary in the long run and where securing independent technology capabilities is essential.

To respond to the changes in the acquisition environment of the 21st century and to achieve our defense policy objectives, the reorganization of acquisition and development objectives is underway as seen in figure 5-1.

Three main policy directions for defense acquisition and development are as follows.

[Figure 5-2] Three Main Policy Directions for Defense Acquisition and Development

- Applying “Open Decision Making System” in Force Improvement Programs (FIPs)
- Developing R&D and Defense Industry Policy
- Carrying Out Efficient and Economical Acquisition and Development Projects

First, “open decision-making system” will be applied to Force Improvement Programs (FIP). Decision at all stages regarding acquisition and development projects will be made openly so that the projects can be carried out fairly and transparently.

Second, a future-oriented R&D and defense industry policy will be developed after clearly reviewing the current status of R&D fields and the defense industry, which still remain underdeveloped.

Third, acquisition and development projects will be carried out in an efficient and economical manner. By doing so, weapons and equipments that meet the requirements of the armed forces will be put into place in an economical and prompt manner.

B. Applying “Open Decision Making System” to Force Improvement Program

In the past, the decision-making procedure regarding force improvements

was focused on who was to be responsible for the decision made. Therefore, most of the decisions were made through the decision-making channel. Such method had its advantages; it was clear who was in charge and the decision was made in a short period of time. However, too much responsibility and authority was centered on the project unit. Sometimes the unit in charge of the projects did not possess the expertise to fully carry out the project, which resulted in decision-making delays and unsatisfactory outcomes. In order to improve and supplement such a process, the Participatory Government has changed the decision-making system of FIPs to an “open” one.

In the “Open Decision-Making System,” “Acquisition and Development Council” and “Expanded Acquisition and Development Council” take charge of all decision-making regarding project management such as the introduction of key FIPs, selection of models, contractors, etc. The “Expanded Council for FIPs” decides on whether to approve the execution of the budget. This allows

[Table 5-5] Improvements in the Decision-Making System

Classification	Present System	Improved System
Decision-making Process	Decision by Approval	Decision by Committee
Project Management Stages	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Acquisition Meeting ○ Expanded Acquisition Meeting ○ Line of command for each project * Decisions made through the line of command 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Acquisition and Development Council ○ Expanded Acquisition and Development Council ○ Line of command for each project * Most decisions made after review by Council
Project (Budget) Execution	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Committee for Defense Investment Projects * Insufficient activities by the committee and insufficient participation by related government agencies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Expanded Council for FIPs * Increased activities by the Council, substantial participation by related government agencies
Characteristics	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Responsibility and speed guaranteed during decision-making 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Expert analysis guaranteed during decision-making ○ Fairness and transparency during projects guaranteed and expanded * Promotion of “People’s Right to Know”

for the gathering of various opinions from members of the council, that will enhance and help build consensus among other relevant divisions and government agencies regarding the appropriateness of the project.

To make FIP more transparent, review sessions will be frequently held, especially before the making decisions on projects that are related to national industry or are closely related to large-scale, government projects. In these review sessions, other government agencies such as the Ministry of Finance and Economy, Ministry of Planning and Budget, Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy, Ministry of Science and Technology, and Ministry of Information and Communication will be urged to participate. This will enhance industrial competitiveness and security capabilities by linking military projects to national industry development.

C. Policy Improvement of R&D and Defense Industry

1. Improvements in R&D policy and research environment

MND is trying to improve the R&D policy and research environment of the military so as to acquire the necessary R&D capabilities regarding high-tech weapons systems, and to develop core technologies necessary for future warfare in the 21st century. To achieve this purpose, a low-cost, high-efficiency R&D operations system will be established that follows the directions of national science and technology policies. Taking into consideration the compatibility of civil and military technologies, large-scale projects will be executed as government projects.

National science and technology resources will be utilized for defense R&D, and the area of research for the Agency for Defense Development will gradually center around the development of core technologies. Efforts to improve research environment will be made. Through these measures, the Agency for Defense Development will be nurtured and developed as a first-class research institute that pioneers cutting edge defense technology, and the

ratio of R&D investment in the budget will be raised to that of other institutes in developed countries.

2. Improvements in Defense Industry Policy

MND is revamping the defense industry policy to enhance competitiveness of defense industry and to expand exports by fostering a defense industry that focuses on accumulation of technology. MND will encourage defense manufacturers to increase investment on R&D so that they can domestically develop technologies as well as raise their technology level. MND is planning to subsidize the development costs of domestically developed projects.

The current specialized affiliate system will be transformed so that specialized enterprises are maintained only for those fields that require large-scale investments. In other fields, competition among manufacturers will be gradually promoted. Compensation for localizing technologies will also be legalized. For expanding exports, fields with export potential will be selected and given strategic assistance. MND and Korea Defense Industry Association will organize task forces for export support and utilize defense attaches to promote defense export.

D. Efficient and Economical Pursuit of Defense Acquisition and Development Programs

To achieve self-reliant defense, a stable distribution of adequate national defense budget is essential. However, with the sustained decrease in the allocation of the national defense budget, the budget for FIP has also shown a decrease since 1997, although it slightly rose in 2002. FIP budget is directly related to building military power that allow the realization of self-reliant defense. Therefore, FIP should be given priority. The aggregate amount of the national defense budget in 2003 increased by 6.5%, reaching 17,426.4 billion won, and the amount of FIP budget increased by 4.7% reaching 5,732.8 billion won (32.9% of total national defense budget).

[Table 5-6] FIP Budget Allocation in 2003

Classification	Total	C4I & Information	Maneuver, Strike	Maritime, Landing	Aerial Air Defense	Support	R&D
Budget (billion won)	5,732.8	326.1	610.0	923.6	1,259.7	2,032.1	581.3
Ratio (%)	100	6	11	16	22	35	10

In 2003, the following projects are being carried out. See [Table 5-7]

[Table 5-7] Major FIPs in 2003


Classification	On-going Projects	Newly-launched projects
C4I & Information	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lattice Structure Tactical Communications System (SPIDER) • Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Electronic Warfare System for Naval Vessels • Tactical Vehicles for Communication Relay
Maneuver, Strike	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) • K9 Self-propelled Artillery, K1A1 Tank 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Reorganization of Mechanized Infantry Division • Infrared Imaging System for Helicopters
Maritime, Landing	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • KDX-II/III • 214-class Submarines (KSS-II), Landing Platform Experimental (LPX) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PKX
Air, Air Defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Additional manufacturing of F-15K and KF-16 fighters • Very Short-range Air-defense (VSHORAD) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Mass production of T-50s • KP-SAM
Support	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Service support such as WRSA, equipment reinforcement, repair and maintenance • Burden-sharing, 2nd Bulgom Project, etc. 	
R&D	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for next-generation high-tech weapons system suited for Korea • Next-generation tanks, Satellite Communication System for military 	

When importing foreign weapons systems, the “rule of competition” will be fully applied. Diversification of weapons acquisition will be maintained, and import of weapons will be carried out in line with offset deals and defense industry exports. This will directly and indirectly contribute to breathing energy into the domestic defense industry. Before accepting sales offers from foreign manufacturers, evaluation standards and methods will be clearly set to ensure fairness in the acquisition process. All manufacturers who meet these standards will be given an equal chance to bid and the final model will be determined by competitive bidding.

Additionally, the use of commercial items will be expanded so that war supplies, especially non-weapons systems, are provided in an economical and efficient manner. To this end, investment efficiency will be enhanced through the alleviation and removal of defense article standards and progressive phase-by-phase upgrade plan in place of turn-key acquisition of weapons systems. The concept of pre-planned capability improvement will be applied in R&D to extend the life span of equipment where possible.

FIPs need to be managed professionally for them to be efficient. Specialists who are capable of executing these projects need to be fostered as well. To enhance the professional capabilities of these specialists in charge of projects, ways to recruit and manage these specialists will be developed. Those working in the field of force improvement should possess a highly skilled policy mind, an understanding of high technology, and the ability to manage projects.

In order for the specialists to possess relative competitiveness, they must be carefully recruited, be given appropriate long-term assignments and be educated periodically in their field. The ties between personnel management and education should be clarified and strengthened. Specialists will also be given continuous opportunities to enhance knowledge in their respective fields through further education both in domestic and foreign institutes.



Part Six

Improving Service Members' Welfare and Barrack Environment

Chapter One
Improving Service Members' Welfare

Chapter Two
Fostering a Desirable Military Culture

Chapter Three
Promotion of Welfare for Veterans


Chapter One

Improving Service Members' Welfare

With the aim of enhancing welfare and uplifting the morale of service members, innovative plans are under way to improve barrack facilities and living quarters for officers and NCOs; to improve treatment for professional soldiers; to realistically adjust wages for soldiers; to make health insurance applicable for soldiers on leave, on the basis of “plans for development in military welfare.”

First, barrack facilities and quarters for officers and NCOs that are old and small will be modernized by stages in order to keep abreast of social development.

In 2000, the military executed a 3-year plan to improve military quarters and solve housing problems for professional soldiers, investing 877.7 billion won: 12,323 official residences that were 25 years or more and 15 pyung or smaller in size were renovated. Yet 38% of all official residences are still in poor condition. Thus, it is expected that old and small residences of 25 years or more and 15 pyung or under (26,954 residences) are to be refurbished by investing national budget intensively over the next 5 years (2004~2008), matching the national housing standard of 24 to 32 pyung. In anticipation of any changes in security circumstances, the minimization of housing construction and a gradual increase in support for purchasing and



leasing residences are expected in the long run.

Old quarters of 25 years or more and insufficient quarters take up 32 percent of all quarters for non-married officers. 2 to 3 officers live in a single room, which raises privacy questions and hinders sufficient rest and relaxation and in turn hampers regular service duty. Therefore, plans are being made to improve old quarters of 25 years or more and provide sufficient housing as soon as possible by investing national budget intensively over the next 5 years (2004~2008).

Old-fashioned and consolidated barrack facilities built in the 1960s and 1970s, which are out-dated and confined, take up 41% of the whole. Platoon-sized quarters make conditions for private life insufficient and lack of individual living space deprive many of normal sleep during summertime. In the future, the living conditions of the new generation will be taken into consideration: in order to improve the barracks life and conditions, consolidated non-bed quarters will be substituted with squad-scaled quarters equipped with beds.

For the purpose of improving treatment for professional soldiers, salaries will be increased to the level of standard private enterprises by the year 2004 in accordance with the government's 5-year plan to realistically moderate wages for public servants.

Basic salary will be increased along with various kinds of bonuses included. Tuition subsidies and separate allowances will be provided for special needs. Special service expenses for staff officers of lieutenant colonel or major will be gradually augmented.

In addition, the acquisition of excellent manpower and stimulation of morale amongst professional soldiers are planned through uniquely organizing the compensation system for service members, which reflects special aspects of military service.

Salaries for enlisted men who are on active duty are to be increased, taking into consideration the actual amount needed for expenses. In the past, treatment for the enlisted mainly consisted of meals, clothing and facilities within the limits of the national defense budget. As a result, an enlisted

soldier's average monthly salary is 24,800 won in 2003, which is insufficient compared to the actual amount of their expenditure. Consequently, most enlisted men depend on remittance from their homes, which might arouse a sense of discomfort due to the disparity in wealth. Therefore, the military is planning to raise enlisted men's monthly salary to 80,000 won a month from the year 2004 to 2006 reflecting the results of surveys on soldiers' living expenses. The aim is to encourage savings and root out family financial support.

Active soldiers may visit military hospitals while on leave but most of them resort to private clinics due to poor traffic conditions. This causes families to take on the entire burden of payment, and thus becomes the target of constant appeals.

The reason why active soldiers are not eligible for medical insurance is because of the “national health insurance law,” which stipulates that service members on active service are classified as “non-applicable.” Accordingly, the military is making efforts to modify the law by discussing this matter with relevant institutions to let service members receive medical insurance support in case of sudden illness or injuries while on leave.

Furthermore, plans are being made to effectively manage the maintenance system welfare facilities of all forces as well as to reasonably distribute the same welfare benefit evenly to every part of the military. In addition, the military is planning to integrate the management of welfare facilities, revise laws and regulations pertaining to this matter in order to enhance efficiency and transparency.

Chapter Two

Fostering a Desirable Military Culture

A. Background

Since the founding of the ROK armed forces, the culture of the military, which emphasizes that “the duty of all soldiers is to serve one’s country through self-sacrifice,” has been the basis of an elite force and the strength to overcome national crises.

Korean military culture is based on traditional ideas of Confucianism, Japanese authoritarianism and American pragmatism and this is why it lacks its own identity. Furthermore, the rapid changes in society are prompting diverse values and practices to flow into the military without due screening and this causes chaos in traditional military values. Even some aspects of military culture that should be protected and passed on are fading away.

Therefore, the military, in terms of reform, is prepared to “settle a desirable military culture” by inheriting and nurturing positive factors while resolutely doing away with negative factors. Fixing misguided military culture and creating sound spirits of duties and reestablishing officer’s ethics about their profession and their value of being a service member will settle advanced military culture.

B. Prospective Directions

A professional soldier who accepts changes in social environment correctly and fulfills basic duties and roles with all his heart will be fostered for building desirable military culture. In other words, values of dedication to the

nation and the people without a moment's hesitation in any circumstance, values of sacrificing themselves as professional soldiers, values of having pride and doing worthwhile duties will be fostered.

Furthermore, current military custom need to be revised within the perspective of present values in order to create its own colors of military culture and to root out corruption and irrationality and so, sound military culture can be fostered and realized by deciding “things to do” and “things not to do” anew.

In other words, the following cultures will be realized: an open culture of policymaking through good understanding of each other, a culture of leadership fostering subordinates into leaders, a culture of a society of information and knowledge that extends information exchanges between the private sector and the government and provides a chance to develop personal skills, a culture of collaboration of armed forces through recurring education and activation of mutual exchange, and a culture of leisure for improving quality of life.

Service members will be allowed to have animated lives by providing advanced conditions and revising methods for their military life. The following plans will be implemented for their benefit: barrack facilities will be renovated to accommodate squad-scale bedrooms, daily schedule will be revised to allow service members their active mode of living by self-control, good atmosphere for service members' leisure, and a chance for self-development will be provided.

Chapter Three

Promotion of Welfare for Veterans

Courses of policy support to the veterans are based on solutions for financial problems, health care, and efficient leisure time spending. The following plans have been implemented to improve their welfare: a guarantee of veterans' new job, an extension for job position, a revision of pension system, an extension of using forces' welfare facilities, provision of same welfare privileges as service members, and a change of recognition from the nation and the society.

Inaccurate amount of pension among the service members in different ranks were deposited, and this problem was often mentioned since the revision of the law in 2000. But this problem was completely solved through the revision in military pension law, implemented at the end of year 2002. It brought a dramatic increase in pension and helped solve financial problems.

Only 27.3% of the service members who were discharged after long years of service during the last 5 years were able to get a new job due to the special aspects of their service in isolated places for a long period of time. A bureau in the MND was organized to take full responsibility of job guiding and counseling. The following plans were implemented in various ways to increase their employment rate allowing them a stable life after discharge: policy development for employment, putting more effort for extending and seeking positions and jobs in either in forces or in society, and developing career guidance training for their stable settling in society.

The Ministry of Patriots and Veterans Affairs is planning to implement supportive systems like health care, education and employment based on the law of “support for the veterans” for the improvement of welfare and, to allow the veterans to use military fitness center, hospital and other military welfare facilities by extending the scope of welfare support and increasing the number

of members.

Moreover, it is planning to use military fitness center for the same price as service members on active duty with same standing. Extending the extent of a free diagnosis in military hospital for the veterans with at least 10 years of service is planned when the capacity and revenue is available. This service is currently available only to veterans who have served at least 20 years.

Funerals for veterans are planned by establishing funeral ceremony halls in the Armed Forces Capital Hospital. Burial support in the National Cemetery for the veterans is planned to continue in the current manner. In the long run, construction of multiple silver town that has a hospital, basic facilities for living and leisure is planned to provide veterans with a stable and comfortable life.



Part Seven Defense Budget

**Chapter One
FY 2003 Defense Budget**

**Chapter Two
Defense Budget Allocation Trend and Status of Defense
Management**

**Chapter Three
Need for Appropriate Defense Budget**

**Chapter Four
Requirement for Advanced Self-Reliant Defense**

Chapter One

FY 2003 Defense Budget

The defense budget for the fiscal year 2003 is 17,426.4 billion won, an increase of 6.5% compared to the previous year. This makes up 15.6% of government budget and 2.7% of GDP.


[Table 7-1] Defense Budget in FY 2003 in comparison to FY 2002

(unit : billion won)

Classification	Year 2002	%	Year 2003	%	Changes	%
Total Defense Outlays	16,364.0	100	17,426.4	100	1,062.4	6.5
Force Investment	5,475.6	33.5	5,732.8	32.9	257.2	4.7
Operation and Maintenance	10,888.4	66.5	11,693.6	67.1	805.2	7.4
Personnel expenses	7,010.4	42.8	7,578.7	43.5	568.3	8.1
Working expenses	3,878.0	23.7	4,114.9	23.6	236.9	6.1

[Figure 7-1] Allocation of FY 2003 Defense Budget by Function

(unit : billion won)



1) Unit activities: facility operation, material acquisition, computerization/information, USFK support, etc.

2) Others: training, reserve force capability, R & D support, etc.

From the FY 2003 Budget, force investment cost was organized to obtain key defense capabilities, and to increase investment in research and development of high-tech weapons systems as a means to prepare for non-security threats of the future. The operation and maintenance portion of the budget was organized with an emphasis on such fields as better treatment for the service members, renovation in basic facilities, securing ammunition for training purposes, environment preservation and public relations matters.


Chapter Two

Defense Budget Allocation Trend and Status of Defense Management

A. Defense Budget Allocation Trend

Until the 1960s, our defense budget had been organized based on the management cost of manpower. Cost for reinforcing military strength and maintenance of equipment relied on US military aid. The Forces Modernization Plan (the Yulgok Project) for self-reliant defense had been pursued since the early 1970s due to the reduction in USFK (1971) in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine of the late 1960s. A special purpose tax

[Figure 7-2] Proportion of Defense Outlays to GDP and Government Outlays



called the “Defense Tax” was introduced in 1975 to meet the necessary expenses. The 6% proportion rate of defense outlay to GDP was set in 1979 as agreed items between the ROK and the US. This 6% level had been maintained until the early 1980s. Since the mid 1980s, to secure funds for economic development, the method of determining a defense budget that is fixed at a certain rate to GDP was abolished. Instead, the defense budget was allocated on the grounds of government's fiscal capability and, as a result, the budget was lowered to the 4% level of GDP.

The advances in democratization and the implementation of local autonomy in the 1990s led to the rise in the demand for social welfare expenditure. Consequently, the defense budget was determined on the basis of the budget's rate of increase from the previous year. The allocation rate for the defense budget dropped to the 3% level of GDP. The trend of tight fiscal management still continues since the financial crisis of 1997, which led to a reduction in defense budget allocation to the 2% level of GDP in this decade, causing serious problems in defense management.

B. Status of Defense Management

The sustained decrease in the allocation rate of the national defense budget, coupled with inflation and cost-raising factors involving high technology weaponry, has worsened the current situation of defense management. If this trend continues, the building of a forward-oriented military, let alone maintaining existing defense capabilities, is expected to face a deadlock.

1. Morale and Welfare of Service Members

Although the ROK is on the eve of becoming an advanced country with a per capita income level of \$10,000, the continued deficient management in the defense sector, as explored in previous chapters, has caused the level of morale and welfare of service members to deteriorate to the levels reminiscent of the

1960s and 1970s. As a result, there is a decline in pride and attraction in being a military officer. Also, the situation makes it harder for the newer generation service members to adapt to military life.

2. Combat Readiness Posture


The continued shortage in national defense resources also had a serious impact on the maintenance of the combat readiness posture. Possessing a number of worn-out equipment that have exceeded their lifespan, the military is having difficulties in securing spare parts and conducting maintenance and repair. As a result, unexpected breakdowns and accidents have been a source for concern. For example, the “Nike” guided missile, which was introduced to ROK as part of US military aid, is no longer in service in any other country in the world except ROK. This aged weaponry caused several accidents during the military exercises of 1998 and 1999. Maintenance work on the equipment necessary for battle is being delayed due to the decrease in the maintenance budget, which could harm combat readiness posture. Of all the types of ammunition needed to sustain combat, only 60% satisfy the sufficient level of ammunition stockpiles and the amount of provision of ammunition for training purposes remains at 86%. Individual and unit combat competence is expected to decline since target practice with some costly ammunition is non-existent. In the meantime, the shortage in oil posed limits in mobile exercise. With training camp shortages, military commanders face many difficulties during mobile exercises conducted beyond base grounds and also spend a large amount of time to prevent civilian complaints.

3. Force Investment

The proportion of force investment in the national defense budget is in continued decline because of a rise in pay that followed the policy of better treatment to public officials and fiscal austerity on national defense that has been maintained since the financial crisis in 1997. The ensuing problems

concerning force investments are as follows.

[Figure 7-3] Change in Proportion of Force Investment to Defense Budget



First, while at least 10% of force investment should be allocated to new investment projects each year, only 6.6% of force improvement outlays went to new investment projects in 1997 and 3.7% in 2003 due to resource constraints. The promotion of new projects to reinforce defense capabilities has become difficult.

Second, investment project of key defense capabilities such as K1A1 tanks, F-15K fighters, AWACS, 7,000 ton-class destroyers, next generation guided weapons were delayed or its scale drastically cut. For example, the project for next generation guided weapons that would replace the Hawk and Nike missiles, planned for the acquisition of 72 missiles. However, the order volume reduced to 48 because of lack of funds. Even the date of completion was delayed from the year 2005 to the year 2010.

Third, following the reduction in the amount of materials for the domestic defense industry, the rate of operation in the defense industry stands at only 50.3% of 2001 levels. As firms of the domestic defense industry are currently manufacturing at minimum capacity to maintain its production line, the very survival of the domestic industry is in question. By delaying the securing of

key technologies for the defense capabilities development in the future and in localization of main weapons systems, the lack of R&D investment could lead to a vicious circle of increasing military technology dependency on foreign countries and a loss in competitiveness in defense exports.

[Figure 7-4] Reduction and Delay of Key FIPs

	Original plan		Adjusted	
	Period	Number of Units	Period	Number of Units
K1A1 tanks	'99~'08	456	'99~'08	323
7,000 ton class Destroyers	'99~'08	3	'01~'12	3
F-15K fighters	'99~'08	120	'02~'09	40
Airborne Warning & Control System	'98~'04	4	'04~'10	4
Next generation guided weapons	'99~'05	72	'04~'10	48
In-flight tanker	'00~'05	5	'04~'10	4

Chapter Three

Need for Appropriate Defense Budget

The Korean society is divided on the question of increasing the defense budget. Those who support an increase in defense budget do so for the following reasons. Despite the efforts for reconciliation and cooperation between the South and North, North Korea still remains a military threat, as evidenced in the nuclear crisis, and therefore ROK's defense capability must be continuously strengthened. Another thread of opinion in support for a rise in defense expenditure calls for an early realization of self-reliant defense, in other words lowering ROK's dependency on USFK and establishing a forward-looking advanced defense system, which is based on quality rather than quantity as a way of preparing for non-specific threats in the future.

Meanwhile, negative opinions on the increase in defense budget are as follows. As the recognition of “no war among the same people” has spread to certain elements of Korean society since the South-North Joint Declaration of June 15, 2000, some have said that the rise in defense budget undermines peace and stability on the peninsula, and that because ROK's economic or military power is far superior to that of North Korea, portions of the defense budget should be used for economic development and social welfare. Still another opinion argues that efficient defense management that includes the reduction of troops can help secure resources for force investment.

With such a diverse array of opinion about the appropriate level of defense budget, forming a public consensus built upon the basis of in-depth understanding of the security situation and policy is needed in order to ensure peace and prosperity on the peninsula.

A. Preparation for Current and Future Non-Specific Threats

Inter-Korean reconciliation and cooperation notwithstanding, North Korea has not abandoned its strategy to communize the South, and to this end maintains an overwhelming quantitative superiority in conventional weapons while also continuously pursuing the development of WMD. More than 70% of their ground forces are deployed south of the Pyongyang-Wonsan Line, enabling them to launch a surprise attack. With the mass development and deployment of long-range artilleries and missiles, they have the capability to attack the metropolitan area and the entire peninsula.

Northeast Asia is emerging as the region with the world's most fierce arms race. Japan is exploring extended political and military roles that are congruent to its economic power. China is pursuing modernization of military strength under the strategy of “active defense,” whereas Russia is qualitatively improving its military strength in order to restore its status as a powerful country. The ROK is facing a security situation that urgently calls for the establishment of a self-defense capability that can actively respond to North Korea's military threat as well as non-specific threats in the future.

B. Preparation for Progressive Readjustment of ROK-US Alliance

In line with changes in the global security environment and development of its forces, the US is recently examining the overall restructuring of its armed forces deployed overseas.

In light of improvement in the capabilities of ROK Armed Forces, role adjustments are being explored in which the ROK will play the leading role in ROK's defense while the US play its role at the regional level. During the

course of this transition, some of USFK's current duties will be handed over to the ROK. Those forces which the ROK has been reliant on the US, such as intelligence, surveillance, precision strike and protective forces need to be secured as soon as possible. While establishing a basis for a self defense capability, the building of a future-oriented military force, which conforms to the modernization of the ROK-US Alliance should also be carried in tandem.

C. Securing Defense Capability that Corresponds with National Power

Economic and military power are the two measurements that are used to gauge a country's standing in the world. A strong national defense raises ROK's status in international society, and plays a key factor in determining Korea's credibility. Therefore, defense expenditure that corresponds to national power is important.

When compared to other countries, the defense outlay of ROK is very low. The defense outlay of other countries decreased briefly after the end of Cold War, but returned to continued growth in the late 1990s. Especially since the 9 · 11 terrorist incident, defense outlays have been climbing sharply.

The proportion of ROK's defense outlay to GDP, which stands at 2.7%, is lower than the world average of 3.5%. This is even less than half the rate of other countries with imminent security threats, such as Israel and Taiwan, which averages at approximately 6.3%. Defense budget per person was \$252 in 2001, which is only the 30th highest in the world. The economy of ROK, which is the 13th largest in the world, can fully absorb a defense outlay of 3.5% of GDP.

[Table 7-2] Defense Outlay of other Countries (FY 2001)

(Year 2001)

Classification	Israel	US	Singapore	France	Taiwan	Russia	Japan	ROK
Defense budget (in million)	10,375	322,365	4,280	32,909	10,432	63,684	39,513	11,920
Ratio to GDP (%)	9.5	3.2	5.1	2.6	3.7	4.3	1.0	2.8
Per Capita Defense Budget (\$)	1,673	1,128	1,044	553	472	440	310	252

※ Source : The Military Balance 2002-2003 (ROK entries quoted from government data)

D. Defense Budget and National Development

Security and economy are two important axes of national administration. Stable security provides the environment in which economic activities can flourish and economic growth makes possible the outlay of appropriate level of defense budget, which in return reinforces national power.

The era of digitization and globalization has created a new market where information, capital and goods circulate rapidly. When security is threatened in this kind of market surroundings, it will have a negative effect on the economy, with an immediate decline in credit rating, depression in investor confidence, a slump in stocks and a decrease in exports.

The effect of security factors on the economy is formidable, especially in the case of divided Korea, whose dependence on external trade is high. A rise in global credit rating agency's interest in security and defense of the ROK can be understood in this context.

In the early 1980s, ROK recorded an annual growth rate of 15~20% while the defense outlay ratio remained at 6% of GDP. The induction effect of industrial production of defense expenditure is higher than the industry average. Defense-related research and development contribute to development of

domestic technologies and an increase in export through the civilian transfer of defense-related technologies and compromised trade in weaponry import. Defense budget is not simply an exhaustive expenditure, but an expense spent in many different industrial fields to contribute to productive economic and social development through many spill-over effects in overall industry fields.

The ROK Armed Forces also contributed to a rise of the country's status by participating in activities of UN PKO and anti-terrorism. Recent dispatch of forces to Iraq and Afghanistan played a decisive role of forming a strong bond between the US and the ROK. The ROK Armed Forces also played key roles during national disasters and large-scale national events. This contributed much to ROK's economy in both direct and indirect ways.

Chapter Four

Requirement for Advanced Self-Reliant Defense

Establishing the basis for advanced, self-reliant defense during the term of the Participatory Government requires not only the maintenance of existing operations and force investment, but also meeting further budget requirements to solve problems stemming from a long-term deficient management and to build a self-defense capability.

This requires an additional 12.2 trillion won for the defense resources until year 2008 including 10.4 trillion won for uplifting service members' morale, spent for squad-scale quarters furnished with individual beds, improvement in quarters for officers and NCOs, a rise in enlisted men's salary and actualization of facility maintenance needs. It also includes 1.8 trillion won, spent for reinforcement of defense capabilities due to the reduced period of service and increase of noncommissioned officers. At the same time, 3.4 trillion won is needed for training-purpose ammunition to strengthen combat readiness posture, fuel for the equipment and securing a training camp. An additional 0.3 trillion won is needed for environment preservation, and to protect people's rights and interests. The overall budget requirement for operation and maintenance between year 2004 and year 2008 is estimated to be 82 trillion won.

Force Investment Programs to secure self-defense capabilities include preparing to counter threats from the North beforehand, developing abilities for non-specific threats in the future and conducting research and development to acquire key technologies, which will require 55 trillion won.

The overall defense budget which includes operation and maintenance and force investment between FY 2004 and FY 2008 is 137 trillion won, which amounts to 3.2~3.5% of estimated GDP.

Some people claim that defense capabilities investment should be funded by reducing troop strength and conducting economical application. During the sustained period of deficient management, the ROK Forces implemented various reform measures to efficiently operate defense budget, and will strive to do so in the future. But the price for F-15K fighter is 100 billion won, equivalent to the yearly budget for 2 divisions, while one Korean destroyer (KDX-III) is 1,500 billion won, equivalent to the yearly budget for 17 divisions. Taking these problems into consideration, it is beyond forces' capability to resolve the shortage of defense capabilities investment which was brought about by the reduced allocation.

The key to national defense is to prevent war and to protect national benefit positively by investing defense budget at the right moment and securing necessary defense capabilities when needed. If establishing national defense power for the future is delayed, the very survival of the country will hardly be guaranteed considering rapid changes in the 21st century's security environment. At a time when establishing and maintaining military strength has reached its limit due to the long term accumulated shortage of national defense resources, appropriate level of defense budget needs to be stably allocated in order to realize advanced self-reliant defense.

In order to support the Policy of Peace and Prosperity with “force” and to develop into an “advanced, high-morale, elite armed forces” that can respond to any security threat in a self-reliant and active manner, a national consensus needs to be forged so that 3.2~3.5% of GDP can be allocated for defense budget.

Peace does not come only because we want it; it is won when there is the “will” and “force” to protect it. Substantial investment along with firm national will toward security is required in order to uphold the national

interest and right to exist, especially when North Korea poses a threat today, and an uncertain security environment looms in the future.

It is imperative that a national consensus be forged on a stable allocation of an appropriate level of defense budget so that the current deadlock in defense management is improved and the basis is established to build a future-oriented military force, which are the precursors in realizing “advanced, self-reliant defense.”



Part Eight
Realizing the National Defense
with the People

Chapter One
Public Benefits Enhancement and Protection of Rights

Chapter Two
Realizing Open Defense Administration

Chapter One

Public Benefits Enhancement and Protection of Rights

A. Enhancing Military's Environment Preservation Activities

1. Laying the Foundation for the Military's Environmental Management

The underlying principle of the military's environmental policy is “environment-friendly management.” The military is actively participating in environment-friendly activities that are aimed at minimizing pollution caused by military presence and utilization, restoring polluted areas, preserving the ecosystem of the surrounding environment, and supporting local environmental cleanup activities.

Environmental management requires the participation and cooperation of all involved personnel. Especially, the employment of wastewater treatment facilities and incinerators requires professional manpower. Out of a total of 5,412 basic environmental facilities classified into 6 categories such as wastewater treatment facilities, incinerators, the military has secured 3,460 facilities (64%) as of 2002. And, the rest (1,952) are to be in place by 2005. Moreover, the military is actively engaged in tasks that are aimed to upgrade

[Table 8-1] Military Owned Basic Environmental Facilities/Plan

Classification	Total Demand	'02	'03	'04	'05
Facilities	5,412	3,460	440	756	756
100 million Won	4,919	2,400	498	1,011	1,010

old environmental facilities in order to satisfy the current law standards. Projects for upgrading 115 basic environmental facilities including incineration facility are planned for 2003.

Furthermore, the military has been securing sufficient numbers of military occupational specialty (MOS) personnel including environmental specialists and other relevant agents that effectively operate these facilities. By the end of 2002, 896 environmental MOS personnel were employed and by the end of 2005, the total demand of 1,609 personnel is to be secured in accordance with the environmental facilities plan.

[Table 8-2] Military Employed MOS Personnel/Plan

Classification	Total Demand	'02	'03	'04	'05
No. of MOS Personnel	1,609	896	237	237	239

2. Reducing Noise in Military Airfields/Firing Ranges

The military holds and operates numerous military airfields and firing ranges and as a result, there has been a rapid increase in complaints over the high level of noise produced at these places. Therefore, the military has established a “comprehensive noise reduction policy” and is doing its best to minimize the inconvenience experienced by the people. Also, in order to reduce the noise level and minimize public inconvenience, the flight course and flight altitude at military airfields are being adjusted.

In order to minimize the noise level of maintaining aircraft, seven sound-proof flight maintenance facilities have been constructed by the end of 2002 and six more are being planned for completion by the year 2005.

Meanwhile, a special law concerning military-related noise is being considered in order to develop fundamental countermeasures to noise produced at military airfields and firing ranges. The current research on the actual condition of military-related noise is to be completed by the year 2004

and after securing enough financial resources, the special law will be enacted by the year 2005, and will go into effect in 2006.

B. Management of Military Facilities and the Protection of Individual Property Rights

1. Relocation of Military Facilities

A total of 3.64 trillion won was spent on the relocation of 234 units from 1966 to 2002. In 2003, the military plans to relocate 36 units at the cost of 327 billion won.

[Table 8-3] Relocation of Military Facilities Unit

(number of units)

Classification	Total	Seoul	Busan	Daegu	Daejon	Gyeongju	Wonju	Inchon	Others
Total Number of Projects 1966-2002 (in 2002)	234 (7)	55 (1)	43 (0)	20 (0)	20 (0)	19 (1)	23 (0)	10 (0)	44 (5)

2. Settlement of Private Land Used by the Military

For private land that the military must continue to use, the military either purchases the land or compensates the owners for it. For those deemed unnecessary for military use, they are returned to the owner immediately.

[Table 8-4] Settlement of Private Land Cases

Classification	Total Size of Land to be Settled	Cases Settled (1983-2002)	Plans	
			2003	After 2004
Size (10 thousand pyung)	4,702	3,681	277	744
Required Budget (100 million won)	6,934	4,520	614	1,800

3. Revision and Deregulation of Military Facility (Base) Protection Areas

To protect major military facility (base) and guarantee smooth military operations, the military has designated and managed military facility (base) protection areas that account for approximately 3.24 billion pyung in accordance with the Military Facility Protection Act, the Naval Base Act, and the Act on Air Bases for Military Use.

However, the effective usage of the land is still restricted since a large portion of the national territory is designated as military facility (base) protection area. Therefore, restrictions related to the military facility (base) protection areas are being reduced and the boundary of these areas are being rationally readjusted, not only to ensure operational efficiency of the land, but to enhance public benefit as well.

a. Improving Legal and Institutional Framework

Since 1970, the laws on military facility (base) protection areas have been revised many times, and some areas, such as villages within the protected area north of the civilian control line, areas necessary to carry out unification polices and national security tourist sites have been adjusted from restricted reservation zones to limited protection zones.

In the past, new construction or remodeling of all types of buildings was not permitted in areas around the ammunition storehouse (depots), but now removal of buildings in these areas is allowed for public projects, e.g., railway or road construction. Plus, the air base protection zone, which was previously set at 5 km from the borderline of airfields, has been reduced to 2 km. Also, the restricted area for helicopter bases has been reduced. Both ease the restrictions on the lands around airfields.

Since February 1998, permitted range or height of construction inside the military facility (base) protection areas has been specified and administrative agencies took charge of consultations in order to simplify the procedures for obtaining permission from the military. The military also made efforts to

appease residents by furnishing maps of military facility (base) protection areas in administrative agencies.

In May 2003, the “Military Facility Protection Act” was revised and enacted as Statute No. 6870. This law not only laid the ground for division and brigade-level units to establish and run “Military Facility Protection Zone Committees” for areas under their jurisdiction but also made possible the processing of petitions concerning consultation commissioning and other military facility reservation services. It shortened the processing time from six months to one month. In addition, it enabled the cooperation between local administrative agencies and responsible units.

Furthermore, in order to cope with various civil appeals and petitions at National Assembly and to effectively manage military facility protection zones, the military has established “Military Facility Protection Area Management Committee” as of January 2003, headed by the Director of Operations of the JCS. This committee is working to ease regulations, to review and lift restrictions on protection areas, to reset operational standards, and also to modify relevant laws and regulations. In March 2003, the Office for Government Policy Organization placed the “Improvement of Military Facility Protection Area Management” at the top of its policy agenda.

b. Easing Regulations

In October 1997, the military lifted restrictions on three reservation zones, a total of 500,000 pyung including ammunition storehouses and villages in Bangsan town, Yanggu county, Kangwon Province that had no influence on military operations. The military also altered the status of 12 areas, a total of 4,820,000 pyung, which includes settlements within the civilian restriction line, national security tourist sites, and air defense bases in rear areas, from restricted reservation zone to limited reservation zone.

In June 1998, it lifted reservation zones on 10 areas, a total of 3,810,000 pyung including cosmopolitan development areas that had no influence on military operations. Also, it altered the status of 16 areas, a total of 2,330,000 pyung, which includes villages within civilian restriction lines, from restricted

reservation zone to limited reservation zone, so that local residents could enlarge and remodel buildings. In August 1998, consultation operations regarding the area of Gyeonggi, Gangwon, Incheon, and Seoul, amounting to 320,000,000 pyung, were consigned to administrative agencies. In November 1999, consultation operations regarding a total of 32 areas, amounting to 15,000,000 pyung, which include Paju Gyeonggi-do, Munsan and Yeoncheon, were consigned to administrative agencies so that they can approve construction within a height range of 5.5 meters to 45 meters.

In September 2000, it lifted the restricted reservation zone on three areas, amounting to 1,060,000 pyung, which had no influence on military operations due to the formation of city and the redeployment of forces. Also, it altered the status of Dongpae-ri, Paju city settlement and national security tourist sights of Pyongwha Dam, amounting to 64,000 pyung, from restricted reservation zone to limited reservation zone. It is operated flexibly in consideration of projects and development plans of local governments.

In December 2001, it lifted restricted reservation zone on 36 areas, amounting to 42,630,000 pyung, which include Gangwha Island, Munsan, Changwon, and so forth, regarding alterations on operational environments. Consultation operations regarding a total of 34 areas, amounting to 3,720,000 pyung, which includes Paju, Gosung, Masan, Jinhae, and so forth, were consigned to administrative agencies so that local residents can build within a height of 3 meters to 70 meters without consulting with the military. It contributed to conveniences and benefits and guaranteed property rights of local residents.

In September 2002, it lifted reservation zone, on 133 areas, amounting to 5,790,000 pyung, nationwide and eased construction height limits. It lifted reservation zones on 25 areas, amounting to 550,000 pyung, which include Jongno, Seoul, and it altered the status of 75 areas, amounting to 2,160,000 pyung, which include villages and islands located northwest of civilian restriction lines, from restricted reservation zones to limited reservation zones, so that new constructions and repairs could become possible. Also, consultation operations regarding 33 areas, amounting to 3,080,000 pyung,

including Byeokjaedong in Goyang city, Sinsanli in Paju city, and so forth, were consigned to administrative agencies which resulted in the omission of consultation process with the military. It also eased construction height limits on existing consigned areas.

[Table 8-5] Cancellation and Deregulation of Military Facility Protection Areas

(Unit: 10 thousand pyung)

Year	total	Before '80	'81~ '85	'86~ '88	'89~ '93	'94	'95~ '98	'99~ '00	'01~ '02
Cancellation	92,776	849	1,104	30,805	1,393	53,770	431	106	4,318
Revision	10,005	257	486	2,615	1,419	4,267	715	6	240
Consultation Commission	33,632	32,000	1,500	132

C. Activities of Military Support for the Public

1. Support for the Public

As “Armed Forces of the People,” the military actively participates in various endeavors where they are most needed by making the best use of its manpower, equipment, and technology, while not hindering fulfillment of its basic missions.

Especially, given manpower shortages and economic difficulties in rural farming areas, the military is an enthusiastic volunteer and source of farmland support in such work as transplanting rice seedlings, harvesting rice, and other needs.



Farmland Support

Rather than simply providing manpower, the military tries to support the foundation of farming through the consolidation of farm roads and river improvement work. Moreover, the military formed farm machine repair teams and dispatched them to places in lack of farm machine service centers.

[Table 8-6] Farmland Support in 2002

Participants	Equipment	Major Support Achievements				
		Farming Support	Farm Machine Repair	Farm Road Repair	Anti-Epidemic Support	Medical Support
613,901 persons	9,105 units	28,752 hectares	6,591 units	89 km	1,384 places	24,874 persons

Meanwhile, the military also provides free medical service and preventive measures against epidemics for residents in remote areas with insufficient medical care, legal counseling services to local residents, and conducts sister-relationships with nearby social welfare facilities or needy neighbors.

2. Support for Public Projects

In an attempt to enhance public welfare and to develop the nation's industrial infrastructure, the military has taken part in national land development projects such as road construction and the reorganization of arable land. From 1990 to 1993, the military supplied manpower and equipment to help pave the Freedom Expressway. In 1996, the military completed road renovation projects on both Baengnyeongdo and Daecheongdo.

Recently from May 1997 to December 1999, the military provided personnel and construction equipment to renovate a 19 km section of the coastal road on Ganghwado. As a second stage of such support, starting in June 2000, a 9.5 km section has been renovated with various construction equipment including excavators and dump trucks, and completed 4.3km by the end of 2002. So far,

this military support has saved 17.3 billion won, has met the needs of the local residents, and has enhanced military operational capability.

3. Support Activities for Disasters and Accidents

In the year 2002, there were large scale disasters resulting from unusual changes in the weather, including heavy snow, drought, red tide, heavy rain and the typhoon “Rusa.”

The military promptly carries out restoration support activities and employs available manpower and equipment to the maximum level possible during disasters or calamities. Eventually, the military will give positive aid to the nation by mobilizing all available army personnel in an aspect of “the performance of military's fundamental duties.” Our military will strive to

[Table 8-7] Support for the Public during the Last 5 Years

Classification	Total	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02
Military Personnel (Persons)	6,670,546	1,875,540	1,446,651	522,309	1,843,986	982,060
Equipment(Units)	149,482	35,476	20,452	3,790	66,892	22,872

[Table 8-8] Statistics of Support for the Public during the Last 5 Years

Classification	Rescued Person (persons)	Arrangement of house (buildings)	Road/Riverbank Repair (km)	Farmland Repair (10,000 pyung)	Quarantine/Sterilization (ha.)	Green House/ Stall Repair (buildings)	Scatter of Yellow Soil (tons)
Total	1,674	77,158	9,388	2,117	161,333	36,867	9,305
'98	861	6,520	922	42	132,678		
'99	578	21,071	1,020	1,429	22,274		
'00	-	1,493	66	-	5,927		
'01	124	36,252	6,813	62	-	36,867	5,705
'02	111	11,822	567	584	454		3,600

enhance its capability to respond to national crises by properly training its personnel and improving its equipment, all to minimize damage to life and property of the people.

4. Military Support for Nation's Logistics Crisis (General Strike of the Korean Cargo Workers Federation)

Since the Korean Cargo Workers Federation went on a strike in May 2003, productive activities reached a deadlock, while exports and imports were not completed timely. At the same time, worry about the national credit rating's downfall soared during the national logistics crisis. Nevertheless, the military contributed to the normalization of the nationwide transport cargo system, as well as the operation of Busan port, by supporting with both military professional personnel and equipment. As a result, the military not only did its best for the public welfare, but also earned credibility as the nation's military in times of national emergency.

During the period of general strike by the Cargo Workers Federation, 35 drivers of container trailers, 20 69-ton tractors and 20 container trailers, together with 40 more drivers (totaling to 230 personnel and 92 vehicles for transportation) made a contribution to normalization of logistics nationwide. In the mean time, the military provided a solution to get through the nation's serious crisis by rendering its exclusive pier as a port of container shipment.

Once more, the military is cultivating around 10,860 men as key industry personnel in approximately



Support for the transportation equipment during the General Strike of Cargo Workers Foundation

12 fields including railroad, electricity, water works, and others to keep up with the constant support system.

Chapter Two

Realizing Open Defense Administration

A. Satisfying the People's Right to Know

1. Information Disclosure and Military Related Petitions


Knowing that defense draws its resources from the people and that the military cannot play its role properly without their support, the military has been doing its best to satisfy the right of the people to know. In order to enhance the sense of national security as well as trust toward the military, the military publicizes its information to the extent that it does not hurt its essential role. Also, considering increasing needs of the public involving the military, and the progress of democracy in Korea, the military is endeavoring to achieve balance.

a. Information Disclosure

The government passed the “Act on Obligatory Disclosure of Information by Public Agencies,” in which it makes it mandatory for all public agencies to publicize all the information they deal with. In accordance with the law, the military has made a list of public files in civil affairs offices and has built a site called “Service Windows” on the Internet website of the MND, which provides various files on its policies and statistics.

Publicizing information is needed to encourage the participation of the people in national affairs and to ensure the credibility and the transparency of the government. A person can first look at lists of various files provided at the website (www.mnd.go.kr) or at government offices, and then ask for the

[Figure 8-1] Process of Information Disclosure



information needed. Once the request is submitted to the agency, the agency is obliged to notify the requester within 15 days, whether the request is permitted or not, and once the request is permitted, it must provide the information within 15 days.

Should an appellant lodge an appeal, the MND and its subordinate institutes are to respond within seven days in writing. If the appeal is denied or dismissed, an information notice of the administrative appeal will be mailed together with the decision. Since January 1, 1998, the MND has been continually expanding the boundaries of information, and starting from July 2000, it has established an information disclosure system on the internet, so that anyone can easily ask for publication of information. Through the Internet service, which provides various statistics, the MND has tried to ensure the trust of the people in its administration. Beyond this effort, the MND has eased restrictions on files regarding National Defense Investment projects, set up procedures for information disclosure and has publicized these efforts since July 1999.

When information disclosure was first introduced in 1998, it only received

five requests. However, this number is increasing as the people's interest grows.

[Table 8-9] The Current Status on Information Disclosure

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003(May)
Number of cases	34	627	2,204	139	113

※ The reason for the reduced number of information disclosure in 2002 is because the basic information disclosures were also counted as general petitions.

b. Military-related Petitions

As the democracy in Korea was being firmly rooted, the people's need for satisfaction of personal and property rights grew. The MND has been putting much effort and resources into this effort to satisfy all these needs. In the past, dealing with civil petitions was slow, perfunctory and inefficient. Its job was only confined to taking requests and shifting around paperwork around. In addition, it had been slow to react to the needs.

[Table 8-10] Civil Petition Information

Classification	Contact information
MND address	1 Yongsan-dong 3 Ga, Yongsan-gu, Seoul, 140-701
Office of Civil Petition	02) 748-6891, 6892, 797-7504, 795-0808
FAX	02) 748-6895
Web address	www.mnd.go.kr
Defense Reporting Center	02) 748-5959, 017-675-5959, 017-674-6880
MND phone number	02) 748-1111

In order to be effective, the MND had to be quick to respond, but due to its many- leveled structure, valuable time was lost in the process.

First, the MND created the Office of Civil Petitions, which can deal with civil petitions comprehensively. The procedure related to civil petitions has been

somewhat passive and limited to delivering documents, but as the importance of civil affairs grew, MND created a civil petitions department under the inspection bureau for more efficient supervision and defense reporting tasks, so that the people can handle civil petitions themselves. It has also improved the service by designating specific departments for the civil petitions that had not been taken care of because of the administrative structure. For repeated civil petitions, it has provided substantial solutions to satisfy the petitioners. Also, it has improved the civil affairs system by activating the defense civil petitions mediation committee.

Second, it has established the Defense Civil Affairs Information System. Within the MND, its subordinate departments and each service headquarters started to use the same program to process the civil petitions. This reduced the process for each petition takes from seven days to real-time. Also it built a database so that the people can check the progress of their petitions on the Internet. This change has ensured speed, reliability and efficiency in civil affairs.

Third, the laws for repeated petitions and unsolved petitions as well as the laws and regulations for benefits and support for national heroes, military air base and hometown reserves have been revised and modified to better meet the public need. If the laws seem irrational or outdated, requests for revising the laws may be submitted, and in return, the concerned ministries will accept and address these problems, successfully getting rid of the possible cause of petitions.

Fourth, for the benefit of the people, automated booths have been installed in the headquarters of the MND and each service headquarters as well. Also, to increase the satisfaction of services, periodic audit procedures are conducted along with annual satisfaction surveys. Friendliness of telephone counseling in each division and higher level units is also a subject of checks, so efficiency could be maintained all the time.

Fifth, in order to foster a bright barrack environment by eradicating battery, abuse and other illegal conduct, MND has activated the National Reporting Center. Its existence and ways to utilize their services have been publicized on

the Korea Defense Daily Newspaper, weekly. All the reports can be received through the Internet, mail, telephone, or fax 24 hours a day. Important matters are directly investigated by the MND, but minor matters are investigated by each service. However, results of all investigations are checked thoroughly by the MND. All these measures help to prevent accidents involving military personnel. Through this effort, battery and abuse as well as illegal or unreasonable conducts have been sharply reduced.

[Table 8-11] Methods of Civil Petition at MND

(Unit: cases)

Year	Total	Paper Petition	Internet Petition	Visiting Petition	Telephone Consultation
2000	51,274	3,793	8,834	2,622	36,025
2001	55,922	3,234	10,666	1,832	40,190
2002	66,763	9,319	13,216	3,028	41,200

The majority of civil petitions involve issues regarding personal information, military regulations, verification of Military Merit, property rights, and accident reports. Requesting a civil petition is now done via the Internet instead of paper work. The MND is working around the clock to increase the satisfaction of the people in many ways, but the vast size of MND and its role of conducting secret missions make it hard to fully satisfy all the needs of the people. Therefore, to increase the satisfaction of the people, MND will continuously improve the laws and regulations regarding civil petitions through various methods including certificates as well as making requested documents available on-line, increasing the number of the units equipped with the Internet, and reducing the process stages of civil petitions. In doing so, the status of the army for the people and of the people will be solidified.

2. Activating Defense Public Relations

The Participatory Government is making constant efforts to open its defense administration by making defense policies public and gathering public

opinion. To meet these goals, the Participatory Government is holding constant “daily press briefings” while opportunely apprising the general public of issues of common interest, such as national defense policies and changes in security circumstances in and around the Korean Peninsula, by means of military media, e.g., Korea Defense Daily, Defense Media Broadcasting, Defense News and other media.

As of March 2000, the MND launched its own Internet website, thereby making interactive communication with the public possible and improving the convenience of its users. The MND has also opened websites for each of its branches within its own website and has established a liaison system with all forces, making the processing of civil appeals swift and more accurate. Various military data and diverse multimedia data, such as marching songs and military films, are also available at this website.

Public opinion is collected and reflected in national defense policies through various sources, such as public polls, open bulletin, and e-mails. In March 2002, a daily newspaper delivery system was introduced to deliver the Korea Defense Daily, the military's public media, into the hands of its readers on the publishing date. The military expects to gradually expand the practice of this system in the near future.

In order to publicize national defense policies and provide answers to the questions of the families of service members, the Korea Defense Daily is being sold in some of the subway stations in Seoul as of March 2002, and in some of the subway stations in Busan as of October 2002. The sale of the Korea Defense Daily is expected to go nationwide depending on the response of its readers and other conditions



The Korea Defense Daily on Newsstands

3. Inspiring Security Consciousness Through Barracks Experience

Each service of the ROK Armed Forces is conducting distinctive barracks experiences and self-control training activities, which contribute to fostering teenagers through cultivation of leadership, discipline of mind and body, and development of their potentials. The total number of participants amounts to 100,000 annually.

The contents of the program are organized as a national education course including an introductory movie on national defense, basic military training, nighttime border guard experience, barracks life education, ocean activity, survival game, and camping. Participating teenagers experience the challenging and adventurous activities, which helps them understand the importance of national security and the significance of national defense duty. Throughout these activities, teenagers have a chance to understand social activities and barracks culture before enlistment. At the same time, the military creates for its soldiers a barracks culture environment, which corresponds to teenagers' taste in order to boost morale and to diffuse and activate sturdy culture.



Teenagers' Barracks Experience

[Table 8-12] Teenager Organizations National Defense Camping Support Result

(Unit : person)

Total	Korea Youth Association	The Scouts Union	The Girl Scouts Union	Young Astronauts Korea	Sea Explorers in Korea	Others
101,890	35,570	38,000	5,450	7,000	13,880	1,990

On the other hand, for adults, this barracks experience heightens confidence and brings back nostalgia of their past service, and gives them an opportunity to propagate security awareness. Furthermore, the MND invites professional photographers as well as major figures from NGOs and the Korea Literature Association to frontline posts annually in order to give them a better understanding of national defense and so that they can share their security consciousness. This is done by providing them an opportunity to gain a first hand look into the security environment and witness the readiness posture of the armed forces.

B. Participation of Civilian Experts in Development of National Defense Policy

In an era that stresses “National Defense Together with the People,” national defense policies must be set and enforced with transparency, and this process should be conveyed to the people. With this in mind, our military, which values the importance of the people's participation and interest in national defense policies, is establishing and executing systems that invite civilian experts of various fields to take part in deciding national defense policies.

1. The Council of Defense Policy

Since 1981, the military has been consulting the “Council of Defense Policy,” which consists of learned and experienced civilian experts from academic fields and the press, thereby improving civil-military relations.

The Council of Defense Policy provides consulting based on the expertise and experience from diverse fields for national defense policy. It commissions a total of 47 members in 13 branch committees, which includes policy, defense-expenditure control, T.I.E. & publicity, planning & budget, judicial affairs, personnel & welfare, mobilization, logistics, procurement, research & development, facilities, intelligence systems, and JCS.

In tandem with the government's policy of motivating women's social participation, the military has been commissioning female experts since 2001, and as of the year 2003, 10 female consultants are currently working in different fields. Taking into consideration the characteristics of branch committees, it is expected that the commissioning of female consultants will gradually increase in the future.

The Council of Defense Policy, with the Minister of National Defense as its chair, comprises a whole conference which is held annually, and branch conferences are held at least once every period. Should matters of national defense become an issue, frequent policy consulting is provided through individual visitations or correspondence.

2. Increasing Participation Opportunities of Civilian Experts

In the past, the participation of civilian experts in defense policy-making was limited to questionnaires or seminars, but as of 1998, civilian experts are directly participating in policy-making as members of various councils. In 2003, the “Committee for the Innovation of National Defense” changed its name to the “Committee for National Defense Research” and is commissioning civilian experts and reserved specialists as its councils.

Furthermore, in order that civilian scholars may show continuous interests in national defense affairs, the MND is holding civilian-sector seminars pertaining to national defense, and is also making significant use of the views of civilian experts when reviewing and deciding defense policies. Moreover, as of 1999, the MND is making efforts to raise the quality of defense research by including civilian research institutions in researching affairs of national defense as of 1999, which was previously done by the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses.

C. The Korean War and the 50th Anniversary Commemoration Project

The Korean War, during which North Korea, with the support of Soviet Union and China, launched an invasion against the South, is one of the representative wars under the order of the Cold War that preserved democracy and contained the spread of Communism.

The support of UN Forces at that time included the dispatch of combat units by the US and 15 other nations; the detachment of medical support units by India and four other countries; and material provision by more than 20 countries. For the duration of the war, over 4 million were killed, more than 10 million were separated from their families, and damages were estimated at \$23 billion. The war, which left the people of Korea with tremendous scars, still leaves the North and South divided and in a military standoff.

Therefore, the government has designated the period from June 25, 2000 to July 27, 2003, which marks the 50th anniversary of the war, as the period for the 50th anniversary commemoration project and is carrying out various undertakings.

1. Remembering the Historical Lessons of the Korean War

The government is making efforts to instill security consciousness by teaching our children historical lessons and the meaning of the Korean War, so as not to let another tragic event take place on this land. In April and July 2000, defense conferences and seminars were held, inviting experts from the US and the world over.

Central and battlefield commemorative events are being held annually, and 16 unestablished military fields in the Korean War, along with 13 non-military areas, such as political, economic, social, cultural fields will be organized and published into booklets by 2003.

In addition, to honor the souls of the war heroes who fought to preserve peace on this land, “the Yeongcheon Battle Monument,” “Pohang Student

Voluntary Forces Memorial,” and “the Geoje POW Camp Park” have been completed in 2002. “The Korean War Sculpture” within the War Memorial is expected to be completed by July 2003. The Participatory Government is also continuously striving to remind the people of the historical lessons of the Korean War by restoring and maintaining 667 battlefield sites nationwide.

2. Events for Remembering Major Battles

Events for remembering major battles of the Korean War are regularly held to bequeath the historical lesson to the posterity to honor the patriotic martyr and to solidify mutual friendship with allied forces

Thirty-three events for remembering major battles have been held so far including “Nakdong River Counterattack,” “Incheon Landing Operation,” and “Seoul Recovery.” On July 27th, “The 50th Anniversary of the Truce” was successfully held at Panmunjeom and the War Memorial of Korea, hosted by the MND and the UN Headquarters in Korea.

3. Honoring Korean War Veterans and the Enlargement of Welfare Policies

Honoring Korean War veterans and their families is still and ongoing business of the government. In order to recover the remains of the patriotic martyr to their families, from April, 2000 to June 2003, 933 bodies and 32,000 relics have been recovered from the 29 major battlefield sites including Yeongcheon and Jincheon.

Unidentified bodies have been placed in the National Cemetery Charnel House, and identified bodies have been placed in the National Cemetery. 5 American remains were returned to the USA, 95 North Korean remains and 19 Chinese remains were buried in the North Korean and Chinese Cemetery in Jeokseongmyeon, Paju city. Also, to help the recovery of the remains in the DMZ and the North Korean area, a written document was published based upon the testimony from the veterans, previous residents of the area, and other relevant

historical documents. Recovering remains will continue long after 50th anniversary of Korean War.

Furthermore, “Regulations on Benefits and Support for National Heroes” was revised, so the veterans aged over 70 would receive a monthly honorary allowance and medical benefits. The restrictions with regard to the use of the National Cemetery were lightened so that not only the veterans themselves but also their spouses could be placed in the National Cemetery.

A newly launched search campaign for the bereaved family is on the move; it notifies the bereaved families of the information regarding their family members who died during the Korea War and of benefits they may claim. A variety of other programs for war veterans are now in the process of implementation. These programs are: constructing monuments for KIAs in each country; writing names of the military merit awardees on road signs; affixing doorplates at war veterans' houses; awarding honorary diplomas for war veterans; and constructing busts of military merit awardees and war heroes. In addition, other programs to honor war veterans include visiting veterans' homes for consolation, inviting veterans to national events, visiting wounded veterans, searching for war comrades and commemorating the dedicated war heroes.

In order to raise the spirit of national and international Korean War veterans and bereaved families, appreciation letters from the President were sent in June, 2000. Since there was a difficulty finding addresses for American veterans and bereaved families, MND has been consistently working on confirming the list through the mass media.

4. Inspiring Homeland Defense Consciousness for Post War Generations

In an effort to heighten homeland defense consciousness for post war generations, which constitute more than 70% of the population, the MND has been developing educational programs and carrying out various national defense cultural events. From 2000 to 2003, the contents concerning the

atrocities of the Korean War and separated families were revised and reflected in elementary, middle and high school curricula; 450,000 people visited Korean War photo exhibition and the DMZ special exhibition; the great march pilgrimage for national defense and barracks experience camping were executed. Through these various methods, MND has heightened homeland defense consciousness for post war generations.

5. Strengthening of Ties among Participant Countries of the Korean War

By expressing appreciation to allies, veterans, and the bereaved families of the Korean War, Korea not only lifts national credibility, but also strengthens security ties with participant countries of the Korean War.

To strengthen ties, representatives and veterans from war participant countries are invited to various Korean War commemoration events. Also, MND is actively supporting events of war participant countries and sending representatives of Korean government to major commemorations, such as memorial ceremonies for those who died in battle.

Furthermore, the Korean government attended America's memorial ceremony for soldiers killed in the Korean War and Canada's participation in the Korean War Memorial Event, which strengthened ties with these countries. Moreover, the Korean government awarded war medals to foreign soldiers, including those from US and New Zealand, who were not awarded medals because of the limitation of their national laws at that time. Nowadays, Korean



Ceremony for Korean War Veterans' Visit to Korea

government has been awarding war medals to veterans and bereaved families. Especially for those Americans who participated in the Korea War, appreciation letters from President were sent to express additional gratitude.

Since the inauguration of the Participatory Government, the MND is continually supporting Korean War related events, such as construction cost for monuments in participant countries, memorial events in US and other participant countries, the 50th anniversary of the ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty, and the visits by 1,430 foreign Korean War veterans from 21 nations and etc. Moreover, the Korean government is heightening confidence of Korean War veterans and strengthening ties among participant countries by inviting foreign Korean War veterans and their families to consolation events, by supporting memorial events at overseas missions, and by inserting special news on Korea in major international news organizations.

Appendices



Appendix 1

Status of Global Conflicts in 2002

■ Distribution of Regional Conflicts Stages: Conflicts in Progress 84, Ended Conflicts 17 (As of Nov, 2002)

Region	Armed Conflicts	Confrontational Conflicts	Potential Conflicts	Subtotal	Ended Conflicts
America (9)	Columbia	Mexico Peru	Falkland Islands	4	Guatemala ('97) Nicaragua ('96) Haiti ('94) El Salvador ('97) Peru-Ecuador ('99)
Africa (34)	DR Congo Sierra Leone Liberia Rwanda Burundi Somalia Angola Uganda Nigeria Chad Kenya Algeria Sudan	Namibia Nigeria-Cameroon Senegal Ethiopia Ethiopia-Eritrea Djibouti Southern Sahara Egypt Egypt-Sudan	Guinea-Bissau Lesotho Togo R Congo	26	Malawi ('97) Ghana ('96) Gabon ('97) South Africa ('97) Mali ('97) Mozambique ('94) Chad-Libya ('94) Niger ('00)
Middle East (13)	US · England-Iraq (Gulf war) Lebanon Turkey-Kurds Palestine Iran Iran-Iraq	Iran-UAE Iran-Afghanistan Iraq Israel-Syria	Iraq-Kuwait Israel-Jordan	12	Yemen ('94)
Asia (20)	Sri Lanka Afghanistan US-Afghanistan Kashmir Nepal Myanmar Indonesia Philippines India South-North Korea	Bangladesh Spratly Islands Kurile Islands Paracel Islands Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands China-Taiwan China-India Cambodia Tibet		19	China-Russia ('97)
CIS (10)	Russia-Chechnya	Georgia-Iphasia Moldova North Osetia-Ingush Azerbaijan-Armenia Estonia-Russia Uzbekistan Kyrgyzstan Tajikistan		9	The Black Sea ('97)
Europe (15)	Macedonia Kosovo Northern Ireland	Greece-Albania Cyprus Albania	Greece-Macedonia Romania Bosnia Voivodina Bulgaria Slovakia Aegean Sea Istria	14	Croatia ('98)
Grand Total (101)	(36) 34	(33) 35	15	84	
	Subtotal: 69				

※ Source: Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, "The Status and Prospect of Global Conflicts" (www.kida.re.kr)

Comparison of South and North Korean Military Capabilities

(As of Dec. 31, 2002)

Classification		South Korea	North Korea		
Troops	Total	691,000	1,170,000		
	Army	560,000	1,000,000		
	Navy	68,000 ¹⁾	60,000		
	Air Force	63,000	110,000		
Principal Force Capabilities	Units	Corps	13 ²⁾	19 ³⁾	
		Divisions	49	69	
		Brigades	19	67 ⁴⁾	
	Equipments	Tanks	2,400	3,700	
		Armored Vehicles	2,400	2,100	
		Field Artilleries	5,000	10,000	
		MRLs	200	4,400	
		SSM	20 (Launcher)	50 (Launcher)	
	Navy	Surface Vessels	Surface combatants	130	430
			Landing crafts	10	260
			Mine warfare vessels	10	30
			Support vessels	20	30
		Submarines/Submersibles	10	100	
	Air Force	Fighters	550	830	
		Special aircrafts	70 ⁵⁾	30	
		Support aircrafts	210	520	
Helicopters		700 ⁶⁾	330		
Reserve Troops		3,800,000 ⁷⁾	7,480,000 ⁸⁾		

※ 1) Marine Corps included

2) Special Warfare Command and Air Operation Command included

3) Artillery, Missile, and Light-Infantry included

4) Excluding about 50 Para-Military Training Units

5) Excluding Naval aircraft

6) All Army, Navy, Air Force Helicopters included

7) Police, Technical experts included

8) The Para-Military Training Units, Worker-Peasant Red Guard Units, and Red Youth Guard Units included

Appendix 3

North Korea's Missile Development and Capability

■ Chronology of Missile Development

- o '76, Introduction of USSR-made SCUD-B (two missiles) from Egypt, and Commencement of development in support of China's technology
- o '84/ '86, Successful test-firing of SCUD-B/ SCUD-C
- o May '93, Successful test-firing of Rodong-1
- o Aug. '98 Successful test-firing of Daepodong-1
- o Sep. '99, In preparation for the test-firing of Daepodong missile, declaring for postponement of test-firing
 - * North Korea's precedents of declaration for postponement of missile test-firing
 - Sept. 24, '99, Announcement for postponement of missile test-firing after the Agreement of US-North Korea's high rank talks
 - Oct. 25, '00, Re-declaration for deferment of missile test-firing during the visit of US Secretary Albright (the first comment about time limit of postponement on test-firing)
 - Sep. 17, '02, A demonstration of "Continuous postponement of missile test-firing after 2003" during the summit talks between Kim Jong-il and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi
 - *Recent instance of North Korea's suspension warning on postponement of missile test-firing
 - Jan. 11, '03, North Korea's prime ambassador in China said, "Because US breached every agreement US and North Korea had made, North Korea might withdraw from discontinuance of missile firing"

■ Capability and Threat Range of North Korea's Missiles

Classification	SCUD		Rodong-1	Daepodong-1	Daepodong-2
	B	C			
Maximum range (km)	300	500	1,300	2,000	6,000 (estimated)
Threatened area	Daejeon	South Sea	Okinawa	Japan/Taiwan	Alaska
Warhead weight (kg)	1,000	770	700	500~700	650~1,000
Hit error (m)	1,000	1,300	5,000	2,500	2,000~5,000 (estimated)

Combined / Joint Training and Exercises

1. ROK-US Combined Exercises

Name	Type	Purpose	Contents
Ulchi-Focus Lense (UFL)	CPX	Exercise Chungmu Plan and OPLAN 5027	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> National and ROK-US combined crisis management procedures Execution of OPLAN 5027 and US-ROK military coordination Support procedures for US reinforcement forces' deployment Procedures of military governance and civil operations
RSOI	CPX	Master procedures of the US reinforcement plan as well as ROK forces' support, mobilization, logistical supports, role of rear area coordinator	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Movement management of US reinforcements and exercise of the procedures of forces deployment Wartime host nation support (WHNS) Protection of airport and port of debarkation and exercise of controlling combined vessels Exercise of procedures of ROK vessels mobilization Commencement of collocated operation base (COB)
Foal Eagle	FTX	Combined special warfare operations, operational capability in the rear area, and joint operational capability improvement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Combined air / maritime maneuver exercise Exercise of counter-maritime special forces operations Exercise of combined special forces' execution of OPLAN 5027, defense of theater against guided missiles. Defense of key terrains in the middle and tactical assembly areas Corps level FTX and brigade level MILES FTX

2. Joint Exercises and Trainings (ROK Forces)

Name	Type	Purpose	Contents
Amnokgang Exercise	CPX	Improvement of war planning and operational command capabilities of the ROK JCS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Mastery of war deterrence, crisis management and war transformation procedures Establishment/development of situational contingency plan Decision on reinforcement required for operational control and mastery of command procedures
Hokuk Training	FTX	Improvement of the joint operations capabilities and establishment of military readiness	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improvement of counter infiltration operations capabilities Development of the joint operations capabilities Development of counter fire operations capabilities Development of survivability measures

3. Major Combined Trainings of Neighboring States

Name	Year	Participants	Contents
RIMPAC	Even year (May-July)	ROK, US, Japan, Canada, UK, Australia, and Chile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Offensive/defensive exercises at sea, naval gunfire training • Security of sea lines of communications (SLOCs) • Naval blockade and air attack
ROK-JAPAN Search and Rescue Training	Odd year (August- September)	ROK, Japan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Search and rescue training for stranded vessels
Pacific Reach	Even year	ROK, US, Australia, Japan, Singapore	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Submarine evacuation and rescue training in the west Pacific region.

Chronology of ROK-US Military Affairs

Year	Date	Main events
1945	Sep. 7	• US puts ROK under military government
	Nov. 13	• US establishes the national defense headquarter in the military governmental office.
1948	Aug. 15	• ROK government established, military government terminated
	Aug. 24	• A temporary military agreement on the security between ROK-US
	Sep. 1	• A temporary PMAG in ROK established
1949	Mar. 22	• US NSC announces a total withdrawal of USFK until Jun. 30th, 1949 (US NSC 8/2)
	Jul. 1	• Inauguration of US KMAG
1950	Jan. 26	• US-ROK mutual defense support treaty
	Jul. 9	• The 8th US Army headquarters establishes in Dae-gu
	Jul. 14	• President Lee, Seung-man entrusts General MacArthur with an operational control over ROKA
	Sep. 15	• Incheon landing operations by UN forces
1951	May 17	• US NSC confirms the termination of war with an armistice agreement(NSC 48/5)
	Aug. 17	• ROK office of the military attache in US established
1953	Oct. 1	• ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty
1954	Aug. 12	• ROK-US military conference, agreements on reinforcement of ROKA and replacement of equipment for reserved army
	Nov. 18	• ROK-US joint minute book signed • Consent on continuous operational control over ROKA to UNC Commander
	Nov. 23	• ROK-US military conference, discussing reinforcement of ROKA
1955	Jan. 14	• ROK-US military conference, consent on tripling ROK navy forces
	Jan. 28	• ROK-US conference on military support
	Jun. 21	• ROK-US conference on military economy (Washington)
1956	Dec. 2	• ROK-US joint military conference (Tokyo)
1957	Mar. 24	• ROK-US military conference (Washington)
	Jul. 1	• UNC, transferred from Japan to ROK
	Dec. 29	• Fix the number of ROK forces (630,000) according to ROK-US joint minute book.

Year	Date	Main events
1958	Feb. 19	• US State Department announces no will to withdraw USFK
1959	May 5	• ROK-US combined landing operations
1961	Apr. 18	• ROK assumes the control over ROKA training from USFK commander
	May 26	• Joint announcement by National Reconstruction Supreme Council and UNC on returning operational control over ROK revolutionary army
	Aug. 19	• ROK-US high-level military talks (Jin-hae)
	Oct. 13	• ROK-US combined commander's conference (The 8th US Army headquarters in Seoul)
1962	Mar. 17	• ROK-US high-level military talks (Washington)
	Apr. 13	• ROK-US high-level military talks (Consent on military aids program)
	May 1	• ROK-US high-level military talks (Consent on additional national defense budget)
1964	Dec. 19	• President Johnson requests President Park to dispatch ROK forces to Vietnam War
1965	Jan. 26	• A bill of dispatching troops to Vietnam passes in the ROK National Assembly
	Jun. 28	• ROK-US high-level military talks on the dispatching troops to Vietnam
	Sep. 6	• ROK-US military working-level agreement in Vietnam
1966	Jun. 22	• ROK-US defense ministers' talks (Washington); consult on the plan of modernizing ROK forces
	Jul. 9	• Signed SOFA agreement, abolished Daejon Agreement
1967	Sep. 5	• ROK-US high-level military talks (Consent on military aids program)
1968	May 7	• 1st ROK-US national defense cabinet meeting (Washington)
	Oct. 13	• 1st Focus Lens Exercise
	Oct. 15	• ROK-US operations planning staff groups' meeting; ROK's first participation in planning defense operations on the Korean Peninsula
1969	Mar. 16	• ROK-US combined airlift training in Focus Retina
	Jul. 22	• ROK-US defense ministers' talks on reduction in forces
1970	May 26	• ROK-US high-level military talks on reducing the number of USFK and modernizing ROKA equipment
	Oct. 14	• ROK-US military conference; mutual discussion on modernization of ROKA equipment and reducing forces
1971	Mar. 12	• ROKA takes over west front line of US 2nd Division area; guards whole area along the DMZ excluding JSA

Year	Date	Main events
1971	Mar. 27	• Withdrawal of US 7th Division
	Apr. 1	• US military advisory group in Korea changes its title to JUSMAG-K
	Jul. 1	• Establishment of ROK-US 1st Corps
	Jul. 13	• ROK-US national defense cabinet meeting changes its title to Security Consultative Meeting(SCM), held in Seoul
1973	Sep. 13	• 6th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1974	Sep. 24	• 7th round of ROK-US SCM (Honolulu)
	Nov. 22	• ROK-US summit meeting (US reconfirms security commitment on ROK)
	Dec. 12	• UNC announces to transfer its operational control to US JCS
1975	May 5	• Ulchi exercise (ROK) combines with Focus Lens exercise (US)
	Aug. 27	• 8th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1976	May 26	• 9th round of ROK-US SCM (Honolulu)
	Jun. 7	• 1st ROK-US combined military training initiated
1977	May 11	• ROK-US begin discussing about the reduction of the USFK
	Jul. 20	• 10th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1978	Jul. 6	• ROK -US sign on basic memorandum of understanding (MOU) for Korean model of tank
	Jul. 27	• 11th round of ROK-US SCM (San Diego)
	Jul. 28	• 1st round of ROK-US Military Committee (MC)
	Nov. 7	• Establishment of ROK-US Combined Forces Command (CFC)
1979	Jul. 20	• US President Carter announces revision of withdrawal of USFK
	Oct. 19	• 12th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1980	Mar. 14	• ROK-US 1st Corps reformed into ROK-US CFA
1981	Jan. 3	• ROK-US summit meeting (Issuing the joint statement with 14 clauses including the concealment of USFK withdraw)
	Apr. 30	• 13th round of ROK-US SCM (San Francisco)
	Jun. 19	• ROK-US naval maneuver training (East China Sea)
1982	Mar. 31	• 14th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1983	Apr. 15	• 15th round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)

Year	Date	Main events
1983	Dec. 8	• MOU on co-production of 155mm self-propelled artillery between ROK-US
1984	May 10	• 16th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul); ROK-US combined air - land joint training
	Jul. 25	• Memorandum of agreement(MOA) between ROK-US on selling stockpiles to ROK except for WRSA
1985	Feb. 15	• ROK government holds ROK-US standing committee on the issue of helicopters' export to North Korea
	May 8	• 17th round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
1986	Apr. 3	• 18th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
	Dec. 16	• US terminates providing FMS to ROK after 1987
1987	May 7	• 19th round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
1988	Apr. 29	• US administration commences demand for burden sharing for the Gulf War to ROK government
	Jun. 8	• ROK-US mutual logistics support treaty; ROK-US MOU on defense technology coordination
	Jun. 9	• 20th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1989	Jul. 18	• MOU between ROK and US on the use of technology in producing defense materiel within ROK
	Jul. 19	• 21st round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
	Aug. 2	• US congress adopts the "Nunn-Warner Amendmen"
1990	Feb. 15	• ROK-US Defense ministers' talks
	Jun. 25	• MOA between ROK and US on transferring "Yong-san garrison" to Osan, Pyung-taek area before 1996
	Nov. 15	• 22nd round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
1991	Jan. 25	• Agreement on establishing JUSMAG-K
	Feb. 1	• 1st modification of ROK-US SOFA
	Mar. 25	• Appointment of ROK general to the chief delegate of the UN side of Military Armistice Commission (MAC)
	Nov. 21	• 23rd round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul); en bloc agreement on ROK-US wartime support
1992	Apr. 24	• Appointment of ROKA officer to the company commander of JSA
	Jun. 25	• Disorganization of ROK-US field army headquarters
	Aug. 20	• US Air force in ROK deploys the first patriot missiles in ROK

Year	Date	Main events
1992	Oct. 8	• 24th round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
1993	Nov. 4	• 25th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1994	Oct. 6	• 26th round of ROK-US SCM(Washington); Agreement on redemption of peacetime operational control to ROK
1995	Nov. 3	• 27th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1996	Apr. 16	• 1st ROK-US combined wartime RSOI exercise
	Nov. 1	• 28th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1997	Dec. 9	• 1st round of plenary session of 4-way talks held, 29th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
1998	Jul. 9	• ROK-US defense ministers' talks
1999	Jan. 15	• 30th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul); Consent on defense burden sharing for 1999~2001
	Jan. 17	• 30th round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
	Jul. 29	• ROK-US defense ministers' talks
	Nov. 3	• 31st round of ROK-US SCM (Washington)
2000	Mar. 18	• ROK- US defense ministers' talks
	Jun. 13	• President Kim, Dae-joong visits Pyongyang; Summit meeting between South and North Korea
	Aug. 18	• General measure to compensate “Maehyang-ri” villagers for shooting range events
	Sep. 21	• 32nd round of ROK-US SCM (Seoul)
	Sep. 25	• South- North Korean defense ministers' talks
2001	Jan. 12	• Announcement of ROK-US joint statement on the compensation of “Nogeun-ri” event; construction of memorial tower, scholarship for the bereaved family
	Jan. 16	• Arrangement in ROK-US missile treaty; New Guideline on missiles
	Jan. 18	• 2nd modification of SOFA (7 fields including criminal jurisdiction, environment, labor, etc.)
	Nov. 15	• 33rd round of ROK-US SCM (Washington); concluding letter of intent on LPP
2002	Mar. 29	• MOA on LPP
	Apr. 4	• Consent on defense burden sharing for 2002 - 2004
	Dec. 5	• 34th round of ROK-US SCM (Washington), Consent on the improvement of SOFA procedures

Year	Date	Main events
2003	Apr. 8	• 1st meeting of “Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative”
	Jun. 4	• 2nd meeting of “Future of the ROK-US Alliance Policy Initiative”
	Jun. 27	• ROK-US defense ministers' talks (Washington)

Appendix 6

Chronology of Major Foreign Military Exchange and Cooperation

	Visits to ROK	Overseas Visits
Jan. 16-19, 2002	The 4th ROK-France policy working-level talks	
Jan. 20-27	Military educational representatives of China	
Jan. 21-25		ROK-Japan navy to navy meeting
Jan. 21-26		Air Force chief of staff to China
Jan. 28-Feb. 1		Asia-Pacific defense officials forum in Japan
Feb. 3-6		ROK-Japan security policy consultation meeting
Feb. 5	The 7th ROK-France defense industry and logistics joint committee	
Feb. 16-19	Vice Defense Minister of Australia	
Feb. 17-20	Army Chief of Staff, Japan	
Feb. 28-Mar. 9		Sangmu soccer team to China
Mar. 2	The 1st exchange students from Japan National Defense Academy to ROK Air Force Academy	
Mar. 3-Mar. 7		Logistics representatives to China
Mar. 4	The 1st ROK-Holland Defense Industry Committee	
Mar. 4-7	Western Corps commander of Japan	
Mar. 10-13	Air Force chief of staff, Japan	
Mar. 11-15	Group of junior officers, Japan	
Mar. 18-23	4 anti-terrorism experts of France	
Mar. 19-22	Commander of Army Force, Thailand	
Mar. 19-24	Superintendent of National Defense College, China	
Mar. 24-28	JCS college students of Thailand	
Mar. 25-29	Air defense working group of Japan	
Mar. 27	Ambassador of Poland	
Apr. 1-4	Naval vessels of Ireland	
Apr. 7-12		Minister of National Defense to Malaysia, Indonesia
Apr. 9-20	Military Advanced Research Agents of France	
Apr. 14-17	Minister of National Defense, Republic of the Philippines	

	Visits to ROK	Overseas Visits
Apr. 14-20	Diplomatic Strategy Research Agents of France	
Apr. 17-26		JCS Chairman to Turkey, France, and Germany
Apr. 18-28	Athletic representative group of China	
Apr. 19-21	Minister of Defense, Japan (4.20 Ministers' Talks)	
Apr. 21-28		Superintendent of National Defense University to China
Apr. 24-May 4		Navy chief of staff to Russia, Germany, and Italy
Apr. 27-May 3	National Defense University students of Pakistan	
Apr. 27-May 7	HALO team of China Air Force	
Apr. 29-May 2	44 Flying officer candidates of Japan, 2 ocean navigation exercise vessels	
May 8-11	The 1st visit of naval vessel, China to In-cheon Port	
May 13-16	The 4th ROK-UK defense working-level meeting	
May 12-14		ROK-US-Japan security conference in Japan
May 14	The 12th ROK-Japan air defense working-level meeting	
May 15-19	ROK-Russia maritime accident prevention committee	
May 12-20		Army chief of staff to Italy and Russia
May 19-23	Navy chief of staff, Pakistan	
May 26-Jun. 1	Superintendent of the 2nd Medical College, China	
Jun. 3-7	France Military Intelligence Agency (DPSD) visits to ROK Defense Security Command	
Jun. 10-15	The 7th ROK-China Defense Study Convention	
Jun. 11-15		ROK-Russia defense working-level meeting
Jun. 17-21	Commander of Turkey land forces	
Jun. 17-22		JCS College students to China
Jun. 18-23	Naval vessel of Germany	
Jul. 7-9	Minister of National Defense, UK	
Jul. 23-28	Politicians of China (Goodwill Emissary)	
Aug. 26-31		Vice-Minister of National Defense to China

	Visits to ROK	Overseas Visits
Aug. 28-Sep. 3. 2002		ROK-Russia JCS headquarters head-level meeting
Aug. 31-Sep. 6	National Defense University students of Bangladesh	
Sept. 2	Director of National Defense Research Agency to Japan	
Sept. 2-6	ROK-Australia defense working-level meeting	
Sept. 9-15	ROK-Japan maritime joint reconnaissance, rescue training	
Sept. 9-15		The 1st visit of transport aircraft and AWC students from Air Force to China
Sept. 9-15		Chairman of Defense Agency for Public Information Service to China
Sept. 24-25	ROK-Japan defense policy working-level meeting	
Sept. 24-28	Commander of Special Warfare Command (SWC), Vietnam	
Sept. 30-Oct. 4	Chairman of JCS, China	
Oct. 3-6	Air Force chief of staff, Japan	
Oct. 8-12	President of Vietnam Defense Science Technology Environment Center	
Oct. 8-15		Naval chief of staff to Japan
Oct. 13-16	Vice-director of Strategy Bureau of National Defense Department, France	
Oct. 17-19		ROK-China diplomacy-defense officials meeting
Nov. 4-6		Chairman of JCS to Japan
Nov. 6-12	Naval vessel of France to In-chon Port	
Nov. 9-13	Commander in chief, PACOM of France	
Nov. 10-13	Naval chief of staff, Japan	
Nov. 10-16		Minister of National Defense to Russia
Nov. 15-24		Air Force military band to Japan
Nov. 17-21	Commander of Training and Doctrine Command, France	
Nov. 17-21		Commander of Defense Security Command to China
Nov. 23-26	The 1st ROK-Spain defense working-level meeting	
Nov. 24-29	Naval deputy chief of India	

	Visits to ROK	Overseas Visits
Nov. 24-Dec. 3, 2002		Commander of SWC to Australia and New Zealand
Nov. 26-30	ROK-New Zealand defense working-level meeting	
Nov. 28	The 4th ROK-Spain defense industry and logistics committee	
Dec. 4-8	Commander in chief, Far East of Russia	
Dec. 8-12	Advanced Research Group of China National Defense College	
Dec. 10-14	Two naval vessels of Russia to Busan Portt	
Dec. 13-15	Chairman of JCS, Rumania	
Dec. 14-17	The 4th ROK-Japan JCS-unified forces head-level meeting	
Jan. 17-20, 2003	Director of intelligence department, China	
Feb. 12-15	Peace and Security Research Agency of Japan	
Feb. 13-16	Air Force chief of staff, Japan	
Feb. 16-21		ROK-Indonesia navy to navy meeting
Mar. 1-4	Naval vessels of Spain	
Mar. 4-7	Vice chief of staff of China	
Mar. 16-19	Chief of Defense Institute, Japan	
Mar. 28-30	ROK-Japan defense ministers' Talks (Mar. 29)	
Apr. 9-11	ROK-Russia defense ministers' Talks (Apr.10)	
Apr. 13-21		ROK-Russia defense industry and logistics committee
Apr. 24-27	Air Force chief of staff, Indonesia	
May 11-14		Air Force chief staff to Japan and Russia
May 18-23	ROK-Russia defense working-level meeting (May 19)	
Jun. 7-15		ROK-France-Japan defense working-level meeting

Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the PKO

■ UN Peace Keeping Operations

(As of June 2003)

Region		Unit(Personnel)	Period	Rotation Period	Total number of Personnel in a year	Approval of the National Assembly
Past Participation	Somalia	Engineer Battalions (252)	Jul. 1993~ Mar. 1994	6 months	504	
		Headquarters Command (6)	Dec. 1993~ Feb. 1995	6 months	12	
	Angola	Engineer Battalions (198)	Oct. 1995~ Dec. 1996	6 months	594	
		Headquarters Command staff (6)	Feb. 1996~ Feb. 1997	1 year	6	
Present Participation	East Timor	Infantry Battalions (250)	Oct. 1999~	6 months	3,244	
		Brigade Headquarters (8)	Jan. 2000~	1 year	84	
	India - Pakistan	Military Observers (9)	Nov. 1994~	1 year	75	
	Georgia	Military Observers (7)	Oct. 1994~	1 year	41	
	Western Sahara	Medical Units (20)	Sep. 1994~	6 months	442	
	Cyprus	Officer in Command (1)	Jan. 2002~	1 year	1	

※ Number of participants: Total number of personnel 5,003 / Current number of participants 295

■ Counter -Terrorism War

(As of June 2003)

Classification		Current number of personnel	Region	Date of Dispatch	Rotation Period	Total Number of Personnel	Approval of the National Assembly
Dong-e Forces (96)	Bagram Headquarters	48	Bagram	Oct. 2002	6 months	288	
	Manas Detachment Party	40	Manas	Feb. 2002	6 months		
	Kabul Detachment Party	8	Kabul	Aug. 2002	6 months		
Construction Engineer Unit		150	Bagram	Feb. 2003	6 months	150	
Naval Transport Supporting Unit		163	Singapore	Dec. 2001	3 months	986	
Air Force Transport Supporting Unit		78	Kim Hae	Dec. 2001	3 months	472	
Coalition Supporting Group (12)	USCENTCOM	5	Florida	Nov. 2001	1 year	11	
	USPACOM	2	Hawaii	Nov. 2001	1 year	6	
	CJTF-180	2	Bagram	Jul. 2002	6 months	4	
	Kuwait	3	Camp Doha	Apr. 2003	6 months	3	
Staff (4)	USCENTCOM	1	Florida	Nov. 2002	1 year	1	
	CJTF-180	2	Bagram	Jul. 2002	6 months	4	
	CJTF-HOA	1	Djibouti	Feb. 2003	6 months	1	

※ Number of participants: Total number of personnel 2,601 / Current number of participants 1,178

■ Gulf War / War in Iraq (As of May 2003)

- Gulf War (Jan. 1991 ~ Apr. 1991): 314 personnel (154 personnel of Medical Supporting unit, 160 personnel of Air Force Transport unit)
- War in Iraq (May 2003 ~): 675 personnel (575 personnel of Construction Engineer supporting units, 100 personnel of Medical supporting unit)

Status of ROK Armed Forces' Participation in the Iraq War

■ Chronology of Troop Dispatch

Date	Principal Matters
Nov. 20, 2002	The First request from the US (The US ambassador delivers a Non-Paper to the ROK minister of foreign affairs.) - Humanitarian support and post-war reconstruction support - Transportation, equipment, combat service support elements (engineer unit, medical unit and etc.), mine sweeping unit, etc
Dec. 27	Present review results to the US (The ministry of foreign affairs delivers a Non-Paper to the Korean embassy in the US) - Support to Iraqi refugees and neighboring countries, post-war reconstruction support possible - Military support: conversion of Afghan war deployment forces, additional support of 1 engineer company possible
Mar. 13, 2003	The Second request from the US (The US ambassador delivers a Non-Paper to the minister of foreign affairs.) - Short-term essential items for safety and security in Iraq, right after outbreak of war - Requested Items: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> ① Military support (infantry, engineer, etc.) ② Experts on WMD, explosive ordnance disposal ③ Decontamination after CBR attacks ④ Humanitarian & medical support, etc
Mar. 20. 11:30	US launches an attack on Iraq (05:30, Mar. 20, local time)
Mar. 20	NSC Standing Committee held, decided to dispatch construction engineer and medical unit
Mar. 21	Resolution of cabinet meeting to approve of troop dispatching to Iraq Resolution of Defense Committee, the National Assembly to approve of troop dispatch to Iraq
Mar. 22	Personnel selection announcement
Mar. 28-29	Plenary session of the National Assembly on troop dispatch
Apr. 2	Resolution of plenary session of the National Assembly to approve the troop dispatch
Apr. 4	Personnel selection (Competition Rate 2.7 : 1), the roster completed on 11th of April *Construction engineer of 575 men and medical support unit of 100 men
Apr. 7	Dispatching on-site coordination group of 3 men to Kuwait *1 man to the USARCENT (Apr. 3)
Apr. 17	Dispatching of the advance element (20 men)
Apr. 30	Dispatching of the 1st echelon (Medical support and construction engineer unit of about 326 men)
May 14	Dispatching of the 2nd echelon (Construction engineer unit of 329 men)

■ Status of Dispatch Forces (as of May 2003)

○ Personnel Conditions

Total	Construction Engineer supporting unit				Medical supporting unit			
	Sub-total	Officer	NCO	Enlisted	Sub-total	Officer	NCO	Enlisted
675	575	62	124	389	100	38	26	36

○ Deployment area

- Deployment location: US military base (Camp Aurthur) between Nasiriya and Talil Airport in Iraq
- 320km Southeast of Baghdad, population of 412,000
- Mostly Shia party, main economic source from agriculture

○ Mission

- Construction engineer supporting unit: Carrying out civil engineering and building works for the reconstruction of infrastructures
- Medical supporting unit: Humanitarian support to the local people and the POWs, medical treatment to the US and coalition forces

○ Combat service support

- Logistics support from the US 377 theater support headquarters
- Logistics requirements such as security, meal service, water supplies, and military quarters are provided by the US


○ Budget

(Unit: 100 million won)

Classification	Total	Allowance	Meal / Clothing	Equipment	Resource acquisition	Unit management	Transportation	Investment on combat power
Total	377	115	27	6	39	14	47	129
Construction Engineer	317	96	23	5	21	12	47	113
Medical Supporting	60	19	4	1	18	2	0	16

Organization of the ROK Ministry of National Defense and the Current Number of Military Personnel

(As of May 31, 2003)



(Unit: Person)

Classification	Total	Army	Navy	Air Force	Other
Total	758,292	606,818	74,683	69,339	7,452
Military personnel	691,600	558,993	67,906	64,701	-
Military civilians components	27,559	13,402	4,722	4,638	4,797
Civilian government officials	2,655	-	-	-	2,655
Full-time reservists	36,478	34,423	2,055	-	-

Force Integration Project of Major Military Equipment in 2003

	Type	2003 Force Integration Project (number)	Remarks
C4I & Intelligence War Capacity	Tactical communication system (SPIDER)	9	Domestic development/production
	New model of VHF wireless equipment	216	Produced with introduced technology (Licensed production)
	UAV	4	Domestic development/production (2 UAVs)
	Long-range radar	2	Foreign purchase
	Mobile radar	3	Foreign purchase
Maneuver & Strike Capacity	A large-caliber Multiple Gun (M/A)	18 / 50	Foreign purchase
	K-9 Self-propelled artillery	38	Domestic development/ production
	K1A1 tank	26	Domestic development/ production
	ROK mine scatterer	10	Domestic development/ production
Maritime & Landing Capacity	Destroyer (KDX - II)	1	Domestic construction
	Mine-sweeper	1	Domestic construction
	A vessel-to-air guided Missile	54	Foreign purchase
	Heavy Torpedo	25	Domestic development/ production
Aerial & Air Defense Capacity	Fighter (KF-16)	9	Produced with introduced technology (Licensed production)
	Basic training jet (KT-1)	19	Domestic development/ production
	Short-range anti-air guided weaponry	12	Domestic development/ production

Status of International Defense Industrial Agreements

Agreements on Cooperation in Defense Industry and Logistics	Agreements on Scientist and Data Exchanges	Agreements on Quality	Agreements on Providing Cost Information
US	US	US	US
United Kingdom	France	United Kingdom	United Kingdom
France	Italy	France	Germany
Italy	United Kingdom	Spain	
Spain	Israel	Swiss	
Indonesia		Canada	
Israel		Italy	
Thailand		Netherlands	
Malaysia		Belgium	
Philippines		Denmark	
Romania		Australia	
Canada		Philippines	
Russia		Germany	
Germany		Israel	
New Zealand		Turkey	
Netherlands		Indonesia	
Turkey		New Zealand	
Venezuela			
Vietnam			
Australia			
20	5	17	3

※ Bolded 11 countries are newly joined members of the Agreement since 1999.

Appendix 12

Status of Investment in Defense Research & Development

■ Annual Investment in National Defense R&D

(Unit: 100 million won)

Year	Defense Budget	FIP ¹⁾ Expenditure	R&D Expenditure Budget			R&D Expenditure to (%)	
			Force Investment	Operation Expense	Total	Defense Budget	FIP Expenditure
1997	137,865	48,836	3,432	1,211	4,643	3.4 (2.5)	9.5 (7.0)
1998	138,000	50,902	3,661	1,129	4,790	3.5 (2.7)	9.4 (7.2)
1999	137,490	52,304	5,960	1,051	7,011	5.1 (4.3)	13.4 (11.4)
2000	144,390	53,437	6,482	967	7,449	5.2 (4.5)	14.0 (12.1)
2001	153,884	52,141	5,888	1,027	6,915	4.5 (3.8)	13.2 (11.3)
2002	163,578	54,756	6,314	1,369	7,683	4.7 (3.9)	14.0 (11.5)
2003	174,264	57,328	6,349	1,511	7,860	4.5 (3.6)	13.7 (11.1)

※ The numbers shown inside the parentheses are pure R&D expenditures, not including the operation expenses.

※ 1) FIP: Force Improvement Program

■ 2004 - 2008 Mid-Term R&D Budget Program

(Unit: 100 million won)

Classification	Total	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
R&D Expenditures	76,040	11,255	12,888	14,781	17,188	19,928
Possession of Defense Budget (%)	6.3	5.4	5.8	6.1	6.6	7.2

Appendix 13

Status of Career Guidance Training before Retirement in 2002

■ Overview

(Unit: person)

Total	Private Institute	Commencement of an enterprise / Independent enterprise
1,834	855	979

■ Courses of Private Institute

(Unit: person)

Classification	Total	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	Warrant Officer	Command Sergeant Major/Master Sergeant	Sergeant First Class
Total	855	15	146	143	232	43	196	80
Army	809	14	140	135	225	35	185	75
Navy	38	-	4	5	7	7	10	5
Air Force	8	1	2	3	-	1	1	-

■ Commencement of an Enterprise / Independent Enterprise Process

(Unit: person)

Classification	Total	Colonel	Lieutenant Colonel	Major	Captain	Warrant Officer	Command Sergeant Major/Master Sergeant	Sergeant First Class
Total	979	78	56	87	80	185	397	96
Army	515	69	30	42	76	26	220	52
Navy	225	1	9	28	2	38	114	33
Air Force	239	8	17	17	2	121	63	11

■ Other Entrusted Educational Courses

(Unit: person)

Classification	Total	Field grade Officer	Company grade Officer	Warrant Officer	Non-commissioned Officer
Total	954	350	310	63	231
Social Accommodation Education	520	209	90	40	181
Independent enterprise education	434	141	220	23	50

Appendix 14

Status of Retirees Re-employment in 2002

(Unit: person)

Classi- fication	Employment rate				Affiliated organiza- tion	Contin- gency planners	Reserve troops comman- ding officer	Military civilian com- ponent	Welfare group service- members	General companies
	Rank	Dis- charged	Employed	Rate (%)						
Total	Total	3,090	850	27.5	5	48	122	21	13	641
	Colonel	189	49	25.9	2	22		6		19
	Lt. Colonel	433	110	25.4	1	24		3	2	80
	Major	652	282	43.3	2	2	96	8	2	172
	Captain	309	169	54.7			26	4		139
	WO	286	32	11.2					1	31
	CSM	628	48	7.6					7	41
	MS	240	41	17.1					1	40
SFC	353	119	33.7						119	
Army	Sub Total	2,200	565	25.7	3	42	121	8	12	379
	Colonel	119	25	21.0	1	18				6
	Lt. Colonel	377	91	24.1		22		2	2	65
	Major	494	180	36.4	2	2	96	3	2	75
	Captain	288	155	53.8			25	3		127
	WO	114	12	10.5					1	11
	CSM	459	31	6.8					6	25
	MS	188	26	13.8					1	25
SFC	161	45	28.0						45	
Navy	Sub Total	442	138	31.2	1	3	1	4	1	128
	Captain	33	14	42.4		2				12
	Commander	30	12	40.0	1	1				10
	Lt. Commander	41	18	43.9				3		15
	Lieutenant	10	9	90.0			1	1		7
	WO	40	6	15.0						6
	MCPO	100	8	8.0					1	7
	SCPO	24	7	29.2						7
CPO	164	64	39.0						64	
Air Force	Sub Total	448	147	32.8	1	3		9		134
	Colonel	37	10	27.0	1	2		6		1
	Lt. Colonel	26	7	26.9		1		1		5
	Major	117	84	71.8				2		82
	Captain	11	5	45.5						5
	WO	132	14	10.6						14
	CMS	69	9	13.0						9
	SMS	28	8	28.6						8
MS	28	10	35.7						10	

※WO: Warrant Officer
 MS: Major Sergeant
 MCPO: Master Chief Petty Officer
 CPO: Chief Petty Officer
 SMS: Senior Master Sergeant

CSM: Command Sergeant Major
 SFC: Sergeant First Class
 SCPO: Senior Chief Petty Officer
 CMS: Chief Master Sergeant
 MS: Master Sergeant

Composition of MND Budget by FY

(Unit: 100 million won)

Year	MND Budget		Current Operating Expense			Force Investment		
	Amount	Increase Rate	Amount	Increase Rate	Composition Rate	Amount	Increase Rate	Composition Rate
1982	31,207	15.7	19,392	18.2	62.1	11,815	11.8	37.9
1983	32,741	4.9	20,525	5.8	62.7	12,216	3.4	37.3
1984	33,061	1.0	20,122	△2.0	60.9	12,939	5.9	39.1
1985	36,892	11.6	21,845	8.6	59.2	15,047	16.3	40.8
1986	41,580	12.7	23,842	9.1	57.3	17,738	17.9	42.7
1987	47,454	14.1	26,001	9.1	54.8	21,453	20.9	45.2
1988	55,202	16.3	30,550	17.5	55.3	24,652	14.9	44.7
1989	60,148	9.0	34,155	11.8	56.8	25,993	5.4	43.2
1990	66,378	10.4	38,515	12.8	58.0	27,863	7.2	42.0
1991	74,764	12.6	44,988	16.8	60.2	29,776	6.9	39.8
1992	84,100	12.5	51,968	15.5	61.8	32,132	7.9	38.2
1993	92,154	9.6	57,981	11.6	62.9	34,173	6.4	37.1
1994	100,753	9.3	64,637	11.5	64.2	36,116	5.7	35.8
1995	110,744	9.9	71,032	9.9	64.1	39,712	10.0	35.9
1996	122,434	10.6	79,772	12.3	65.2	42,662	7.4	34.8
1997	137,865	12.6	89,032	11.6	64.6	48,833	14.5	35.4
1998	138,000	0.1	87,098	△2.2	63.1	50,902	4.2	36.9
1999	137,490	△0.4	85,186	△2.2	62.0	52,304	2.8	38.0
2000	144,774	5.3	91,337	7.2	63.1	53,437	2.2	36.9
2001	153,884	6.3	101,743	11.4	66.1	52,141	△2.4	33.9
2002	163,640	6.3	108,884	7.0	66.5	54,756	5.0	33.5
2003	174,264	6.5	116,936	7.4	67.1	57,328	4.7	32.9

Appendix 16

Defense Budget of Select Powers

(Unit: constant in 2001)

Country	GDP (US\$ 100 million)	Defense Budget (US\$100 million)	GDP to Defense Budget(%)	Personnel (thousand persons)	Military Expenditure per Capita (US\$)
ROK	4,222	119	2.8	690	252
US	102,000	3,224	3.2	1,368	1,128
Japan	41,000	395	1.0	240	310
China	12,000	460	4.0	2,310	36
Russia	15,220	637	4.3	977	440
Taiwan	2,900	104	3.7	370	472
United Kingdom	14,000	347	2.5	211	583
France	13,000	329	2.6	274	553
Germany	18,000	269	1.5	308	328
Israel	1,100	104	9.5	164	1,673
Egypt	938	43	4.7	443	62
Saudi	1,760	243	14.1	201	1,156
Australia	3,580	68	1.9	51	350
Turkey	1,480	72	5.0	515	107
Malaysia	870	32	3.8	101	144
Thailand	1,120	18	1.7	306	29
Singapore	850	43	5.1	61	1,044

※ Source: The Military Balance 2002-2003 (Korean data was based on the Government Statistics)

**PARTICIPATORY GOVERNMENT
DEFENSE POLICY**

2003

